

241 From Mexico it is reported that eight travelers arriving from Guatemala... [Repeats #293-081.]

244 A Reuters reporter yesterday afternoon... [Repeats #293-107, which obviously came first.]

276 Flash! Flash! [Repeats 175 above.]

328 Attention EL-4 sabotage group. [Repeats 128 above, in which group was referred to as S-4.]

330 Attention. Our first broadcast will be at 2000 hours on 3420 Kcs. And at 2300 hours, we will have a special broadcast in three languages for all journalists and radio producers around the world.

340 Guatemala. The taking of Chiquimula is a historic event. 24 June 1961, glorious date which marks the moment our Army opened the first crack in the government's ranks. Viva Guatemala! Viva Colonel Castillo Armas! Viva the National Army!

365 Back again at 2000 hours, and a special program at 2300 hours in three languages. [Anthem.]

26 June 1982

CASSETTE 4296

006 [Author, Station, Identification.]

037 Attention Guatemala, Attention National Army. We now the Special Communique from the High Command of the Liberation Army which was broadcast several times today. The High command informs that the following are the conditions for re-establishment of peace and order throughout the country.

First, the Army is not our enemy and we are not the Army's enemy. The enemy of both is communism, personified by Jacobo Arbenz, Cruz Wier, etc.

Second, we appeal to all members of the army to arrest all known members and sympathizers of the communist party.

Third, we appeal to senior army officers to capture Arbenz and establish an interim military junta.

Fourth, the interim junta should immediately instruct, should instruct all units to arrest all communists and prepare to join forces with the liberation army to restore order. These orders should apply to Civil Guard units under army control.

Fifth, the interim junta will establish the hour for a cease-fire, giving all commanders at least three hours notice. Immediately thereafter, the decision to form a new government should be announced over TICO or Radio Merida. The Executive Committee of the Liberation Army will immediately establish contact with the interim junta.

With this, this call is made to the army in the name of humanitarianism, and before God, to thereby avoid the useless shedding of blood and the devastation of our beloved Guatemala.

Sixth, until these conditions are met, the Liberation Army will continue increasing its attacks using all its human and military power to destroy communism and all those who make common cause with it.

General Headquarters, 26 June 1982.

062 Arbenz, in his desperation at being unable to control the public fury and the relentless advance of the Liberation Army, is planning with his thug Cruz Wier, the genocide of anti-Communists. Cruz Wier has already ordered all governors to arrest all known anti-Communists. On our 2340 hours program tonight we will give all details of this criminal machination of Arbenz.

115 Attention Conalia. Tonight you should blow up the bridge located in Sector 5-21. Leonardo taking oral instructions. Then proceed with Plan Mercedes. Good luck.

132 Attention Guatemala, measurement, Rafael Factory. Fury says, Arben should arrive. Giga."

147 The Army of Liberation continues its march on all fronts. Tonight at 2300 hours on 3420 kc we will give a full report on today's developments.

169 Message from Col. Carlos Capilla Armas to the Catholic people of Guatemala. [A lengthy message is read in which CCA associates the political objectives of the liberation movement with ideals of the Catholic Church, and calls on all Catholics to join the holy fight against communism.]

270 Radio Liberation signs off. Now up at 2300 hours on 3420 kc.

24 June 2000

CASSETTE 4295

106 [Attention. Station identification.] Attention. "Medico, Fabricio, Rafa" 40 days. Article date "Aguo, Oga" [Measurement. Factory. Rafa]. 40 days. Artist should arrive. Oga." Purports to be a military or agent message.]

107 Attention Guatemala. As we promised in our last broadcast, here is the complete and final text of the regular message sent by the assassin Rogelio Cruz Vito, Director General of the Police [sic] to the governors throughout the republic. We obtained this message through the collaboration of one of the many senior officers who have joined our ranks today.

"June 25, 1984. Time: 1940. Frequency: 3400 kcs. From Guatemala. To all Department Governors in the Republic. Capture immediately all mayors and other anti-Communist officials currently affiliated with parties of the revolution who in your areas have been previously identified as anti-Communist. Keep them in prison, and at the first shot fired when you are attacked, shoot them immediately. Acknowledge message. Signed, Cruz, Director General of the Civil Guard."

108 Attention Corinto. Tonight you should blow up the bridge located in Sector H-2x. Lookards comes oral instructions. Then, proceed with Plan Mercedes. Good luck.

109 Attention chief of the Jutiapa military zone. You have seen our enormous power. You have seen our air force in action. You have seen our more than 1,500 men. You have seen just this afternoon how we can blow up a bridge in seconds. You know your time is coming. And you know what will happen to you and your troops if you do not choose the path of honor, joining the forces of the Liberation Army. Think of your country, think of your troops, think of military honor, think of the flag to which you were allegiance. The Liberation Army opens its arms to you. Raise a white flag tomorrow. Think about this.

110 Attention Four White Feathers. Congratulations for your brilliant work in Tilapa, Chalatenango, Agua Blanca and El Ralito. Keep up the good work. You will receive reinforcements.

111 We remind everyone to stay away from possible military targets. Anyone close to them is in danger. Also, we remind that all motorized vehicles have been declared military targets.

112 Attention Aviatico pilots. We have reliable information that Aviatico planes are being used to transport mercenaries recruited in Mexico by the ambassador of Roberto Alvarado Fueno. You are therefore warned that Aviatico planes are declared military targets. Any Aviatico plane disobeying orders from our fighters will be shot down.

113 Attention Guatemala. [Results Cruz Vito in 040 above.]

114 Attention Guatemala and reporters. Here is the Liberation Army's Communiqué #27:

1. The military front remained calm as no enemy troops were encountered except for the Zapatista guerilla, where a couple of deathrate and suicidal groups presented some resistance.
2. Today the air force made several attacks, principally in Zacapa. In the last three days our planes have stopped all train traffic in the northeast, and our saboteurs have isolated Zacapa from the capital by cutting telegraphic lines. Puerto Barrios is in the same situation.
3. In the southern part of the battle zone, two of our columns march on the capital. Advance parties are at the moment about 60 kilometers from the city.
4. Despite government threats, anti-Communists throughout the country continue their sabotage activities by cutting lines.
5. Yesterday, 23 June, the High Command gave many hours' advance warning of the air attack that left Matamoros Perdido in flames.

(cont'd.)

CASSETTE 1988 (cont'd.)

6. Today, 26 June, the High Command announced that the only way to achieve a quick peace would be the arrest of Arbenz and gang.

7. Col. Carlos Castillo Armas met today with air force commander Col. Rosendo Mendez Azurduy to discuss planes and results. They met by the Chiquimula shores which, despite government claims to the contrary, is in perfect condition.

These have been the most important developments in today's war news. Tomorrow we expect to provide very important news which, for now, cannot be revealed for reasons of military security.

357. Attention chief of the Juarez military zone. [Repeats message from 320 above.]

367. [Reminder to stay away from military targets, and that motorized vehicles are targets.]

379. Battalion 2. [Anthem.] Next regular broadcast at 1300 on 6360 kcs.

005 Sign On [variant]. Attention, Guatemala. Radio Liberation, the clandestine station of the great Liberation Movement, taking news to all parts of the republic, broadcasting from operations headquarters at a secret place in liberated territory. [Music.]

025 The Brazilian foreign minister, referring to the resignation presented by the Guatemalan government to the Security Council of the UN, said the current Guatemalan situation is an American problem that should be solved in the Organization of American States (OAS). He said the case presented by Guatemala before the Security Council has been ignored before our very eyes by the sudden solidarity and vote of the Soviet Union. [Music.]

042 News item: For the first time since the beginning of the liberation action in Guatemala, the free world is realizing what is happening in that country. Foreign correspondents are arriving in San Salvador, Tegucigalpa and Mexico City after having witnessed events there, and have started to write reports that could not be sent from Guatemala because of the Arbenz regime's censorship. The famous Mexican photographer Jesus Diaz was expelled from Guatemala on the 23rd of this month, after having four ribs broken by army troops. [Gives other purloined accounts of foreign journalists.]

057 United Nations. The Soviet delegate is not a gentleman, according to his own words. "I am not a gentleman, I am the representative of the Soviet Union," he said, during a debate on the Guatemala issue.

070 Flash! Flash! The Mexican government has announced the results of its investigation of the Guatemalan government's claim that it had hit and forced a rebel airplane to land in Mexico, and that the plane's two American pilots were in a Mexican hospital. The Mexican record says the plane was a single engine tourist plane, on a flight to Bogota, that it had not been hit by anti-aircraft fire, and was not equipped to drop bombs or conduct reconnaissance.

100 Attention, residents of the capital. We repeat our oft-expressed warning to abndon residences near military installations, communications centers and military training grounds. This is our last warning. Arbenz government officials: when the government uses the TOW to make such a scandal of an old man and a child having been killed on a train near Zarcero, why is it that you permit women, children and old people to travel on trains laden with troops in combat zones? Is it because you cannot acknowledge the situation that exists in those areas? If indeed there have been innocent victims of our air force, this has been due exclusively to their having been in combat zones or near military targets. The fault lies solely with the salaried propagandists of the TOW who cannot acknowledge the despair that exists among government forces in Zarcero and allow innocent people into combat areas.

120 Attention, residents of Quetzaltenango. Because of the Arbenz government's stubbornness, we must continue our military campaign to the end. All residents of Quetzaltenango should avoid going near the studio of Radio Minas, because as of this moment [Radio Minas is considered a military target. [Sound effect: Bomb explosion.]

150 Flash! Flash! Our intelligence service's sources report that Jacobo Arbenz has refused to follow the advice of a group of senior military officers to withdraw his support from communist leaders unconnected in his government. "We rid ourselves of the communists, we will have peace in the republic," said the military officers, "otherwise much blood will be shed because the Liberation Army has complete control of the air and ground." Arbenz responded that he preferred suicide to surrender. This information was provided by a senior military officer who, along with many others, fights along with the force of national liberation.

160 Attention, residents of Quetzaltenango. [Repeats 133 above.]

[Cont'd.]

213 Attention, members of the National Army. Many times we have warned you of how the Arbenz regime and the communists are taking our country to ruin, and how they intend to destroy the national army. Evidently this fall on deaf ears, but now you can see for yourselves. You have now seen how, after you were sent to Zacapa to confront our victorious forces, you were replaced by peasants and workers comprising the popular militia, people who are loyal to their communist bosses and who hate the national army. It is incredible that you support the designs of international communism. Even if the government forces were to win this civil war, which is impossible because they have been cut off from their communications and supplies, these peasants would have the power in their hands upon your return from the front. That is still true. Tomorrow will be too late, because you will die at the hands of that infuriated gang that has no country, no ideals, but fights only for the defense of international communism. Do your part. Join the forces of liberation, come join the fight in defense of our Fatherland, our people, our homes, justice and liberty.

270 Attention, people of Guatemala. We have for you the text of a message sent, by the assassin Rogelio Cruz Vila to all the governors of the republic. We obtained this text thanks to the collaboration of one of the many senior officers who have joined our forces in recent days. The message reads as follows:

June 26, 1954, From Guatemala. To all Department Governors in the Republic.
Capo: Immediately all mayors and other anti-Communist city officials currently affiliated with parties of the revolution who in your areas have been previously identified as anti-Communists. Keep them in prison, and at the first shot fired when you are attacked, shoot them immediately. Acknowledged receipt. Signed, Cruz, Director General of the Civil Guard.

This message speaks clearly of those who say they govern our country democratically. It proves once again the rightlessness of our struggle. And it constitutes still another warning to members of the national army, on whom we have called on innumerable occasions, since they are the ones responsible for stopping these cowardly assassinations. We promise now that these killers will be placed in the hands of the judicial system, accused of war crimes, accused of high treason!

316 Lt. Col. Oscar Mendez Arendia, brother of Colonels Rodolfo and Miguel Mendez, has joined the ranks of the liberation army. He has resigned his position as military attaché in Cuba because he does not want to continue serving a regime of blood (but suffocates the Guatemalan people). Follow the example so worthy of imitation, soldiers of the Fatherland! Welcome, Col. Oscar Mendez, the Army of Liberation opens its arms to you.

911 Despite our humanitarian instincts, we will not be able to pardon three killers of the people who have already committed the most abominable crimes in areas that have fallen under our control. Many Guatemalans have fallen to the nephews of communist leaders, for the mere fact of being anti-Communists. All those who have committed these crimes will be put in the hands of the judicial system and tried as war criminals. Assassins! Barbarians! Traitors! That's what they should be called!

355 CGW of Guatemala, next of kin! TGW speaks out in anger. While the government insists that it has everything under control, it is bulimic and not on TGW suggest otherwise. TGW today told residents of the capital that the shots heard in the city are from training being conducted by the popular militia. Training? Could that be true? Or is it that the government has already ordered the cowardly execution of all anti-Communists, as Cruz Vila's orders all governors did? Or is it that our advance troops are already in view? But if it is true that it is due to militia training, this is irrefutable proof for the armed forces that they are already being replaced by the communist shock troops. TGW also said today that the situation is "variable" at the Chiquimula and Zacapa fronts, despite having announced a few moments earlier that they had complete control. The truth is that Chiquimula has been definitively liberated, and the proof is in the reporting of war correspondents who have already interviewed Col. Carvajal Armas at that location. And Zacapa is totally

(con'd.)

CASSETTE #243 (cont'd.)

surrounded by our troops and totally isolated. (Edn') In fact, the army bulletin of the 28th report that Zacapa and Chiquimula were many cities? Why call them that if they are under government control? TGW has also reported the call-up of reserves. If reserves are called, is it because everything is under control? Why hasn't TGW reported that the Matamoros Fort was totally destroyed by our air attacks, and that that happened after the civilian population had been warned by our broadcasts throughout the entire previous day? Why does TGW continue trying to fool the entire country and the army by using without propaganda techniques employed during World War II? They're the only ones being fooled!

426 So ends another Radio Liberation broadcast. Important news today at 11:00 PM sharp. Viva la Guatemala!

27 June

CASSETTE #137

006 Special Sign On, Atlantico, Guatemalan! This is Radio Liberation, voice of the liberation movement, transmitting from liberated territory! Here's the news. [Anthem plays out.]

029 We joyously announce that one of our objectives in our struggle against the communists who sold out our country has been attained: Jacobo Arbenz has resigned. The resignation demonstrates the power of the army of liberation. There is more to be done - we are fighting international communism on our soil. This announcement gives us joy, but we are not satisfied. We are going to suspend our programming for this moment to await communication from the high command of the liberation army, which we will then pass on. For now, we will say the people demand more than this. Be sure, we will be passing on the communication from the high command. [Anthem] [Repeats above twice.]

174 Music stops. Off the air. No Sign Off.

27 June

CASSETTE 4298

058 [Anthems. Station identification - 0340 hrs.]

020 Women of Guatemala. Don't let your menfolk fight on the side of the communists and traitors.

036 Since early yesterday afternoon, the unions in the capital have been summoned to the labor centrals in order to receive weapons. The government claims it only wants to have sufficient reserve force, but the truth is even the Foreign Ministry staff people are being forced to receive weapons.

070 Attention electricians, radio operators, telegraphers - collaborate by cutting cables. There is no danger because these lines carry no current.

083 Attention Guatemala. As promised in earlier broadcasts, we are going to repeat ... [repeats Cruz War order of Cassette #036-040. It was obtained from a senior officer who came over "in recent days."]

118 Attention chief of the Jutiapa military zone. [Repeats message of #295-337.]

143 [Reminder to stay away from military camps, and about motorized vehicles, per #295-165 et al.]

160 Attention Guatemala. Here is Communiqué #97 [reprints message from Cassette #295-271.] These have been the most important news from the war actions of yesterday, 26 June. Tonight at 2300 on 3420 hrs we will give report on war news that we cannot give today for reasons of military security [sic].

297 Rerungrams continue to arrive at this headquarters reporting that hundreds of Guatemalans are joining the great Army of Liberation. 500 were seen in yesterday in Chiquimulas. Today the number of volunteers is more than 1,100. Real volunteers, who have joined the march to the capital.

218 Lt. Col. Oscar Mendoza Azurdia, brother of the colonels Rodolfo and Miguel, has joined our glorious movement. [Same report as Cassette 243-316.]

224 Communist organizations continue to summon their followers to receive arms and training. These, members of the National Army, are the popular militias we have been warning about for so long. This is the popular army called up to replace the national army. You must stop this crime!

254 Message of support for the Arbenz regime are coming from communist organizations around the world. The mads have issued the order to use the Guatemala issue as a basis for agitation. The more such messages are received, the more clearly everyone sees how the government is a tool of the Kremlin.

274 Even though we want to keep to our humanitarian line, we will not be able to pardon the executioners and torturers of the people who have already committed the most abominable crimes in the areas that have fallen under our control. All those who have committed such crimes will be put in the hands of the judicial system and tried for our crimes.

291 Reports continue to come in from all over the country reporting uprisings everywhere. That's

(Cont'd.)

because they've had it. They're fed up with all the crimes and abuses. The cry is unanimous across the nation. Out with the communists. Viva Guatemala! Viva! The chains are breaking! [Anthem.]

322 Attention commander of the Jutiapa military zone. [Repeats message from Cassette #298-119.]

356 All Catholics around the world have prayed today, Sunday, for God to bring peace and tranquility to Guatemala.

365 [Antwerp.] Next regular broadcast will be at 2000 hours on 2420 Kev. And on the 2300 hours broadcast we will give you a summary of the military activity of today, Sunday.

26 June

CASSI/TE 4712

037 Sign On (voiced). Radio Liberation broadcasting from Liberation Army Headquarters.

038 Attention, people, army. We have listened carefully to the words of Col. Carlos Enrique Diaz, in whose hands Arbenz left the presidency. Just more of the same, same theater as when Averroes left. But this time we will not be fooled. Our fight was not just against Arbenz, but against the system, international communism. We do not recognize this government. Army - you owe no allegiance to Diaz. The time to choose is now.

039 We inform the people and the army. The bases and conditions for our actions remain as before:
first, the army is not our enemy, our enemy is communism....
second, we appeal to the army to arrest all known communist party members...
third, we call on senior army officers to prevent the flight of Arbenz, and establish an interim, military junta...
fourth, the interim military junta should direct all military units to carry out the arrest of all communist leaders, and prepare to join forces with the liberation army....
fifth, the interim junta should announce the time of cease-fire, notifying all field commandants three hours before the fact, and then immediately announce this action over TGW... the liberation army will then immediately establish contact with the interim junta...
sixth, this call is made to the national army in the name of God and Fatherland to avoid needless bloodshed...
seventh, until those conditions are accepted, the liberation army will continue increasing its pressure.

These are the only conditions for peace for our country. Colonel Diaz, you have until 0800 hours to accept. Our air force is poised to act today and will bomb military targets in the capital, and will do so continuously until you, Colonel Diaz, accept these conditions. Response before 0800 via TGW, repeat your decision..... we will repeat this message constantly until 0800 hours. This is Radio Liberation, operating from Headquarters in liberated territory. Thanks to the world's stations that are rebroadcasting us. [Music]

180 Music ends. No Sign Off.

28 June

CASSETTE #241

066 Sign On (variant). Transmitting from the Liberation Army's headquarters at some secret place in Guatemala, in liberated territory, Radio Liberation on the air. [Long and spirited oration built around the three theme-words Truth, Justice and Work.]

067 Attention Guatemalans. Attention Guatemalans. The High Command of the Liberation Army waited until 0800 today for the response of the new government headed by Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz in order to re-establish public order and tranquility throughout the nation, thereby avoiding the useless spilling of blood. The response from Col. Diaz was not heard on The Voice of Guatemala or any other government station, with the result that the High Command and Executive Committee of the Liberation Movement [inform the entire nation that our struggle will continue forward until returning to the people their rights and liberties. We will not vacillate in continuing our bombing of military targets, in the capital as well as the various battle fronts, until achieving the total elimination of international communism from our national soil. The transfer of power from the traitor Jacobo Arbenz to Col. Diaz does not signify any change. The same systems are functioning. They will allow the escape of our criminals who should be tried by the nation's tribunals, and Col. Diaz himself has said he will continue the battle against the liberation movement with the support of the revolutionary political parties and popular organizations that back the Arbenz regime. In July of 1960 [Counter 061] goes into some history illustrating other acts of deceit by the Arbenz-Arbenz people, but insisting that the people will no longer be fooled by this (so-called) [With their changes they want us to think they have moved to moderation. But it is not Jacobo Arbenz, the man, that we want, we want the entire system. We want justice, justice and justice, and punishment as well. Replacing Rogelio Cruz Wier with a thug just as bad or worse, like Jose Luis Morales Melgar, hasn't fixed anything. Cruz Wier must answer for all the horrendous crimes that he committed. We regret that Col. Diaz did not respond to our offer. Our bombings will increase. We need a quick victory to avoid further bloodshed. Citizens should stay away from military installations as we continue on to the capital, and remember that all motorized vehicles are military targets. We will soon be with you! We thank the stations of the free world that are re-broadcasting our statements. Attention, National Army and Civil Guard. Now is your opportunity to shake off the yokes. Today or never. Capture Jacobo Arbenz and his colleagues. Arbenz' retreat is nothing but a trick, he is still running everything. [Does an attack Morales Melgar and Col. J. Antonio Barrios, respective replacements for Cruz Wier and Judicial Guard chief Jaime Roseberg.] Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, commander of the Liberation Army, invites all officers and soldiers of the National Army to join the ranks of the Liberation Army which is marching to victory in the nation's capital. He calls on the people not to be fooled by the government's (posed) acts.]

068 The Liberation Army's air and ground forces continued this morning to pummel the defenders of the government. You are listening to Radio Liberation, the station of the Liberation Army.

069 Attention, residents of the capital. We warn all those who live near military installations to abandon their homes immediately to avoid the bombing attacks that we will carry out starting today. It is possible that we could attack this very afternoon or this evening one of the many military targets which are marked on our plans. Every citizen should avoid these military installations.

070 Fleet Fleet. A news bulletin from Mexico reports that Mexico City authorities today captured a shipment of 100 million bullets and several hundred rifles, pistols, etc., that were en route to Guatemala.

071 A brief biography of Col. Carlos Enrique Diaz, the puppe replacing Arbenz on Moscow's orders. Diaz is a pure communist; trained by Moscow's agents in Prague. He is not a true soldier, but a puppet of the Kremlin, as was made clear by his words of last night. He has formed a government of personal friends and communist agents. This is the new Kremlin puppet.

(cont'd.)

CASSETTE #241 (cont'd.)

366 The latest! We have learned of a change in the government of Col. Diaz, who agreed to share the presidency with Colonels Jose Angel Sanchez and Eliezer Montez. There are also rumors of the resignation of Foreign Minister Toriello, and of a sudden trip by Arbenz to Argentina. Well give you all the details on our next program at 11:00 PM sharp on 3420 mcs. Be listening!

366 There is a game currently going on in Guatemala, with the effort being made to convince people that the reasons for the people having taken up in armed revolt have now been eliminated by the nominal replacement of the president and apparent closing of the communist party. But nobody is fooled, we Guatemalans know about these tricks, and we are not biting. Either the demands of the High Command are met, or we will continue our insinable march to the capital. If they are not met, we will consider the current *de facto* government as just a masquerade, nothing but a prolongation of the previous one. And we will not accept that.

466 Sign Off (variant). Will be back at 11:00 PM on 3420 mcs.

SOURCE CASSETTES



SYNOPSIS
OF
SOURCE CASSETTES

CASSETTE) 474

105 (Badly distorted signal.) *Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia*, apparently presented by a student federation. Garbled to the point of being largely indecipherable.

110 *Tribuna de la Libertad*. *El Monasterio del Siglo Veinti* (Signal is now clearer.) 8th episode. Lt. Col. Carlos Castillo Armas recovered after being "executed" by a firing squad. Provides details of his subsequent incarceration. Dismantles prayers offered by Castillo Armas, a visit by his wife, conversations with other prisoners. The year is 1950.

115 Sloganeering around the symbols God, Fatherland and Liberty (very garbled again)

120 Martial music (garbled).

200 *Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia*. *Tribuna de la Libertad*. *El Monasterio del Siglo Veinti*. 10th episode. Debate in the Congress over the request for amnesty presented by Castillo Armas on behalf of all political prisoners. Congress denies the petition. Castillo Armas tells other prisoners to develop an escape plan.

416 *Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia*. The Committee of Anti-Communist Students of Guatemala presents *Tribuna de la Libertad*. *El Monasterio del Siglo Veinti*. (chapter number distorted, unlistable). Congress has denied the amnesty petition. Castillo Armas again speaks to other political prisoners, telling them to develop several escape plans from which they will choose. Some are presented, but rejected by Castillo Armas, who presents one of his own. It's accepted by the others, and they all sign a pact of secrecy.

650 Type finally ends. No Sign Off.

CASSETTE 499

004 No Sign On. [Refrain 2.]

016 Hello, Guatemala. Radio Liberation returns to the airwaves after a prudent withdrawal caused by circumstances. We are persecuted by the communists and Arbenz, and as a result we are occasionally forced to miss some of our regular contacts with you, either to evade their surveillance or to change our broadcast site. The need to reacquire the equipment has occasionally forced us to miss some broadcasts, and this will happen again. [Music.]

017 Again noting they have had to find a new broadcast site. [Music.]

112 This is Radio Liberation. Again asks forgiveness for irregularity in their recent programs. [Music.] [Refrain 5, Refrain 6.] [Music.]

209 This is Radio Liberation. Again explains the problem. Now we're back on schedule. [Music.] [Refrain 3, Refrain 4, Refrain 5, Refrain 2.] [Music.]

320 Radio Liberation back on the air. Again seeks forgiveness. [Refrain 2.] [Martial music.]

416 Music ends. No Sign Off.

NOTE: From the context, this tape may have been played in the aftermath of the purported attack on the transmitter site on 24 May (Cassette 497)

CASE STUDY 30

006 No Sign On. Rehats 2. Announcement of a special 30 minute program of classical music, *[in Alex de la Musica Que No Puede Escoltar].* Announcer reminds listeners that police are constantly on the search for their transmitter; in order to thwart police, they have recently moved to a new secret site and are now headquarters their equipment; hence this special musical program. It is clear that the station has missed at least some transmissions. Plays Paris Radio Symphonic Orchestra, Ravel's "Bolero" and others.

230 Radio Liberation is pleased to retransmit its broadcasts which were interrupted due to the need to evade police and communist groups' search for the transmitter. We are constantly eluding this chase, and as a result we may have to cancel one or another transmission. If you don't hear us on a given day on our frequency, be sure to tune in the next day because we will be there. Also, in order to elude the government's effort to jam our transmitter, we are occasionally forced to vary our frequency a bit from our standard 6360 kilocycles and 3420 kilocycles. So, if you don't find us there, go up or down a few kilocycles and you will find us.

266 Continues with the special musical program. ABC Symphony Orchestra, "Waltz of the Flowers" from The Nutcracker Suite.

360 Repeats above notice.

386 Abbreviated Sign Off.

206 No Sign Off. Relein 8. Relein 2. [3420 kca]

208 *Los Asesinatos de Alvaro Trujillo* The conduct of the Guatemalan delegation to the International Conference of Caracas was a defense of the role of communism in the Americas, in the extent that it voted against a Pan American resolution against racial discrimination just because it was phrased in a way that the communists disliked. Even Arbenz declares that the communist party played an active role in Guatemala, thereby violating article 22 of the Constitution. And we must avoid the response of the army to this treason. Will it remain passive, surrendered? Or will it assume its role of national army. Sentry! Alert! The enemy is in sight! Your commander in chief is its accompanist! We accuse him of high treason! [Relein 8. Relein 2.] [3420 kca]

148 *Que Socava y Atravesó Vargas* It's too late, comrade Guerra Burgos. We have already discovered the bad state of the Social Security Institute. Ever since the communists seized control of it, it has been characterized by bankruptcy. The international communists, Alfonso Solizcano and Abel Cuenca have played a key role in this. Even Guerra Burgos has written that the Institute is based on a major mistake in the beginning, and further weakened by a series of subsequent errors. The communists have been responsible for these mistakes. And Solizcano and Cuenca have been personally responsible. And it was the communists who can the bill through congress removing the government's obligation to the Institute the debt it is owed. Guerra Burgos tries to blame others, but the people sees its own open and sees communist responsibility everywhere. And very soon it will pass judgment. There is no money to pay the Institute what it is owed, but there is money for propaganda and for funding foreign interventions and vast espionage networks. [Music fades out at Counter 287.]

207 No Sign Off. Music fades out.

CASSETTE #01
CASSETTE #02
CASSETTE #03
CASSETTE #04
CASSETTE #05

These two cassettes contain a recording of the events at the "First Continental Congress Against Soviet Intervention in Latin America," held at the Cervantes Theater in Mexico City, sponsored by the Popular Anti-Communist Front of Mexico. Various telegrams to the congress are read, and many speeches made. Rousing welcoming speech by a Mexican delegate (1:14) on side 2 of Cassette #01, declaring the congress officially opened on this the 27th day of May 1964. Several samples of good Old-Fashioned Anti-Communist oratory, a particularly good one being by a Guatemalan labor delegate at the beginning of Cassette #04.

CASSETTE A86

056 Sign On 1. [No frequency given]

058 Sign Off

CASSETTE #90

504 Speech by Castillo Armas to his [Jemino] RINR officers, responding to the Congress' act of 1 February [year not given] declaring him a traitor, and his subsequent cashiering by the Supreme Defense Council. Not clear whether it is Castillo Armas speaking, or someone reading his manifesto, presumably the same manifesto referred to in the *Que Somos y Adonde Vamos?* segment on Cassette #91.

505 Specific info. Recording ends.

CASSSETTE #67

This is not a broadcast tape, it contains no sign on, sign off, retrans, etc. It simply contains two episodes of the below program.

008 Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia - Tribuna de la Libertad Dramatic presentation of three incidents illustrating pernicious communism infiltration of the peasantry, and the way the communists incite the peasants into violent crime against legitimate landowners.

185 Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia - Tribuna de la Libertad Dramatic presentation on conditions at the Salama prison, built for 20 prisoners but housing more than one hundred - "the Stew of Guzman". The cases of anti-Communist student leaders Mario Sanchez Alarcos and Oscar Cobos Castillo are highlighted.

CASSETTE #69

This is not a broadcast tape; it contains no sign on, sign off, newsprint, etc. It contains the following items:

014 A long patriotic poem extolling the spirit of the fatherland and attacking the communists.

124 Mujeres Lucha por la Libertad y la Democracia Tribute to the Liberated. A long series of patriotic slogans and appeals, read alternately by male and female announcers, and interposed with martial music. It ends at 308 and there is nothing further on the tape.

CASSETTE 5493

019 No Sign On. (Cuts in) ...with a soft, slow music, to sweeten the hours of leisure of our beloved Guatemala which these days finds itself dominated by the rods. We're going to offer you, in a moment of tranquility, Música Delicias (Delicias Music). Soft music review. That's a soft musical commercial sponsored by Jaime Cruz Wier's "message parlor." More music. More satire of Cruz Wier, this time about his quiz program, and the massage parlor again. More satire.

169 With the anthem as background, the announcer very dramatically pronounces the inauguration of Berta Líberation. After a lofty description of its positive contributions, the music fades out. After a moment of silence...

189 ...jazz music breaks in. This is a recording of a disk jockey show on Miami station WIMZ, in English, commercials and all.

420 Recording ends.

CASSETTE #136

024 No Sign On. [Very distorted recording] Music leads directly into...

026 *Mesma Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia*. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents *Tribuna de la Libertad: The Monologues of the 20th Century*. Does not give chapter number. Starts with the 6 November 1960 assault on the La Aurora military base. Castillo Armas is reported dead, with others. Scene with his weeping wife. Scene in the ambulance. Castillo Armas arrives, and is rushed into the operating room at the military hospital where he and the other corpses were taken by the ambulance. Tape in tomorrow for the next chapter.

206 *Mesma Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia*. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents *Tribuna de la Libertad: The Monologues of the 20th Century*. The third episode. Picks up where above chapter ended, in the emergency room at the military hospital. Teller, in military jail at La Aurora still anaesthetized. Wakes up on jail floor. Tape in tomorrow for next chapter.

480 *Mesma Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia*. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents *Tribuna de la Libertad: The Monologues of the 20th Century*. The fourth episode. Interrogated. Refuses to talk. Threatened with execution. Transferred to Judicial Guard. Tape ends abruptly while Interrogator is trying to get him to admit he was the leader.

670 Recording ends abruptly.

CASSETTE #129

005 No Sign On. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents: The Crimes of the Communists in Guatemala. Listen now to the story of the martyrdom of Sergeant Carlos Enrique Portales [see: Sangre de Machos on Cassette #129]. Listen tomorrow at 3:00 PM to this same Radio America [sic] for another report on The Crimes of the Communists in Guatemala. [Music and off the air.]

156 No Sign Off. Off the air.

CASSETTE #141

006 Breaks into a mambo...Cita en el Tropico...Pobrecita....this tape is all music, probably made so that selections could be drawn from it to insert in the various programs like Mariachi Musical del Año.

026 Recording ends.

CASSETTE #142

005 Breaks straight into music. All music on this cassette.

426 Music ends

CASSETTE #143

001 Breaks straight into music. To the dictatorship of Guatemala and the Republic. These are the clandestine channels of Radio Liberation, clandestine transmitter, to present in your home, a 30-minute program of North American music, as a host. The transmission you are about to hear, friends, is for the clandestine transmitters of Radio Liberation, the clandestine station of Guatemala...[sentence doesn't end, straight into music...the signal is very distorted, and cuts off].

006 You are listening to Radio Liberation, the clandestine transmitter of the Guatemalan liberation movement, testing its transmitters. [More music, still distorted.]

329 You are listening to Radio Liberation, the clandestine station, testing its transmitters. [More music, now distortion-free.] Radio Liberation on the air, testing transmitters.

324 Radio Liberation thanks you for listening to this 30-minute program testing transmitters. [Music.]

427 Music ends. Off the air. No Sign Off.

CASSETTE #144

005 Straight into music.

030 Attention Guatemalans. This is Radio Liberation, operating secretly with its clandestine transmitter in some place in the republic of Guatemala, in a test mode. Listen to us and you will know the reality of the political moment that Guatemala is going through, and the inevitable progress of the liberation movement through this clandestine radio which will begin to function very soon. During our daily broadcasts we will bring you music, commentaries and news in general, and we will denounce clearly the crime of the communist domination and the unmitigable force of the Guatemalan liberation movement. This is the clandestine transmitter Radio Liberation operating on its short wave frequency in a test mode, and from some secret place in the national territory. [Music.]

070 Attention Guatemaltecos. You are listening to Radio Liberation.... Our message to the entire anti-Communist public in the Guatemalan Republic. The moment will come to act in support of this cause of liberation for Guatemala. We urge you all, everyone involved in the cause, and everyone who should be very careful with the *oncua* (government informants). Several governments of America for the implementation of the anti-Communist declarations of Corazón, in view of the fact that the influence of international communism is clearly visible in the government of Jacobo Árbenz. The Guatemalan government does not permit publication of this news item, which is being published all around the world. [More Station Identification] [More music.]

160 Station Identification. [Music.]

244 Station Identification. Don't believe TAN or the Guatemalan press. Listen to Radio Liberation, which will be coming to you soon. [Music.]

413 Off the air.

CASSETTE #548

006 *Agencia Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia.* [As usual with this segment, there is severe distortion.] The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents *Tribuna de la Libertad. The Manifesto of the 20th Century.* Chapter 12. After the amnesty is denied, Castillo Armas proposes to the other prisoners an escape plan based on excavating a tunnel. The prison warden offers his assistance. El Chivo, a common prisoner, volunteers his machine shop expertise. The digging begins.

180 *Agencia Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia.* [As usual with this segment, there is severe distortion.] The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents *Tribuna de la Libertad. The Manifesto of the 20th Century.* Chapter 13. The difficulties encountered in digging the tunnel, Castillo Armas' frustration to his companions. He is visited by his wife, she holds over his dirty hands, he tells her the secret, she worries. He refuses to give up.

470 *Agencia Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia.* [As usual with this segment, there is severe distortion.] The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents *Tribuna de la Libertad. The Manifesto of the 20th Century.* Chapter 14. Castillo Armas relates to his wife his determination, she supports him. The digging continues. He deals with the discouragement of his companions, inspires them to further effort. [The cassette cuts off abruptly mid-chapter at 000].

[Picks up on reverse side.]

014 Picks up with further digging. Chapter ends at 001.

CASSETTE 10A

605 No Sign On. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents Los Comunistas Contraatacan en Santiago. Dramatic presentation - meeting of anti-Communists in Nov 1969 deciding to throw out the communists. Plan to attack La Aurora base, led by Carlos Castillo Armas. The failure of the assault on the base is evoked. Massacre of the wounded attackers. Execution of the prisoners. Castillo Armas survives the firing squad. Operated on and transferred to Guardia Civil. Tortured. Transferred to penitentiary. Escapes.

600 Music ends, no Sign Off.

108 No Sign On. Guatemaltecos, atención! Guatemala, the time of terror given by the government communists of Arbenz has already come to an end. Dispersing the militiamen of the various parties, scattering them into many families innocent, but very pronto devolveremos guate por golpe, y finalmente conquistaremos para Guatemala la libertad y el bienestar que todos sus hijos desean. Paciencia, guatemaltecos. Suavemente permítanme la y esperanza, no por mismo tiempo. Ya las nubes, ya los muelles, ya todo Guatemala se agita con las legítimas libertades que dentro de muy poco días se abren al grito de la redención nacional, el finamento de los cañones de la patria. Apregúntate a ti mismo: Guatemala! Residir con astucia patetismo unos días más. El gran momento de la patria está ya muy cerca. Vuestros sufrimientos terminarán con el estallido de los cañones de la libertad de Guatemala. Guatemaltecos! Argen! Es cuando! Guatemaltecos! Obrard los comunales! Guatemaltecos! Disipadres al sacrificio! Guatemaltecos! A luchar con los armas en la mano por la libertad de la patria! El grito libertad se dura lo poco! Viva Guatemala libre! [Guatemaltecos, atención! Guatemaltecos, the time of terror unleashed by the communist Arbenz government will subject thousands of Patriotic homes to misery, bring suffering to many honorable families, but very soon we will be returning blow for blow, and finally we will conquer for Guatemala the liberty and well-being that all its sons desire. Patience, Guatemaltecos. We ask only for faith and hope, and not for long. Already the time, the will of all of Guatemala are alive with the liberating legions that within a very few days will rise up to the cry of national redemption, responding to the clamors of the fatherland. Get ready to fight, Guatemaltecos! Resist with stoical patriotism for a few more days. The great moment of the fatherland is near. Your sufferings will end with the beams of the cañons of freedom for Guatemala. Guatemaltecos! Raise your head! Guatemaltecos! Raise your hearts! Guatemaltecos! Be ready for sacrifice! Guatemaltecos! To the fight with weapons in hand for the liberty of the fatherland! The Army of Liberation will give you the signal! Viva free Guatemala!]

109 You will now hear a transcendental decision taken last night by the Liberation Movement's Executive Committee in a secret session held just a few kilometers from the National Palace. This is an important message, and we ask you to listen carefully and repeat it to your family and friends, especially to those in the armed forces of the Arbenz government. Here's the decision:

[After detailing the crimes of the Arbenz regime, the following is proclaimed:

- The presidency is vacant.
- The National Congress is dissolved.
- The military are absolved from following any orders from the Arbenz regime.
- A National Convention is convoked, to be held very soon.
- Any person collaborating with the regime will be held accountable.
- Civil administration.
- The army should decommission and guard any weapons distributed to shock troops and other elements that have usurped the duties of the military.
- People, do not be party to this treason.
- Civil Guard, Judicial Guard, Military Police - refuse to follow the orders of the Kremlin's agents.
- Guatemaltecos, the night is nearly over, down is only a few hours, a few days, today.

[Music.]

204 Music ends. No Sign Off.

[NOTE: The box containing this reel was marked, "Special, Miriam." Such reels were usually made to be played at a specific point in time, keyed to a specific event. This one could well have been broadcast at some point in late June, perhaps keyed to Arbenz' resignation, but it is impossible to specify the date.]

Q16 Begins with the reading of a speech, possibly one given by Toledo at the Cuscatan Conference. Then there is a reading of a text, describing events at the conference, taking the Guatemalan government's point of view. At one point [Counter 302] there is a reference to the plenary session of March 5, so this indeed probably was the Cuscatan conference. Overall, this is a defense of the Guatemalan position at the conference. Endia [340] was a portion of the anthem.

005 No Sign On. Goes straight into a flourish not heard before, and the ambusher (supported by some great drum rolls) reminds listeners that Radio Liberation has been warning that the Arbenz regime, following orders from Moscow, has been preparing a series of moves, on a pretext to unleash its criminal plans. Wiru warned you that the regime is about to 'discover' a cache of American arms that will be the excuse for a wave of crime that is already underway. Our agent in army intelligence has informed us that army intelligence has prepared several crates of American arms for this purpose. The crates will have "United Fruit Company" and "machinery replacement parts" stenciled on them. The government has planned appropriate fanfares to follow the "discovery" of these crates buried on United Fruit property. The first discovery will take place on the Chinook [ph.] plantation. The second will take place on a banana plantation near Morales. We are putting everyone on alert, even though the government will change its place as a result of this exposure. [Ends at 005].

CASSETTE #107

005 Breaks into a pro-government speech at same sort of rally. Appears to have been recorded from a short-wave radio broadcast, given the fading, hummin, and interference. At one point speaker says "we have arrived or another 1st of May..." so this may have been a May Day rally. Speech ends at Counter 300 with "Viva el 1^o de Mayo, Viva Guatemala" and then calls of "Arbarel Arbarel Arbarel" It was probably Arbelaez giving the speech. The anthem begins at 305 and everything cuts off at 388. At the end an amateur film confirms this was a radio broadcast and that the event was the closing ceremony of the May Day festivities.

388 Anthem cuts off. No Sign Off.

CASSETTE #166

003 Please but No Sign On. Attention people of Guatemala! We interrupt our normal programming to give you a sensational news item. Our troops have managed to block the passage of a train from Puerto Barrios en route to the capital bearing Soviet arms purchased by Major Alfonso Martinez Estrada on his recent trip. The background in this event is that on Saturday 15 May the said Alfonso arrived in Puerto Barrios from via Soviet arms purchased by Martinez...no flag, no shipping documents, everything very sensitive. Defense Minister Sanchez was there ordering immediate unloading of the arms and shipment to the capital. This mind us that arms have been destroyed. The people should take no action yet, the time has not yet come. Say your prayers, Communists.

000 Attention, Guatemala. Sensational Notice. Repeats the news item, says the attack unit was Brigade 17. Rail service to the capital has been interrupted until repairs can be conducted. [There is a bad echo on this broadcast.] Radio Liberation congratulates Cleto, Pedro and Dolores and members of Brigade 17. [Ends at 077.]

CASSETTE #185

009 A few false starts, then seems to come on in a handful of people and then cut right off again.

010 This is Radio America broadcasting a special program of CEGUNDE. [Plays "Los Trinqueteros." Again some false starts, then plays "Los Trinqueteros" again. Thus it is played again. And again. And again.] [Ends at 290.]

CASSETTE #271

005 No Sign On. Breaks right into a statement by an apparent exile: "Comrades, the decisive moment is near. Our country will be liberated soon, with the cooperation of all good patriots. Be alert. All of us in exile are working without rest to reach the final goal. Confidence, courage and God be with us." (This statement ends at Counter 010 and there is nothing more on this cassette.)

010 Ends per above. No Sign Off.

037 Nos Ligan Cr. Muestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia. El Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anti-Comunistas Guatemaltecos en el Exilio presents, Tribuna de la Libertad. [As usual with the introduction to this segment, the recording is distorted.] Today we present the story of the heroic student Edgar Llosa [pmt], killed by the communists on 18 July 1980 in Guatemala City in the wake of the Francisco Javier Arana assassination. [Dramatic presentation of history.] [Music.] [Ends at Counter 195.]

189 Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia. El Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anti-Comunistas Guatemaltecos en el Exilio presents, Muestra de la Libertad. Today we present the story of the writing of the Constitution, the symbolic description of the records of the National Constituent Assembly of 1945 in the wake of the dismissal of the Supreme Court Justices. Let's return to 1993...[tells the story.]

480 Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia. El Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anti-Comunistas Guatemaltecos en el Exilio presents, Tribuna de la Libertad. [Dramatizes several instances of abuses by the Arbenz and Arbenz regimes against the Church and the press. Specifically cites the cases of Radio Paz, Radio Continental, Roberto Vicente Rubio and Oscar Conde.] [Ends at Counter 586...continues on reverse side.]

[Reverse side]

036 [picks up with case of Oscar Conde from front side.]

041 [Segment ends. Nothing more on this side.]

046 Aliviando Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia. El Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anti-Comunista Guatemalteco en el Bolic presenta, Centro de la Libertad. Once again the Caribbean Legion is in action, with the second attempt on the life of Nicaraguan President Somoza. Arnaldo started the Legion in 1845, and we have since seen it in action in El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. (The assassination attempt on Somoza is then decentralized, beginning with Arbelo's instructions to Esteban Fernandez. As the planning in Nicaragua is being centralized, the assassin says, "Turn in tomorrow at 9 PM on this same station for the end of the adventure of how the Caribbean Legion, with the communist (Guatemalan government, tried to kill President Somoza. Good night.")

158 Aliviando Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia. El Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anti-Comunista Guatemalteco en el Bolic presenta, Albada de la Libertad picks up from the previous episode above on the Somoza assassination attempt. The Guatemalan ambassador, Colonel Santizo, gives instructions to the attack team. The plan is to ambush Somoza as he leaves a party at the American Embassy. But the wily Somoza gets wind of it, dispatches troops who wipe out the attack team. (Ends at 344.)

CASSETTE #201
CASSETTE #200
CASSETTE #219
CASSETTE #218
CASSETTE #217
CASSETTE #203
CASSETTE #222

005-406

Nothing but music.

056 No Sign On. Rethink 7. (Rethink 2. (3420 kcs.)

018 *Pregunto Castro.* Attention Chico Delgado. Attention Jorge Isaac Delgado. We have evidence that you, cooperating with the [impeccable] Ariana government from the Secretariat of Publicity in the Presidency, are compiling apocryphal documents and have [attempted] to involve hundreds of innocent Guatemalans in a alleged plot against the government. Jorge Isaac Delgado, Chico, get ready. Your days are numbered. Traitor is paid for with death, and we're going to set a precedent in Guatemala beginning with you. We will kill you like a [jerk... -- possibly snarl] dog.

264 (Rethink 20. Rethink 2.) (3420 kcs.)

266 [Begins a musical introduction, then shuts off. Foyer, then...]

071 Rethink 7. (Rethink 2.) (6360 kcs.) [Change of frequency, this is a different broadcast from above.]

089 *Our Senator y Adjunto Vargas.* "The Urgent Need to Establish the Family Salary" Is Recognized! -- taken from our "Plan of Tegusigalpa." The economic [chaos] that has ruined our social structure sees men as units, with no regard for the environment that surrounds them. For that system, any man is the same as another, regardless of whether this wife is ill or his children starving. That's why our program incorporates the concept of the "family salary," a salary sufficient for a man to support his family. Nothing can strengthen social development more than family security, the very basis of the nation. And how for another point from our Plan of Tegusigalpa -- "The Guatemalan School." The school should be an extension of the home, not, as it is under the communists, a place where the teachings of the home are undermined and challenged, and where discipline for parents is furtured. In our schools the children will learn and live by Truth, Justice and Work. (Music, and abruptly at counter 199.)

195 No Sign On. Ends abruptly.

CASSETTE #226

008 No Sign On. Rehears 7. Rehears 2. [doesn't finish. Intro to Los Acusados breaks in.]

018 *Los Acusados de Alta Traición*
We accuse Carlos Arana Standard of having divided the officer corps of the Army. In earlier times, officers graduated from the military academy - the Polytechnic Institute - and those who acquired their commissions through the ranks, got along perfectly well. The graduates wore the distinctive academy emblem on their uniforms, and it was inspired by the first-grade. The cohesion between the two groups was excellent. But then Col. Carlos Alvarado Sandoval, then a member of Arana's staff, decreed that the emblem was no longer to be worn. This set off a conflict between the two groups based on the resentment felt by the graduates. Once he saw the problem that developed, Arana compounded his crime by letting it be known that the thing had been Col. Francisco Javier Arana's idea, thereby bringing false discredit on this patriotic officer. The problems created by Arana remain alive today.

The Army Under the Red Guillotine Sometime very soon, an accounting will have to be made of the many cold-blooded heinous crimes committed by the two "revolutionary" governments. The top leaders of the Army have never wanted to open their eyes to these crimes. Let's review just some of the victims of the red guillotine. There is the case of David Pimentel, murdered at the Central Penitentiary for the sole crime of being the brother of presidential candidate Col. Oscar Elman. Then there are the well-known cases of Col. Francisco Javier Arana and Abstol Pérez. And Carlos Castillo Armas at La Aurora. You will never forget this split blood. We will never forget the burns. [Rehears 38. Rehears 7. Rehears 8.] [Rehears 2 is interrupted by musical intro to *Monólogo del Cordero*.]

245 Monólogo del Cordero. The recent statement by Monsignor Mariano Rossell y Avilano to the New York Times that relations between the Church and government in Guatemala no longer exist underscores the extent to which the communists have tried to intervene in religious matters. Because of all the injustice committed in earlier days, communism found fertile ground in Guatemala. Workers and peasants, down trodden for years, were easy captives of the communists' false teachings. But the Archbishop's statement is a clear call that the time has come to confront the evils of communism. It is a battlecry which has opened the eyes of many. For us it is a renewal of hope, because we know the people will rise up as one single man to throw out the communists. [Rehears 8. Rehears 2 stops half way through [at Counter 397] and only silence follows.]

387 No Sign Off.

CASSETTE #085

006 ...[breaks into music...].—[Hora Nacional. The Hora Nacional normally plays the classical piece, "Salomé," and others. (Occasional entries of the station as other stations drift in, then out. The timing of the broadcast is Holy Week.] [A notation on the box of the original reel indicates this is a recording of the official station TGW.] [Music cuts off at Counter 448.]

CASSETTE #284

06 Starts off directly with a reading of Jose Filomeno's poem, "A la Puya" with marimba musical background.

074 Marimba music leads into reading of poem, "A Jecobito Arbeo." Typical passage, "You who have corrupted our youth, you who carry poison in your veins, you, murderer, you, thief, you who have earned the noose a thousand times over... your mission is to kill... pollute yourself, kill and before yourself is fraternal blood... here, take my blood, I don't want your pardon, it would insult me.... I would rather be a martyr than a slave.... I want to see you closely so I can spit in your face, and say to you as I die, "Damn you!"

140 Marimba music leads into reading of poem, "A Guachamota."

169 Marimba music leads into reading of poem, "Ode to a Leader."

228 Marimba music leads into reading of poem, "El Indio." (Recording cuts off at Counter 254, before the end of the poem.)

254 Ends, per above.

CASSETTE A289

807 No Sign-On. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, "Communist Crimes in Guatemala," "The Exulsion of Raul Fernandez Alvaro." [Text of story of Fernandez, just as it was told on *Sangre de Martires* on Cassette #120.]

195 The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, "Communist Crimes in Guatemala," "The Case of the Brothers Quiñones" [this is chapter II] ["Listen day after tomorrow for the next chapter."]

381 The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, "Communist Crimes in Guatemala," "The Case of the Brothers Quiñones" [this is chapter II] (this is the same chapter as played on *Sangre de Martires* on Cassette #80]. ["Listen day after tomorrow for the next chapter."]

811 The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, "Communist Crimes in Guatemala," "The Case of the Brothers Quiñones" [this is chapter III] (this is the same chapter as played on *Sangre de Martires* on Cassette #70] [Page ends at Counter 606 just as review of the last chapter is ending.] [continued on reverse side of cassette, ...]

080 [picked up from first side.] [Turn in next Monday at 2:15 in the morning the next chapter of the Case of the Brothers Quiñones. This program was produced by ... CRIMAGE [Music, ends at 198.]

13d Ends. No Sign-Off.

CASSETTE #202

008 No Bigh On. [Very poor recording at beginning] Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, Tribuna de la Libertad. [Continuation of the Brothers Guatimos Case.] Our last chapter ended with Mario Guatimos being taken to his cell in a virtual coma as a result of the tortures [was Cassette #s 203 and 78]. [In this current chapter, the fourth, Edgar is tortured, to the extent that he must be treated by "a well-known physician." This is definitely not for the squeamish!] [Edgar with brothers about to be brought before a habeas corpus hearing brought by their father. They are warned not to say anything.]

177 Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, Tribuna de la Libertad. The next chapter of the Guatimos brothers case, but the audio is so weak it is barely discernible.

412 Nuestra Lucha al Servicio de la Libertad y la Democracia. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, Tribuna de la Libertad. The next chapter of the Guatimos brothers case. The Arbenz government was prepared to lay the last card to impede the return of the brothers. Prohibitory bill is set, but the father comes up with it, and they escape to El Salvador before they can be re-arrested. [This appears to have been the final chapter, the sixth.] And so ends another program of Tribuna...[one off at Counter 660]. [Continues on reverse side of cassette...]

012 [picks up from front side], the end of the above chapter. Nothing more.

CASSETTE #261

067 No Sign On. The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, "Communist Crimes in Guatemala." The case of Hugo Dreher Jenaro, an anti-Communist candidate for mayor of Antigua in January 1951, and the "first Guatemalan female victim of communist terrorism." Although she won the election, she was denied office. This eventually led to a street demonstration in July, led by male & women. An urban fire was then levied on them which they protested at city hall. Communists kill by Dreher in the market, were set upon by the police with truncheons and rubber hoses. Dreher went into hiding in the capital, winding up in the Salvadoran embassy.

179 [...] [this is about a man speaking to his weeping daughter Maria Elena who is song having to be away from him and her mother and sister. He tells her to kiss her husband, but not to worry because 6 months will pass quickly. He departs, apparently leaving her on a coffee farm in the care of a male, Maria Dolores. [Then a commercial for Fag laundry detergent.] The announcer comes back with, 'What will happen to Maria Elena, left on that miserable coffee farm? Will her child, the husband, be born there?'] [This is a small soap opera.] (See also at Counter 228.)

CASSETTE #27

No sign on.

069 Magnitudes Musicales del Aire. (Same as Cassette 26)

143 Magnitudes Musicales del Aire. (Same as Cassette 26)

932 [cuts in]...case of the president. Once again, the president is drunk... now Los Charumbales de Espana return, this time with La Leyenda del Bosque...[but this cut, no music, Chevette ends with no sign off.]

[This cassette contains snippets from Tapes 26, 23 and 19.]

CASSSETTE #28

07 Sign On 1.

104 Announces program schedule:
1- Miscelanea Musical del Aire (15 minutes)
2- Nuestra Campana Radial (15 minutes)
3- Comunicado al Deudores (15 minutes)
4- Musical Program (25 minutes)

Miscelanea Musical del Aire [Same as cassette 18.]

240 Nuestra Campana Radial [Same as cassette 26.]

315 Station identification. Off the air.

[This cassette contains snippets from tapes 26 and 19.]

CASSETTE #280

005 The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents,
"Communist Crimes in Guatemala". The case of Major Manuel Commissar Orellana. [Note: the
real box says this was already played on Radio Liberation on Thursday, June 3. It was played on
Sangre de Marlin on Cassette #106 -- see the Cassette.] (End of Counter 280.)

CASSETTE #279

007 The Committee of Anti-Communist Guatemalan University Students in Exile presents, "Communist Crimes in Guatemala." The case of Sgt. Carlos Enrique Posadas. [This was played on the Sangre de Madres segment on Cassette #130.]

180 And now, the odyssey of Major Manuel Contreras Crislana. (Details the case of Contreras - see Cassette #280-008.) [Ends at Counter 432.]

CASSETTE #273

005 Starts with a few bars of Glenn Miller, then goes to a few minstrel songs, then to recordings of the "Bill Sullivan" disc jockey radio show featuring top American hits, including "Oh Moin Papa," "The Man with the Handle," "Make Love to Me," "Wanted," "Cross Over the Bridge," "I Got So Lonely," and others. [Ends at 361.]

CASSETTE 65A

005 [music blended with digested, multi-layered recording of a Middle Eastern-sounding, third language.
Arabic? Date off of Counter 225.]

CASSETTE #240

010 "Companions. It has come to my attention that the government's press office has denounced a plot which purportedly is headed by me. The people of Guatemala are familiar with the acts of a government which, supported by international communism,.....Companions, it is true that there is a great conspiracy against the communist government in our country..... May our slogan be, for the salvation of Guatemala! for the salvation of Guatemala! for the salvation of Guatemala!" (Ends at Counter 072.) [This is a Cardozo-Armas speech, same speech as Cassettes #s 238 and 239.]

006 [Breaks into a US news program detailing the history of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, but switches abruptly to Counter 022 (a...)]

027 [Breaks into a Castillo Armas speech....The hour of national liberation nears. The government itself is showing its weakness, its pathological fear of panic. It senses how its hours are counted, and its term in the face of its fail takes it to zero.... Compañeros, It is true that there is a great conspiracy against the communist government in our country.... May our slogan be, for the salvation of Guatemala! for the salvation of Guatemala! for the salvation of Guatemala! (Ensayo at Counter 071.) (Same speech as Counter 4s 240 and 238.)

CASSETTE #238

013 "Compañeros. It has come to my attention that the government's press office has denounced a plot which reportedly is headed by me. The people of Guatemala are familiar with the acts of a government which, supported by international communism..... Compañeros, it is true that there is a great conspiracy against the communal government in our country..... May our slogan be, for the salvation of Guatemala! for the salvation of Guatemala! for the salvation of Guatemala!" [Same speech as Cassette #239 see 240. Ends at Counter 674.]

CASSETTE #2874

002 [cuts into music, then some brief speaking recorded at the wrong speed. Then at 010 cuts into music program, La Voz de la Radio Latinoamericana, which plays the bolero La Ultima Palabra. More music. Probably recorded from a short-wave broadcast, given the occasional interference. At 025 goes back to the wrong speed again. At 037 back to correct speed again, more music.

CASSETTE #217B

002 Cuts into music, recorded from short wave broadcast, station identification reveals this is the official station TGW. There is much dot switching from one station to another. Occasionally the recording speed is off - too slow. #108 plays the same recording as on Cassette #207A, the Lukero La Orlina Rumba, but at the wrong speed setting - music too slow. #109 goes back to the right speed, records music from short-wave broadcast. Dial-bumping. Everything ends at Counter 124.

004 [Anthem starts up, ever so slowly]

007 Attention, people of Guatemala. Attention, radio and press correspondents. While the High Command of the Liberation Army formulates a decision in response to the new series of developments, we bring you this special program. This is Radio Liberation, the clandestine station of the great Guatemalan liberation movement.

020 Attention, people of Guatemala. Attention, radio and press correspondents. We have listened attentively to the words of Col. Carlos Eusebio Cruz, in whose hands the presidency was left by Jacobo Arbenz. From those "communist" words which sound so much like those of his predecessors, we conclude that we have just one more effort to feel us by those who have sold out to the Kremlin. This is no different than when Arbenz turned power over to his armed forces' chief, Carlos Paz Tejada, who then betrayed the people. But we're not buying this one. It is not Arbenz we have been fighting, but the entire system. Cruz is betraying the people when he says he will fight with the forces of the proletariat against the anti-Communists, who comprise 99% of the population. We do not recognize this Cruz government. National Army - you owe no allegiance to this, this is the opportunity to throw out the communists. Our fight is with the communists, and we won't rest until they are out. If Torollo said, "The Battle of Guatemala has begun," we say, "The Battle of Guatemala hasn't finished yet!" Arbenz resigned. Now we demand that all communist leaders and their sympathizers be brought under control so that the judicial system can determine the punishment they deserve!

034 The High Command of the Liberation Army announces to the people and army of Guatemala the conditions necessary for the restoration of peace and order across the nation:

- first, the Army is not our enemy and we are not the Army's enemy. The enemy of both is communism, personified by Jacobo Arbenz, Cruz, WRI, etc.
- second, we appeal to all members of the army to arrest all known members and sympathizers of the communist party.
- third, we appeal to senior army officers to capture Arbenz and establish an interim military junta.
- fourth, the interim junta should immediately instruct all units to arrest all communists and prepare to join forces with the liberation army to restore order. These orders should apply to Civil Guard units under army control.
- fifth, the interim junta will establish the hour for a cease-fire, giving all commanders at least three hours notice. Immediately thereafter, the decision to form a new government should be announced over TGR or Radio Mersa. The Executive Committee of the Liberation Army will immediately establish contact with the interim junta.
- sixth, this call is made to the army in the name of humanitarianism and before God, to thereby avoid the useless shedding of blood and the devastation of our beloved Guatemala.

(Cont'd.)

seventy, until these conditions are met, the Liberation Army will continue increasing its attacks using all its human and military power to destroy communism and all those who make common cause with it.

This program is being reproduced throughout the free world via the following stations: La Voz Dominicana, in the Dominican Republic; Radio Mundial in Managua; two local stations in Mexico City; nine stations in the US; two Cuban stations; 11 stations in South America; and three more in Central America. Thank you, free nations of America.

135. We appeal to the people of Guatemala and the rest of the continent to stay tuned to Radio Liberation to hear the truth during this period of national suspense. We are on 10380 kcs during the day and 3430 kcs at night. We broadcast all day and all night with brief intermissions.
148. While the High Command formulates a decision in response to the new developments, we are offering these special programs. Listen to Radio Liberation. Until we return to our regular programming, we will be reproducing this program for all of you, be listening to all our broadcasts. We will have great news for the people of Guatemala.
161. Radio Liberation leaves the air for a moment. We'll be back in a few instants. [Ends at Counter 573.]

[NOTE: THE PHRASES IN BOLD ABOVE WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE VERSION PROVIDED ON CASSETTE #112, PRESUMABLY THE VICTIM OF EDITING. IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED FROM CONTENT WHETHER BOTH THESE TAPES WERE BROADCAST, OR WHETHER THIS ONE IS SIMPLY THE FIRST AND UNEDITED VERSION OF #112.]

CASSETTE #271

005 Sign On II can be heard under much distortion and noise. [Refrain 2, no frequency given.]
[1490 kcs, provided later in the broadcast.] [There is much interference, suggesting this recording was made off a receiver, not the transmitter.]

[This is a duplicate of Cassette #116, except that this one was recorded off a receiver, with lots of interference, whereas #116 is a clean recording off the transmitter.]

CASSI/TTE #267

[Cassette is blank on both sides. The presence of a burn on side 1, and its absence on side 2, suggests the recording of a blank reel on side 1.]

The TWO Tapes

The TGW Tapes

The TOW Tapes

On 30 December 1954, 2B16 recorded one full day's transmissions of the official Guatemalan system TOW, from 06:30 to 24:00. This was probably done so the SHERWOOD planners could see what they were up against and target their programming accordingly. The 34 broadcast years, as well as the 34 cassettes onto which the feeds were transposed, are numbered 246-266 and 303-314. They were recorded off a short-wave receiver and are affected, often seriously, by natural and man-made interference (in fact as GRN and QRM below). At the station's signoff at 24:00, the announcer tells us that TOW broadcasts on four frequencies:

TOW - on 840 kcs
TOWA - on 15170 kcs (1MW) and 8750 kcs (300W)
TOWB - on 8180 kcs (4MW)
TOWC - on 1520 kcs (1MW)

Cassette #268 is the first in the sequence, beginning the recording at approximately 0630 Guatemala time.

— Tape begins with strong interference (QRM, GRN), obviously received from a short-wave receiver.
— National Anthem. This is "Vox de Guatemala" broadcasting on 30 December 1950. Announcement gives various frequencies of transmission, but these are unlistable.
— Plays marimba song, during which interference noticeably disappears.
— Announcement then says time is 6:30 AM.
— Announces other three historic events that occurred on 30 December: 1808, death of Dutch chemist Robert Boyle [ph.]; 1814, during British in Argentina; 1895, birth of Rudyard Kipling.
— More marimba.
— Time 6:44:30.
— More historic 30 Dec events: 1878, death of the Marquis of Casa Rosada, director of the Banco de Barcelona; 1879, death of Spanish politician Adolfo Lopez de Ayala; 1895, Cuban battle in Cuba during which Cuban patriots are defeated by Spanish forces; 1896, execution of Jose Rizal in Manila; 1903, assassination of Romanian president.
— Time 6:46 am.
— Marimba.
— Time 6:50.
— 24-hour schedule for week of 28 Dec - 2 Jan: Lourdes, El Aguila, Antigua, San Carlos, Cls #1, Santa, Bayar, gives addresses and phone.
— Marimba.
— 6:08 am, Reminds that this program begins every day at 6:30. To all, a good morning, and a day of well-paid work. Marimba.
— 7:00 am, Guatemala time. Cuts off at Counter 427.

CASSETTE #268 has minimal interference, but enough distortion to make listening a bit difficult.)

— Starts by announcing Great Artistic Festival tonight at 8 PM at the Palace Theater.
— This is T3W in The New Guatemala, Central America.
— Now, Truck driver innocent in death of female passenger, Guatemalan ambassador to Honduras offers reception, machete, mazador, and other abuses.
— And now we give you Vox de Guatemala programming for today, 30 December 1953, starting at 7:15.

7:15 - Tiempo en Música de Lotería Nacional [The National Lottery's Music Time]
7:45 - Recortes de Prensa [Press Clippings]
8:00 - Concierto Matinal [Morning Concert]
9:15 - Melodías de Juventud [Melodies of Youth]
9:45 - Radionovela, El Visitador [Soap Opera, The Visitor]
10:00 - Música en Miniatura [Music in Miniature]
10:15 - Conferencia de América [America's Popular Songs]

10:45 - Festival de Rámc [Festival of Rhythm]
11:15 - Obras Maestras de la Música [Music Masterworks]
11:45 - Arreglos Populares [Popular Arrangements]
12:00 - Programa Especial de la AEU [Special Program of the AEU]
12:30 - Informador Diario de Centroamérica [Daily Central American Report]
12:45 - Radioteatro, Memorias de un Médico [Soap Opera, Memoirs of a Doctor]
13:00 - Guatemala y su Marimba [Guatemala and her Marimba]
13:30 - Radioteatro, Benaventurado los Pobres [Soap Opera, Blessed Are the Poor]
13:45 - Páginas Ilustradas, Obras de los Grandes Músicos [Immortal Pages, Works of the Masters]
15:00 - Por los Caminos del Arte [On the Paths of Art]
15:15 - Bel Canto, canto clásico [Bel Canto, classical singing]
15:30 - Música de las Américas [Music of the Americas]
16:45 - Radioteatro y su Marimba [Guatemala and her Marimba]
16:15 - Música Folclórica Argentina [Argentine Folkloric Music]
16:30 - Los Grandes Solistas [The Great Soloists]
17:00 - Saludos Felices [Happy Greetings]
17:30 - Solidaridad con Santo Domingo [Solidarity with Santo Domingo]
17:45 - Música en Miniatura [Music in Miniature]
18:00 - Radioteatro, Benaventurado los Pobres [Soap Opera, Blessed Are the Poor]
18:15 - Poemas [Poems]
18:30 - Recital de Órgano [Organ Recital]
19:45 - Informador del INPDP [INPDP's News Report]
19:00 - Radioteatro [Soap Opera]
19:15 - Tríos de Guatemala [Tríos of Guatemala]
19:30 - Momento Deportivo [Sports Moment]
19:45 - Radioteatro, El Visitador [Soap Opera, The Visitor]
20:00 - Programa Antialcohólico [Anti-Alcoholic Program]
20:15 - La Hora Nacional [The National Hour]
21:00 - Recortes de Prensa [Press Clippings]
21:15 - Nuevos Valores/New Talent
22:15 - Pulse del Mundo [Pulse of the World]
22:30 - Club Rapsodia [Rhapsody Club]
23:00 - A Tiempo de Vals [With Time]
23:15 - Orquesta Cetálica [Cetálica Orchestra]
24:00 - Cierre de Transmisiones [Sign Off]

Now, *Tiempo en Música*, [Music,] 7:30:10 is the time. The 6 January 1984 lottery has a first prize of 120,000 quetzales, second prize of 20,000 quetzales. [Music,] 7:30:10 is the time. Write to us with your requests for songs. Just address an envelope to *La Voz de Guatemala* or *Lotería Nacional, Tiempo en Música* [Music,] 7:30:15 is the time. Reminds about the 120,000 quetzal prize coming up, cites the lesser prizes as well. [Cuts off in mid-sentence at Counter 440.]

The remainder of the tapes that follow the sequence below. By the end of the day, however, two major changes had been made to the schedule:

A decision was made to read off the day's lottery results, and this took one and a half hours, from 10:30 to 12:00. As a result, *Cuentas de América* was cut to 15 minutes, and *Festival de Ríos*, *Obra Maestra* and *Amigos Populares* were not heard.

Nuevos Valores, a talent show that was broadcast live from the Palace Theater, ran very late schedule to 23:35. Consequently, *Club Rapocar*, *A Tiempo de Vida* and *Quinceaños Centenarios* were not broadcast.

In the chart below, Column A is the cassette number, Column B is the first time of day mentioned on the cassette, and Column C describes the content. The numbers in parentheses in Column C are Tape Counter points. **Bold** indicates the time of day or program title was either not on the tape or could not be heard because of interference, but was deduced from the context.

A	B	C
266	0:39 Sign Dr. A.M. Health event.	
266	1:21 Schedule for the day 7:25. Time to eat breakfast...	
267	1:22 Tiempo en Música (cont'd). (188) Instrucciones Primaria. (170) Conceptos Música - Física/Visión...	
267	1:45 Comisión Musical (cont'd).	
268	1:48 Conceptos Música (cont'd).	
268	2:26 Conceptos Música (cont'd). (189) 8:25. (208) Melodías de diversidad...	
269	3:45 Melodías de diversidad (cont'd). 9:45. (248) Radioteatro Yerba. (242) Música en Movimiento.	
270	10:16 10:16. Cuentos de América. (146) 10:30. Trámites en la lotería familiar, cada país...	
270	11:08 Reading heavy stories (throughput)...	
271	11:45 Reading heavy stories (throughput)...	
272	12:01 Reading heavy stories. (249) music. 12:01 (182) 18:01 Musical program, music (cont'd)...	
272	12:30 Music, stories. 12:30 (265) Danza de Caleidoscopio. 12:30 (245) Radioteatro - presentación de un Medio...	
273	13:00 Radioteatro - Presentación de un Medio (cont'd). 13:30 (267) Cuadernos a su Nombre (cont'd)	
274	13:29 13:29 Radioteatro - Presentación de un Medio (cont'd). 13:45 (269) Páginas Inmortales - Radios Berlín...	
275	13:59 Páginas Inmortales - Radios Berlín. (cont'd)...	
276	14:20 Páginas Inmortales (cont'd) - video (cont'd), 14:20	
276	15:15 Páginas Inmortales (cont'd) - www.Radios.Berlín. (186) 15:15. Por los Caminos del Arte. 15:30 Música en las Américas...	
277	15:45 Música en las Américas (cont'd). 15:45 (265) Cuadernos a su Nombre...	
278	16:10 Cuadernos a su Nombre (cont'd). 16:10 (267) Música Folclórica Argentina. 16:30 (215) Los Grandes Sinfónicos.	
279	17:00 Los Grandes Sinfónicos. 17:00 (268) Radioteatro...	
280	17:31 Radioteatro (cont'd). Señales generales en...	
281	17:45 Señales generales (cont'd). Música en Misiones. (201) Radioteatro - Desarrollando los Mismos...	
281	18:16 Radioteatro - Desarrollando los Mismos (cont'd). 18:16 (261) Poesía. 18:30 (262) The Andrew Sisters...	
282	18:45 Andrew Sisters (cont'd). 18:45 (263) Información del Bunge. 18:45 (262) Radioteatro - Músicos de Chivilcoy. 18:45 Títeres Gobernacion...	
283	18:59 Títeres Gobernacion (cont'd). 18:59 (264) Música Descripción Henry Cowell. 18:59 (264) Radioteatro - El Víctima...	
284	20:01 Radioteatro - El Víctima (cont'd). 20:01 (264) Radioteatro Antártida, series (cont'd). 20:15 (265) La Música de...	
285	20:15 La Música de (cont'd)...	
286	21:02 La Música Nacional. 21:02 (265) Reportajes de Prensa - sección documental, msc (247) m = Hoy en Música...	
287	21:49 Hoy en Música (cont'd) (investigación)...	
288	22:15 Hoy en Música (cont'd) (investigación)...	
289	22:44 Hoy en Música (cont'd)...	
290	23:26 Hoy en Música (cont'd) (investigación) (cont'd) (266) Páginas de Música...	
291	23:35 Páginas de Música (cont'd). 23:35 (217) 23:35 (266) m = Hoy en Música (cont'd) (266) Páginas de Música...	
292	23:59 Radios Berlín (cont'd) (267) (cont'd)...	

CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals 1952-1954

CIA History Staff Analysis

Gerald K. Haines

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Introduction

In the early 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency directed covert operations aimed at removing the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from power in Guatemala. Included in these efforts were various suggestions for the disposal of key Arbenz government officials and Guatemalan Communists. The Agency drew up lists of individuals for assassination, discussed training Guatemalan exiles for assassination teams, and conducted intimidation programs against prominent Guatemalan officials.

This brief study traces, in a chronological manner, the injection of assassination planning and proposals into the PBFORTUNE covert operation against the Arbenz government in 1952 and into the PBSUCCESS operation in 1954. It attempts to illustrate the depth of such planning and the level of involvement of Agency officials. It also attempts to detail where the proposals originated, who approved them, and how advanced the preparations for such actions were. Finally, the study examines the implementation of such planning and the results - - i.e., in the end, the plans were abandoned and no Arbenz officials or Guatemalan Communists were killed. The study is based almost exclusively on Directorate of Operations records relating to PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS.

Background

As early as 1952 US policymakers viewed the government of President Arbenz, with some alarm. Although he had been popularly elected in 1950, growing Communist influence within his government gave rise to concern in the United States that Arbenz had established an effective working alliance with the Communists. Moreover, Arbenz' policies had damaged US business interests in Guatemala; a sweeping agrarian reform called for the expropriation and redistribution of much of the United Fruit Company's land.¹ Although most high-level US officials recognized that a hostile government in Guatemala by itself did not constitute a direct security threat to the United States, they viewed events there in the context of the growing global Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and feared that Guatemala could become a client state from which the Soviets could project power and influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.²

CIA and Intelligence Community reports tended to support the view that Guatemala and the Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of the Communists.¹ Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Walter Bedell Smith and other Agency officials believed the situation called for action. Their assessment was, that without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain inept, disorganized and ineffective. The anti-Communist elements -- the Catholic hierarchy, landowners, business interests, the railway workers union, university students, and the Army were prepared to prevent a Communist accession to power, but they had little outside support.²

Other US officials, especially in the Department of State, urged a more cautious approach. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, for example, did not want to present "the spectacle of the elephant shaking with alarm before the mouse." It wanted a policy of firm persuasion with the withholding of virtually all cooperative assistance, and the concluding of military defense assistance pacts with El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras.³ Although the Department of State position became the official public US policy, the CIA assessment of the situation had support within the Truman administration as well. This led to the development of a covert action program designed to topple the Arbenz government -- PBFORTUNE.

PBFORTUNE

Following a visit to Washington by Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in April 1952, in which Somoza boasted that if provided arms he and Guatemalan exile Carlos Castillo Armas could overthrow Arbenz, President Harry Truman asked DCI Smith, to investigate the possibility. Smith sent an agent, codenamed SEEKFORD, to contact Guatemalan dissidents about armed action against the Arbenz regime.⁴ After seeing his report, "[] Chief of the [] Division of the Directorate of Plans (DP), proposed to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles that the Agency supply Castillo Armas with arms and \$225,000 and that Nicaragua and Honduras furnish the Guatemalans with air support.⁵ Gaining Department of State support, Smith, on 9 September 1952, officially approved []'s request to initiate operation PBFORTUNE to aid Guatemalan exiles in overthrowing Arbenz. Planning for PBFORTUNE lasted barely a month, however, when Smith terminated it after he learned in October that it had been blown.⁶

Throughout planning for PBFORTUNE there were proposals for assassination. Even months before the official approval of PBFORTUNE, Directorate of Plans (DP) officers compiled a "hit list." Working from an old 1949 Guatemalan Army list of Communists and information supplied by the Directorate of Intelligence, in January 1952 DP officers compiled a list of "top flight Communists whom the new government would desire to eliminate immediately in event of successful anti-Communist coup."

Headquarters asked [] to verify the list and recommend any additions or deletions.⁷ Headquarters also requested [] to verify a list of an additional 16 Communists and/or sympathizers whom the new government would desire to incarcerate immediately if the coup succeeded.⁸ [] in Guatemala City added three names to the list in his reply.⁹ Nine months later,

SEEKFORD, the CIA agent in touch with Castillo Armas, forwarded to Headquarters a disposal list compiled by Castillo Armas. That list called for the execution through executive action of 58 Guatemalans (Category I) and the imprisonment or exile of 74 additional Guatemalans (Category II).¹³ SEEKFORD also reported at the same time, 18 September 1952, that General Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, had agreed to aid Castillo Armas in return for the "killing of four Santo Domingans at present residing in Guatemala a few days prior to D-Day." According to SEEKFORD, Castillo Armas readily agreed, but cautioned that it could not be done prior to D-day because of security reasons. Castillo Armas further added that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were already being trained.¹⁴ There is no record that Headquarters took any action regarding Castillo Armas' list.

After the PBFORTUNE operation was officially terminated, the Agency continued to pick up reports of assassination planning on the part of the Guatemalan opposition. In late November 1952, for example, an opposition Guatemalan leader, in a conversation with SEEKFORD, confirmed that Castillo Armas had special "K" groups whose mission was to kill all leading political and military leaders, and that the hit list with the location of the homes and offices of all targets had already been drawn up.¹⁵ On 12 December SEEKFORD reported further that Castillo Armas planned to make maximum use of the "K" groups.¹⁶ Another source subsequently reported that Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Salvadoran soldiers in civilian clothes would infiltrate Guatemala and assassinate unnamed Communist leaders.¹⁷

In addition to monitoring events in Guatemala, the Agency continued to try to influence developments and to float ideas for disposing of key figures in the [] government. [] in 1953 proposed not only to focus on sabotage, defection, penetration, and propaganda efforts with regard to Guatemala, but to eliminate []. [] According to []'s draft memorandum, after creating a story that [] was preparing to oust the Communists, he could be eliminated. His assassination would be "laid to the Commies" and used to bring about a mass defection of the Guatemalan army.¹⁸ A Western Hemisphere Division memo of 28 August 1953 also suggested possibly assassinating key Guatemalan military officers if they refused to be converted to the rebel cause.¹⁹ In September 1953 [] also sent [] an updated plan of action which included a reference to "neutralizing" key Guatemalan military leaders.²⁰

In the psychological warfare area, Guatemala City Station sent [] all leading Communists in Guatemala, "death notice" cards for 30 straight days beginning 15 April 1953. The Station repeated the operation beginning 15 June 1953 but reported no reaction from the targeted leaders.²¹

PBSUCCESS

By the fall of 1953, US policymakers, including CIA officials, were searching for a new overall program for dealing with Arbenz. The Guatemalan leader had moved even closer to the Communists. He had expropriated additional United Fruit Company holdings, legalized the Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT, and suppressed anti-Communist opposition following an abortive uprising at Salamá. In response, the National Security Council authorized a covert action operation against Arbenz and gave the CIA primary responsibility.²²

The CIA plan, as drawn up by []'s Western Hemisphere Division, combined psychological warfare, economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions against Guatemala. Named PBSUCCESS, and coordinated with the Department of State, the plan's stated objective was "to remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of Guatemala." In the outline of the operation the sixth stage called for the "roll-up" of Communists and collaborators after a successful coup.²³

Dulles placed [] in charge of PBSUCCESS and sent a senior DDP officer, [] to establish a temporary station (LINCOLN), to coordinate the planning and execution of PBSUCCESS. Other key Agency figures involved were [] and [] Chief of the [] Staff, Department of State [] Assistant Secretary of State for [] from the Office of [] Affairs, and [] State liaison to the Agency, also played major roles.

Training

Although assassination was not mentioned specifically in the overall plan, the Chief of [] at [] requested a special paper on liquidation of personnel on 5 January 1954. This paper, according to the [] chief, was to be utilized to brief the training chief for PBSUCCESS before he left to begin training Castillo Armas' forces in Honduras on 10 January 1954. A cable from [] the following day requested 20 silencers (converters) for .22 caliber rifles. Headquarters sent the rifles.²⁴ The [] chief also discussed the training plan with the agent SEEKFORD on 13 January 1954, indicating that he wanted Castillo Armas and the PBSUCCESS [] officer to train two assassins. In addition, he discussed these "assassination specialists" with Castillo Armas on 3 February 1954.²⁵

The idea of forming assassination teams ("K" groups) apparently originated with Castillo Armas in 1952. Adapting Castillo Armas' concept, the [] chief routinely included two assassination specialists in his training plans.²⁶

CIA planning for sabotage teams in early 1954 also included creating a "K" group trained to perform assassinations. The main mission of the sabotage teams or harassment teams, however, was to attack local Communists and Communist property and to avoid

attacks on the army.²⁷ A chart depicting the [] chief's plan for the CALLIGERIS (Castillo Armas) organization showed the "K" Group. It was distributed in various paramilitary planning packets as late as the spring of 1954.²⁸ In a briefing for [] in June 1954, [] also mentioned that sabotage teams would assassinate known Communists in their areas once the invasion operation began.²⁹

Psychological Warfare

As in PBFORTUNE, an intensive psychological warfare program paralleled the planning for paramilitary action. Utilizing the anti-Communist network established by a Guatemalan dissident, the Chief of Political and Psychological Operations at LINCOLN developed a major propaganda campaign against the Arbenz government. Part of this program included the sending of new mourning cards to top Communist leaders. These cards mourned the imminent purge or execution of various Communists throughout the world and hinted of the forthcoming doom of the addressee. Death letters were also sent to top Guatemalan Communists such as [].

[] Guatemala City Station, [] prepared these letters for the dissident leader. The "Nerve War Against Individuals," as it was called, also included sending wooden coffins, hangman's nooses, and phony bombs to selected individuals. Such slogans as "Here Lives a Spy" and "You have Only 5 Days" were painted on their houses.³⁰

Wanting to go beyond mere threats, the dissident leader suggested that the "violent disposal" of one of the top Guatemalan Communists would have a positive effect on the resistance movement and undermine Communist morale. The dissident leader's recommendations called for the formation of a covert action group to perform violent, illegal acts against the government. LINCOLN cautioned the dissident leader, however, that such techniques were designed only to destroy a person's usefulness. By destroy "we do not mean to kill the man," LINCOLN cabled the dissident leader. Responding to the proposal that a top Communist leader be killed, [] Guatemala City told [] he could not recommend assassinating any "death letter" recipients at this time because it might touch off "wholesale reprisals." Reiterating that the plan was "to scare not kill," he nevertheless suggested that [] might wish to "study the suggestion for utility now or in the future."³¹

While Agency paramilitary and psychological warfare planning both included suggestions which implied assassination proposals, these proposals appear never to have been implemented. The [] chief had sought to use Castillo Armas' "K" group scheme but there was no State Department or White House support. Such was also the case when the subject of assassination emerged in high-level Agency and inter-agency planning discussions.

Target Lists

A weekly PBSUCCESS meeting at Headquarters on 9 March 1954 considered the elimination of 15-20 of Guatemala's top leaders with "Trujillo's trained pistoleros." Those attending the meeting were []

[] DP Operations, along with State Department representatives []. Addressing the group, [] while stating clearly that "such elimination was part of the plan and could be done," objected to the proposal at that time. [] however, expressed the view that "knocking off" the leaders might make it possible for the Army to take over.¹²

Following this meeting, [] appears to be the Agency official who revived discussion of assassination as an option. On 25 March he broached the subject with [] who had just returned from the Organization of American States meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, that voted 17 to 1 to condemn communism in Guatemala. With [] and [] again present, [] asked [] if he had changed his thinking since the conference on the possible methods to get rid of the Arbenz government. [] replied that in his opinion "the elimination of those in high positions of the government would bring about its collapse." He then qualified his statement, according to []'s memo, by saying that perhaps "even a smaller number, say 20, would be sufficient."¹³

Less than a week later [] visited [] on 31 March. The records do not indicate why [] flew to [].¹⁴ but on that date the [] officers were asked to draw up an up-dated target list. Criteria for inclusion on the disposal list required that individuals be (1) high government and organizational leaders "irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine and policy," (2) "out and out proven Communist leaders," or (3) those few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance "whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action."¹⁵

The [] chief took the new list with him when he consulted Castillo Armas on 7 April 1954. [] also borrowed a copy of the list on the same day. The [] chief and Castillo Armas apparently discussed the list and at least tentatively agreed that any assassination would take place during the actual invasion of Guatemala by Castillo Armas' forces. There was still no time date for the actual beginning of hostilities, however.¹⁶

Agency contacts with conservative Guatemalan exile leader [] at the same time also produced an assassination list. [] provided a CIA cutout with a list of Communist leaders he would like to see executed. [] saw [] as a loose cannon, however. They did not want him to become involved in PBSUCCESS.¹⁷

CIA received further Department of State encouragement for assassination plotting in April 1954. Fueling the fire for action, [] in a meeting with [] and another CIA officer, concluded that "more drastic and definitive steps to overthrow the government [in

Guatemala] must be taken." In response to a question of whether Guatemalan [] was "salvageable," [] replied in the negative and suggested "he be eliminated."³⁸

On 16 May 1954 the [] Officer at [] proposed in a memorandum to [] the new Chief of [] and [] now serving as [] that assassination be incorporated into the psychological part of PBSUCCESS. The [] Officer laid out a specific assassination schedule leading up to D-Day, the actual invasion by Castillo Armas. He proposed a raid on []

[] on D12. This was to be a show of force; no one was to be harmed and the attack was to take place when [] was absent []. The [] Officer, however, proposed the disposal of [] on D-10 as a means of paralyzing the []

[]. The [] Officer suggested that [] be killed on D-8. This would, according to the [] Officer, eliminate the [] character of the Arbenz regime. The [] Officer called for the disposal on D-6 of [] in the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) []. This would leave Guatemala's [] believed. On D-4 [] would be eliminated. [] was to be eliminated so that the rebel forces would not have to worry about him or deal with him after victory. The [] Officer considered the possibility of reprisals as a weakness in his scheme, but decided that "such actions were expected anyway." The [] Officer argued that his proposal, if adopted, would not only be physically impressive but psychologically significant by providing a show of strength for the opposition. It would also "soften up" the enemy. He added that his first three suggestions had the previous approval of [].³⁹

On 21 May [] asked Headquarters for permission to implement the [] Officer's proposal and asked for suggestions about the specific individuals to be targeted.⁴⁰ No reply from Headquarters to [] has been found. On 29 May 1954, however, the [] chief requested the names of the "four men" he and the [] Officer discussed assassinating. More than likely, the [] chief wanted to take up the issue again with Castillo Armas. Again, no cable reply from Headquarters or [] has been found.⁴¹ At the same time, [] continued compiling information on [] and lists of home addresses for individuals named on the "disposal list" drafted in April.⁴² [] believed [] was a "worthy target."⁴³

Meanwhile, [] traveled to Washington and submitted a proposal on 1 June 1954 that suggested that as an alternative approach to the paramilitary action program "specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected."⁴⁴ [] took up [] suggestion in discussions with [] on 1 and 2 June. According to [] considered the proposal and then ruled it out, "at least for the immediate future," on the ground that it would prove counter-productive. [] wanted more specific plans concerning the individual targets, timing, and statement of purpose. Both [] and [] agreed that the advantages gained by this type of activity needed to be clearly spelled out.⁴⁵ This appears to be the end of

serious planning in Washington for the inclusion of selective assassination proposals in PBSUCCESS. Returning from Washington to [] on 2 June 1954, [] however, reported to his staff that the consensus in Washington was that "Arbenz must go; how does not matter."⁴⁶

The Paramilitary Operation

On 16 June 1954 Castillo Armas' CIA-supported force of armed exiles entered Guatemala. While these forces advanced tentatively in the hinterland, [] Guatemala City on 16 and 17 June met with a leading Guatemalan military commander, in the hopes of convincing him to lead a coup against Arbenz. In these discussions, the military commander hinted he would like to see []

[] killed. The [] frustrated by the continued inaction of the Guatemalan military commander, told him that if he wanted them killed he should do it himself. Despite the Guatemalan military commander's vacillation, a [] cable indicated that he remained convinced that [] had to be eliminated.⁴⁷

With the Guatemala Army's position uncertain and the outcome still in doubt, a few days later, the [] chief, in [], requested permission to bomb the [] and []. LINCOLN responded on 22 June that it did not want to waste air strikes on [] or [] while a battle was raging at Zacapa.⁴⁸ The [] and [] also supported the [] chief's request to bomb [] with a dramatic cable which ended "Bomb Repeat Bomb."⁴⁹ LINCOLN and Headquarters held fast and [] was never bombed. "We do not take action with grave foreign policy implications except as agent for the policymakers," Dulles cabled LINCOLN.⁵⁰

President Arbenz, on 27 June 1954, in a bitterly anti-American speech, resigned his office and sought asylum in the Mexican embassy in Guatemala City. []

[].⁵¹ After Castillo Armas assumed the presidency, however, Arbenz was allowed to leave the country for Mexico, which granted him political asylum. In addition, 120 other Arbenz government officials or Communists departed Guatemala under a safe passage agreement with the Castillo Armas government.⁵² There is no evidence that any Guatemalans were executed.

CONCLUSION

CIA officers responsible for planning and implementing covert action against the Arbenz government engaged in extensive discussions over a two-and a half year period about the possibility of assassinating Guatemalan officials []. Consideration of using assassination to [] purge Guatemala of Communist influence was born of the extreme international tensions in the early Cold War years. The Agency did not act unilaterally, but consulted with State Department officials with responsibility for policy toward Latin America. In the end, no assassinations of Guatemalan officials were carried out, according to all available evidence.

Proposals for assassination pervaded both PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS, rather than being confined to an early stage of these programs. Even before official approval of PBFORTUNE, CIA officers compiled elimination lists and discussed the concept of assassination with Guatemalan opposition leaders. Until the day that Arbenz resigned in June 1954 the option of assassination was still being considered.

Discussions of assassination reached a high level within the Agency. Among those involved were []

[] is known to have been present at one meeting where the subject of assassination came up. It is likely that [] was also aware in general terms that assassination was under discussion. Beyond planning, some actual preparations were made. Some assassins were selected, training began, and tentative "hit lists" were drawn up.

Yet no covert action plan involving assassinations of Guatemalans was ever approved or implemented. The official objective of PBSUCCESS was to remove the Guatemalan government covertly "without bloodshed if possible." Elimination lists were never finalized, assassination proposals remained controversial within the Agency, and it appears that no Guatemalans associated with Arbenz were assassinated. Both CIA and State Department officers were divided (and undecided) about using assassination.

Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalan Communists and leaders sympathetic to Communist programs took place in a historical era quite different from the present. Soviet Communism had earned a reputation of using whatever means were expedient to advance Moscow's interests internationally. Considering Moscow's machinations in Eastern Europe, role in the Korean War, sponsorship of subversion through Communist surrogates in the Third World, and espousal of an ideology that seemed to have global hegemony as the ultimate objective, American officials and the American public alike regarded foreign Communist Parties as Soviet pawns and as threatening to vital US security interests.

Cold War realities and perceptions conditioned American attitudes toward what political weapons were legitimate to use in the struggle against Communism. It would be over two decades after the events in Guatemala before DCI William Colby prohibited any CIA involvement in assassination and a subsequent Executive Order banned any US government involvement in assassination.

¹ See Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 187-88. United Fruit dominated Guatemalan banana production, controlled the International Railroad of Central America, and its merchant fleet had a virtual monopoly of Guatemalan overseas shipping. It was second only to the Guatemalan government as an employer.

² See Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope* and Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982) for general overviews of the Guatemalan situation in the early 1950s and US reaction. See also John Peurifoy US Ambassador to Guatemala statement of 23 October 1953 in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republic 1950-1954*, 4:1093. (Hereinafter cited as *FRUS*).

³ See PBSUCCESS Planning Documents, Directorate of Operations, Latin American Division Records, Job Number 79-101025A, CIA Archives (S). See also NSC 144/1, 18 March 1953, *FRUS* 4: 1-79 and J. C. King, memo for DDP, "Estimate of Situation in Guatemala," 11 January 1952 printed in Michael Warner, ed. *The CIA under Harry Truman* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1994), pp. 452-53.

⁴ J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, dispatch, 22 March 1952, Box 7 (S).

⁵ See Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, "Alternative Policy Lines, 1953," and NSC, "Guatemala," 19 August 1953, *FRUS*, 4:1074 -1086.

⁶ See cable to Dulles, "Conference with ...," 4 August 1952, Box 69 (S).

⁷ See memorandum to Dulles, "Guatemalan Situation," 9 July 1952, Box 67 (S) and memorandum to Dulles, "Conference with ...," 4 August 1952, Box 69 (S).

⁸ See [] "Chronology of Meeting's Leading to Approval of Project A," 8 October 1952, Box 69 (S); to [] "Guatemala," 8 October 1952, Box 69 (S); and to Dulles, "Guatemala Situation," 9 July 1952, Box 69.

⁹ See [] "Chronology of Meetings Leading to Approval of Project A," (S). See also Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, pp. 120-22. Because of security leaks and the boasting of General Somoza about his and the Agency's role in supporting the rebellion PBFORTUNE was soon called off. Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked DCI Smith to stop the operation on October 1952.

¹⁰ See Cable 24629 OPC/OSO/WHD to [] 26 January 1952, Box 7 (S). For a list of the names and biographical data see, Chief, Economic Warfare Operations, LINCOLN to All Staff Officers, "Selection of Individuals for Disposal by Junta Group," 31 March 1954, Box 145.

¹¹ Washington Cable [] to [] 29 January 1952, Box 7 (S).

¹² [] to Headquarters, 29 January 1952, Box 10 (S).

¹³ See to [] "Guatemala Communist Personnel to be Disposed of During Military Operations of CALLIGERIS," (Castillo Armas), 18 September 1952, Box 134 (S).

¹⁴ See, Report # 3 to [] "Liaison between CALLEGERS and General Trujillo of Santo Domingo," 18 September 1952, Box 134 (S). Assassination was a nasty but frequent tool of Guatemalan politics. Arbenz himself benefitted from the killing of his arch rival for the presidency Francisco Arana in 1949.

¹⁵ See to [] memo, "Conference," 1 December 1952, Box 134 (S).

¹⁶ To [] memo, "Current Planning of Calligeris Organization," 12 December 1952, Box 134 (S). See also, Acting Chief, [] Branch, Western Hemisphere Division that reported in November 1952 that Castillo Armas was studying PW use of liquidation lists. Memorandum for the record, "PW Conference," 5 November 1952, Box 151 (S). The case officer also reported that the Arbenz government had targeted Castillo Armas for assassination.

¹⁷ See [] 30 March 1953, Box 150 (S).

¹⁸ See [] memorandum, "Proposed Course of Action U Plan is Not Continued in Present Form," undated but probably 1953, Box 154 (S).

¹⁹ Western Hemisphere Division, memo, "PBFORTUNE," 28 August 1953, Box 72 (S).

²⁰ See [] memo to [] "Guatemala - General Plan of Action," 11 September 1953, Box 5 (TS). See also the attached memorandum from [] to [] 9 September 1953 (TS).

" See Dispatch, COS Guatemala City to LINCOLN, "Death Notices," 19 April 1954, Box 99 (S)
" NSC Policy Paper, 19 August 1953, FRUS 4:1083.
" See [] to [] "Guatemala - General Plan of Action," Box 3 (TS) and []
Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS, memo for the record, "Program for PBSUCCESS," 12 November 1953,
Box 135 (C). See also, memo to [] "Summary of Directives and Instructions on PBSUCCESS," 5
November 1953, Box 142 (S). [] does not specially mention assassination either.

" [] reported on 9 December, See [] to Headquarters, 3 January
1954, Box 1 (S) and [] to Headquarters 6 January 1954, Box 1 (S). See also 38 to
Headquarters, 9 March 1954, Box 13 (S); [] to Headquarters, 4 January 1954, Box 1 (S);

" See the [] Chief to Chief, [] "CALLIGERIS Briefing Notes," 3
February 1954, Box 147 (S). See also, Chief, [] memo for
[] "Cost of Support for PBSUCCESS," 27 September 1954, Box 43 (S). He listed the 20 silenced
ruses. See also [] to Headquarters, 6 January 1954, Box 75 (S) and [] to
Headquarters, 21 January 1954, Box 1 (S).

" To [] Report #5, [] * 18 September 1952, Box 73 (S) and
[] Chief, memo for the record, "PM Conference Held at []" 13 February 1954, Box 74
(S). See also [] to Headquarters, 4 January 1954, Box 1 (S). The Headquarters Registry copy
of the pouch manifest for, 8 January 1954, Box 97 (S) lists the manual "A Study of Assassination." A
handwritten note on the original manifest says the pouch was carried to [] by []. The actual
assassination study is in Box 145 (S).

" See [] to Headquarters, 8 June 1954, Box 5 (S) or [] to
Headquarters, 8 June 1954, Box 5 (S).

" See to [] Report #22, "Current Planning of CALLIGERIS Organization," 12 December
1952, Box 134 (S) and "Contact Report," 13 January 1954, (S).

" See Dispatch, to [] "Training," 6 June 1954, Box 75
(Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybal). []

" To LINCOLN, 26 May 1954, "Tactical Instructions (part II)," (S) and To LINCOLN,
"Instructions" Nerve War Against Individuals, 9 June 1954, Box 50 (S).

" See COS Guatemala City, to Western Hemisphere Division, undated, Box 46, (C) and
Guatemala City 553 to LINCOLN, 14 May 1954. See also the COS, dispatch Guatemala City to
LINCOLN, 14 May 1954, Box 145 (S). []

" See [] memo for the record, "Weekly PBSUCCESS Meeting with []" 9 March 1954,
Box 154 (TS). Even before this meeting [] suggested that the top Guatemalan leadership
needed to be assassinated during the first hours of the revolution. They had to be "pulled out by the
roots." If we waited [] argued, "if too many of these birds get out they will be back in about
three years." See [] Tape 17, Box 209 (S). [] See []

[] "Administrative Details," 15 April 1954, Box 70 (S); [] memo for the record, "Meeting," 2
March 1954, Box 70 (S).

" [] memo for the record, "Report of Mr. [] on OAS Conference," 29 March
1954, Box 145 (TS).

" See, Chief, Economic Warfare, [] memo to All Staff Officers, "Selection of
Individuals for Disposal by Junta Group," 31 March 1954, Box 145 (S). We know [] visited
[] on this date from the [] visitors log book. He signed into [] on 31 March.
See [] Log Book for 31 March 1954, Box 178 (S).

" Memo, Box 145 (S).

" See memo and attachment notes on the memo which indicates that [] returned the list to
the file on 1 June 1954, Box 145 (S). []

" []

[]

1950. See memo to [] "Summary of Operation," 18 April 1954, Box 134 (S). See also Dispatch, [] to [] "Assets in Guatemala," 14 April 1954, Box 134 (S). An attachment notes that some assets are also on another list for "eradication" (see attachment in Box 102). See also [] to [] 5 April 1954, Box 123 (S).

* See memo for the record, "Synthesis of []'s remarks Relevant to PBSUCCESS Made at a Meeting 21 April 1954," 22 April 1954, Box 151 (S).

* See [] Officer, [] memo to [] and [] "Acts of Force Before D-Day," 16 May 1954, Box 142 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar). See also [] memo to [] Officer, undated, in which [] states, "Your views were discussed with Chief []" Box 145 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar).

* See [] to Director, 21 May 1954, Box 4 (S) and [] to Director, 21 May 1954, Box 4 (S).

* See to Headquarters, 29 May 1954, Box 13 (S). Perhaps [] Officer, [] and chief [] talked at a conference held at [] on 2 June 1954. See [] "Contact Report," 2 June 1954, Box 146 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar).

* See dispatch, [] to [] "K-Program," []* 25 May 1954, Box 145 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar).

* See "Disposal List Home Addresses," copied from an attachment to dispatch, [] to [] 1 June 1954, Box 145, (S). It contained 15 names. See also [] routing slip for the attachment (Dispatch dated 25 May 1954), Box 145 (Secret, Rybar).

* See [] draft memo, "Present Status and Possible Future Course of PBSUCCESS," 1 June 1954, Box 145 (S).

* [] memo for the record, "Points Covered in H/W Discussions of June 1 and 2," 3 June 1954, Box 145, (S). This memo is originally from Job 00075R, Box 1, Folder 3.

* See "Contact Report," 2 June 1954, Box 146 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar). See also [] memo for the record, "Points Covered in H/W Discussion of June 1 and 2," 3 June 1954 and [] note for the file, "Disposal List Prepared by O/EW," 1 June 1954, Box 145 (S).

* See [] to Headquarters, 17 June 1954, Box 75 (S); [] to Headquarters, 18 June 1954, Box 11 (S). See earlier Agency meetings with Guatemalan military leader, "First Meeting, 4 May 1954, Dispatch, [] to [] 1 June 1954, Box 134 (S); Dispatch, 11 June 1954, Box 134 (S); and Dispatch, [] to [] 4 May 1954, Box 154 (S). For []'s cable, see [] to [] 24 June 1954, Box 153 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar).

* See [] to LINCOLN, 14 June 1954, Box 93 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar); [] to LINCOLN, 19 June 1954, Box 93 (S); and LINCOLN, #175 to Headquarters, 22 June 1954, Box 93 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar).

* [] to LINCOLN, 25 June 1954, Box 146 (S) and [] to Dulles, 19 June 1954, Box 91 (S).

* See Headquarters to LINCOLN, 5837, 22 June 1954, Box 143, (TS).

* See Guatemala City 977 to LINCOLN, 27 June 1954, Box 145 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybar).

* John H. Waller, CIA Inspector General, letter to Thomas Farmer, Chairman of the Intelligence Oversight Board, 15 October 1979.

Security Information

In 14000

1

TO: []

Copy

FROM: []

Cable

Priority

Re

25 June 1952

[]

TO: []

RE: []

Following is detailed summary information furnished by []
24 June and language used which indicates opinions are his.

1. Group has opportunity buy for \$50,000 enough arms and ammunition to arm 650 men with sufficient strength to start armed revolt with good results. Arms consist of 500 hand grenades, 180 machine guns, 500 automatic rifles and about 600,000 rounds ammunition. Arms and ammo are already within the city limits and can get them in 24 hours after group has the money. Person with whom dealing is of utmost confidence and giving property valued at more than \$50,000 as security. As further security group could keep under control for 48 hours the men who receive the money until merchandise received and determined to be satisfactory. Important have tear gas tanks and request we secure some.

2. As to flying boats would have an airport in control of group and location could be told at right report. (Indicates) Flying boats should carry flare throwers, automatic arms and machine guns. Use would be to support movement after fighting starts. (Claims) Air force presently has only four old planes which can operate.

3. Revolt to take place in Guatemala City in daring coup involving several important military and government points. Detailed manner (of operation) already prepared. Could have govt disorganized in about six hours of fighting. Once [] high officials eliminated and no govt to obey knows can get some army officers give help. Have enough men not presently in army who know arms well and previously in armed forces. Preparations already made for use about 400 men who are ready to act within short notice. They only know they are about to enter action.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REVIEWED
FOR SECURITY, AS SANITIZED, BY
C.S.I./H.R.C. ON 11 JULY 1952

(continued on next page)

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

Page 2

4. Already has prepared group of professional gunmen to eliminate communists and control the unions which are well armed. Action by then to be timed with overall movement.

5. Can produce some revolt's in interior if desire attract attention of rest. No pledges received from military (active) officers but think possible get pledges last minute. Cannot trust any inactive service now.

6. Would be best to have junta including civilians and military men but this not definitely discussed yet (within group).

7. Have no assistance of men or material in neighboring countries but know of group working on that subject and could get their support if could interest that group at precise moment.

8. Funds to be used are 50,000 for mentioned arms and ammo, 20,000 representing 2,000 for each gunman in the elimination of the important communist, the latter to be paid in U.S. dollars after job done. Remainder for other expenses including salaries, foodstuffs and other emergencies such as bribing army officers at last moment.

9. Cannot be sure of success but if operate within short period have chance "maybe as good as 50-50". Intend operate if possible within two weeks. Comments: Any most difficult plan will succeed in view absence any pledged army support. Statements do not indicate [] actually has adequate confidence. Attempt should definitely be timed with Castillo Armas efforts of which pressure you informed and can judge whether [] not willing make such revelation.

~~SECRET~~

Security Information

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

2

DATE : 9 APRIL 54.

S E C R E T
Approved for Release by C.I.A.

ROUTINE

1	4
2	5
3	5

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: WR (1-3)

INFO :

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY
C.I.A./MRC ON 12 JULY 75

LINC 1725 (IN 35623)

0630Z 9 APR 54

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: SGUAT

INFO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

RYBAT/PP83UCCESS

1. CONTEMPLATING USE ORDINARY DEATH NOTICE CARDS WITH

FILLED-IN NAMES COMMIE WHEELS TO CREATE FEELING INEVITABILITY
ANTI-COMMIE VICTORY.2. REQUEST GUAT SUPPLY WASH AND LINC WITH BLANK EXEMPLARS
AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T
Approved for Release by C.I.A.

3

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: C/P

FROM: C/FI

SUBJ. CT: Status of ESI's

There follows a list of all outstanding ESI's together with comments regarding action taken thus far by C/FI and results obtained:

No. 1 - Coban Garrison. Information questionnaire sent to [] 17 March. No reply received to date.

No. 2 - Central Zone Guatemala City. According to records no information request has gone to the field.

No. 3 - Residence of []. Information request sent to [] Guatemala City 17 March. No replies received thus far.

No. 4 - Major Standard Broadcast Stations. Information request pouches to [] Guatemala City 17 March. No replies received to date.

No. 5 - Main RR Terminal Guatemala City. Information request dispatched to [] Guatemala City 17 March. No replies received to date.

No. 6 - Weather Studies. No FI action requested.

No. 7 - Zacapa Garrison. Information questionnaire hand-carried to [] 25 March. No reply received to date.

No. 8 - Jutiapa Garrison. Information questionnaire hand-carried to [] 25 March. No reply received thus far.

No. 9 - Mazatenango Garrison. Information questionnaire hand-carried to [] 25 March. No reply received to date.

No. 10 - Quetzaltenango Garrison. Information questionnaire pouches to [] 17 March. No reply received to date.

cc. C/DR
C/PH
DC/P
C/FI

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR DIVISION USE
BY [REDACTED]
ON [REDACTED]
C/ [REDACTED]
S/ [REDACTED]

No. 11 - Belize Garrison. No FI action requested.

No. 12 - El Peten Garrison. No EEI prepared as original request cancelled.

No. 13 - Puerto Barrios Garrison. Information questionnaire pouches to C [] 17 March. No reply received thus far.

No. 14 - San Jose Garrison. Information questionnaire pouches to C [] 24 March. No reply received to date.

No. 15 - Copies of MA reports from Guatemala City, Guatemala furnished list of reports on hand at LINCOLN in C [] no subsequent reply received. Cable sent 6 April asking Guatemala to forward all additional reports available.

No. 16 - ~~Not requested~~ order for 66 bound records

No. 17 - ~~Not requested~~ Black

No. 18 - SAB Target A, Air Facilities Puerto Barrios. Information request pouches to C [] 24 March. No reply received to date.

No. 19 - SAB Target B, Rail Line North of Bananera. No FI action requested.

No. 20 - SAB Target C, Road Conditions. No FI action requested.

No. 21 - SAB Target D, Condition North Road. No FI action requested.

No. 22 - SAB Target E, Rail Line Quulan to Zacapa. No FI action requested.

No. 23 - SAB Target F, Rail Line Quulan to Zacapa. No FI action requested.

No. 24 - SAB Target G, Rail Conditions from Guatemala City. No FI action requested.

No. 25 - SAB Target H, Road conditions near San mateo. No FI action requested.

No. 26 - SAB Targets I, J, and K, Rail Situation Guatemala City Area. No FI action requested.

No. 27 - SAB Target L, Aurora Airport. Information dispatch pouches to Guatemala City 7 April. S-3 7

No. 27 - S/2 Target P, P, G & I, Radio stations. No FI action taken thus far except in connection with REI No. 1.

No. 29 - S/2 Target P, Air Facilities: San Jose. Information request passed to C 24 Kirch. No reply received to date.

No. 30 - S/2 Target Q, Road Conditions near Villa Nueva. No FI action requested.

No. 31 - S/2 Target R, Rail Line between Palin and Laguna de Carrizal. No FI action requested.

No. 32 - S/2 Target S, Road Conditions between Patricia and Santiago. No FI action requested.

No. 33 - S/2 Target T, Road Conditions between Totonicapan and Quetzaltenango. No FI action requested.

No. 34 - S/2 Target U, Road Conditions between Asuncion Mita and Jutiapa. No FI action requested.

No. 35 - S/2 Target V, Power Sources Guatemala City. Guatemala cable of 29 March provided partial answers.

No. 36 - Terrain Study Los Amates Area. No FI action requested.

No. 37 - Aerial Rail Networks between Los Amates and La Union. No FI action requested.

No. 38 - Aerial Photo Study of Area 55 Qualen. No FI action requested.

No. 39 - Communication Study of Qualen Area. No FI action requested.

No. 40 - Aerial Photo Study of Area 5 of Asuncion Mita. No FI action requested.

No. 41 - Communications Study of Asuncion Mita. No FI action requested.

No. 42 - Aerial Photo Study of Tenedores Area. No FI action requested.

No. 43 - Aerial Photo Study of Entre Rios Area. No FI action requested.

No. 44 Aerial photo study of Coban area. No action requested.

No. 45 Anti-air power enemy capabilities. FI action requested 9 April 1954.

No. 46 Communications System in Quat City. FI action requested 9 April 1954.

No. 47 Not covered previously. Action requested.

No. 48 Aerial photo study of area between Lago de Amatitlan and Escuintla and Amatitlan and Palin. U. further action.

No. 49 Aerial photo study of Encuentros. - I recd. U. further action.

No. 50 Aerial photo study of Mazatenango

No. 51 Aerial photo study of area south of Asuncion Mts.

No. 52 Police Check points in Quat City, road to Gualan and road to Salvador.

No. 53 Railroad yards in Quat City. Completed. No further action.

No. 54 Shooting Club (Caza Tiro y Pesca)

No. 55 Possible Sab target: Cotton stored near Escuintla

No. 56 Diario de Centro America Anniv. Edition—Arana Assassination

No. 57 Selection of Drop Zones in Jalepa (CG 2779)

No. 58 Selection of Drop Zone BG 9075

No. 59 Possible Purchase of Station TGA for Panic Broadcasts.

No. 60

No. 61 Selection of Drop Zone Area SE Mazatenango (AG 6166, Radius 5 miles)

No. 62 Selection of Drop Zone Area W of Chiquimula (CG 5315 Radius 5 miles)

No. 63 Selection of Drop Zone, Area SW of Jutiapa (CG 2845, Radius 5 miles)

No. 64 Receivers for Panic Broadcasts.

15 September 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, WH

FROM :

SUBJECT: Assassins designated by Guatemalan to kill CALLIDERIS

SOURCE : [] para. #1.
[] para. #2.

Gen. Carias

1. As of 10 June 1953 the following men were known to be [] on assignment from the Guatemalan government to assassinate CALLIDERIS, [] and, General Carias of Honduras.

True Name	Present Cover Name	Nationality
[]	?	Not known
Juan José NOLAZCO		Dominican Republic
Germán Ruiz MONTEJO		Not known
Manuel Lobos MONZON		Cuban
[]	?	Guatemalan

The group has its own automobile (make not known) in []. The automobile bears Guatemalan tags for 1953 with the number; 1821. Mr [] is the chauffeur for the group.

2. In August 1953 [] reported that the THREE(3) men listed below were assigned to assist the men listed in para. 1. above. The full names, nor the present whereabouts, of these men is not known.

CASTRO
META
VILLALOBAN

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS UNRESTRICTED BY
CSET Rule 10
ON 11 JUNE 1954

ALIAS: E

AGE: 29 años

PROFESSION: Comerciante

MILITARY GRADE: None

YEARS MILITARY SERVICE: None

MILITARY SPECIALTY: None

OBSERVATIONS: Fairly intelligent; good assassin
possibilities; extremely cooperative;
hard worker; fairly good qualities
for small group leader;

Recommended: assassin
 Sab-Leader

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

P.O.W.

1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 28 MAY 54

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: WH (PBS) (1-3)

INFO : WH (4)

6

LINC 2919 (IN 49471) 23267 28 MAY 54

ROUTINE
RELEASEDTO: (OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE) C INFO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

FOR C AND C

C STATES TWO UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS REPORTEDLY LEFT

C FOR C 14 MAY TO KILL CALLIGER IS C TRYING
TO OBTAIN IDENTITIES AND CONFIRMATION.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

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THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS STATED
ON 13 JULY 1986
C.S.I./HAG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 16 JUNE 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
 FROM : LINCOLN
 ACTION: WH (PBS) (1-3)
 INFO : WH (4)

7

LINC 3882 (IN 18341) 01297 16 JUN 54

ROUTINE
PRIORITY

TO: PRITY SHERWOOD INFO: DIR CITE: SLING
 PBSUCCESS RYBAT
 FOR [] INSTRUCTION 4.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
 FOR RELEASE AS AUTHORIZED
 BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 ON 1 JULY 1985

1. OPERATIONAL:

A. REPORT IMMEDIATELY WHAT TIME YOU STARTED BROADCASTING AT SITE

B. CABLE DAILY BRIEF SUMMARY CONTENTS OF DAY'S PROGRAMS

2. GENERAL DIRECTIVES:

A. INCREASE STRESS ON POSITIVE, CONFIDENT, AGGRESSIVE TENOR ALL BROADCASTS:

OUR OPPOSITION IS ON WINNING SIDE, ENEMY IS PANICKY, RETREATING, BESET BY INTERNAL QUARRELS.

B. IF ACTUAL STORIES INSUFFICIENT TO GIVE ABOVE IMPRESSION, SUPPLEMENT BY APPROPRIATE FICTITIOUS ITEMS, CONGRATULATING VARIOUS GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS FOR HAVING "ELIMINATED" COMMIE AGENTS, POLICE INFORMERS, FOR COMMIE ARMS CACHES UNCOVERED, PRIVATE AIRPLANE CABINET MEMBER SABOTAGED TO PREVENT

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

16 JUNE 54

LINC 3882 (IN 18341)

PAGE -2-

HIS FLIGHT FROM COUNTRY, OR THE LIKE.

3. COMMENT ON GOVT PRESS PUBLISHING MANY MESSAGES OF "SUPPORT" FOR ARBENZ REGIME, ALLEGEDLY FROM LOCAL UNION, PEASANT GROUPS AND FROM ABROAD. MOST CASES, SIGNERS TERRORIZED INTO SIGNING; MANY OTHER MESSAGES SIMPLY INVENTED, OLD COMMIE PRACTICE. WARN AGAINST SIGNING.

4. SHARP PERSONAL ATTACK AGAINST []

[] RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE ILLEGAL ARRESTS, HOUSE SEARCHES, BUT ESPECIALLY TORTURES, UNEXPLAINED DISAPPEARANCES AND DEATHS OF ANTI-COMMUNISTS. FOR A FEW MORE DAYS, HE MAY HAVE CHOICE BECOMING EITHER GUAT'S BERIA OR HIMMLER. BUT BERIA, SOVIET SECRET POLICE CHIEF, THOUGH MARSHAL, DIED BEFORE FIRING SQUAD AFTER SECRET TRIAL, HIMMLER, NAZI SECRET POLICE CHIEF, HAD TO SWALLOW POISON TO ESCAPE EXECUTION. WHICH SHALL IT BE? WARNING TO RANK AND FILE
SEPARATE YOURSELF FROM YOU CRIMINAL LEADERS, BUT TIME IS RUNNING OUT!

5. SPECIAL APPEAL TO TEACHERS. 25 JUNE, NATIONAL TEACHERS DAY, WILL BE MISUSED BY COMMIES TO ENLIST TEACHERS AID DEFENSE ARBENZ-FORTUNY REGIME UNDER PRETEXT COMMEMORATION FIGHT AGAINST UBICO. (PILGRIMAGE GRAVE TEACHER KILLED FIGHTING UBICO REGIME INTENDED). SHEEREST HYPOCRISY: OVERTHROWING UBICO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

16 JUNE 54

LINC 3882 (IN 18341)

PAGE-3-

WAS HISTORICALLY NECESSARY, BUT COMMIE DICTATORSHIP EVEN
WORSE THAN ANY PREVIOUS TYRANNY.

ALL EDUCATION RUSSIA CONTROLLED BY COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE,
STUDENTS MUST INFORM AGAINST TEACHERS WHO HAVE INDEPENDENT
OPINION, NOT ONLY IN POLITICS, BUT SCIENCE, RELIGION, PRIVATE
LIVES. NO TRUE TEACHER CAN ENDORSE COMMIE DISTORTION HISTORY,
SCIENCE, TOTAL SUPPRESSION OF TRUTH. DO NOT GO TO COMMIE
INSPIRED COMMEMORATION! THINK OF YOU AND YOUR COUNTRY'S
FUTURE!

6. GUAT PRESS UNDER CENSORSHIP CONSISTS EITHER COMMIE
PROPAGANDA OR DENIAL ALLEGED RUMORS. THEY MUST DENY THERE IS
TENSION AND UNREST, THEY MUST DENY THAT THE GOVT PLANS TRAVEL
RESTRICTIONS OF GUATS AND FOREIGNERS TO U.S. CUBA, SALVADOR,
THAT ARBENZ ORDERED THE MEXICAN BORDER CLOSED, THAT CURRENCY
REFORM IS IN THE MAKING. APPEAL: DO NOT READ CENSORED PRESS,
LISTEN TO OUR UNCENSORED RADIO.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 11 JUNE 54

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : []

ACTION: DD/P (L) (1)

INFO : DCI (2), D/DCI (3), WH (PBS) (4-6), WH (7), SA/PO/DCI (8)

8

C D(IN 16929)

1933Z 11 JUN 54

PRIORITY
PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE

TO: PRITY SLINC

INFO: PRITY DIR

CITE: []

TC []

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

FROM []

1. BELIEVE WAR OF NERVES WORKING ON [] AMBASSADOR TO [] WHO NOT EATING AND APPEARS ON VERGE OF COLLAPSE. PUTS UP BRAVE FRONT BUT SINCE DOES NOT DRINK, POUCHES UNDER EYES INDICATE IN BAD SHAPE FROM WORRY. HE MAY BE HARD CORE COMMIE, BUT BEGINNING DOUBT.

2. AS DISTINGUISHED FROM HIS LINE OF SIX WEEKS AGO TO EFFECT "NO COMMIES IN [] AND DENIAL KNOWLEDGE FORTUNY, HE NOW PROPOSES [] CAN AND WILL CLEAN OWN HOUSE. SUSPECT HE MAY HAVE SINCERELY ACCEPTED AS FACT THIS CHANGE OF PROPAGANDA LINE.

3. BELIEVE HE FEARS HE ON THE LIST. SUCH LISTING STRATEGY BOUND HAVE EFFECT; SUGGEST CALLIGERIS FOLLOW THIS UP, GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION ATTEMPT DEFECTON SUBJECT WITH CALLIGERIS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11 JUNE 54

[] (IN 16929)

PAGE 2

PERSONAL PROMISE IMMUNITY AS TEST CASE.

4. FURTHER SUGGEST TELL [] AMBASSADOR [] AND OTHER POTENTIAL DEFECTORS SOVIET HAS ABANDONED SUPPORT [] AS BEACHHEAD DUE [] AND HEMISPHERIC REACTIONS. SOVIET HAS NOW ACTIVATED SECOND TARGET PLAN INVOLVING MARTYRDOM [] AS PROPAGANDA WEAPON FOR LONG RANGE HEMISPHERE OBJECTIVES. SUGGEST APPROACH POTENTIAL DEFECTORS WITH QUESTION "DO YOU WANT TO BE A SOVIET MARTYR?".

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

410
INIT
KT : 603
DATE : 28 JUNE 1954

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE



ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : SENIOR REP. [REDACTED]

FROM : DIR, CIA

ONR : DO/P (L) (1)

INFO : DCI (2), D/DCI (3), SA/PC/DCI (4), WH (PBS) (5-7), WH (8)

DIR 06778 (OUT 57914) 1735Z 28 JUN 54 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO: [REDACTED] K

RTBAT/PBSUCCESS

REF: [REDACTED] (IN 22794)

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE QUOTE UNQUOTE IS FROM [REDACTED] PURSUANT
TO [REDACTED] REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

"A. YOU SHOULD STATE TO [REDACTED] AND HIS GROUP THAT YOUR
ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR REQUEST OF YESTERDAY TO USE YOUR QUOTE GOOD
OFFICES UNQUOTE WAS, AS THEY WILL DISTINCTLY RECALL, EXPRESSLY
CONDITIONED UPON THEIR AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY TO OUTLAW COMMUNISM
AND OUST COMMUNISTS.

"B. HOWEVER BY PERMITTING ARBENZ TO RESTORE AND TO MAKE A
STRONG COMMUNIST SPEECH AND, FOLLOWING THIS, BY [REDACTED]
MAKING OWN SPEECH PRAISING ARBENZ AND SUBSCRIBING TO HIS VIEWS,

[REDACTED] HAS BROKEN HIS WORD AND FORFEITED ANY CLAIM UPON YOU
FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE. YOUR POSITION REMAINS IDENTICAL TO THAT
WHICH YOU TOOK YESTERDAY AND ONLY WHEN [REDACTED] AND HIS GROUP
HAVE DONE WHAT THEY PROMISED AND UNDERTOOK, VIZ., EFFECTIVELY

COORDINATING OFFICER



RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

S E C R E T

ROUTINE

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : [REDACTED]
FROM : [REDACTED]
CONF : [REDACTED]
INFO : [REDACTED]

PAGE TWO

01R 06778 (OUT 5791)

PRIORITY

OUTLAWING COMMUNISM AND QUOTING COMMUNISTS, WILL YOU CONSIDER USING
YOUR GOOD OFFICES. END QUOTE.

2. FOLLOWING FROM [REDACTED] ONLY, ALTHOUGH DISCUSSED WITH [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WILL MOVE RE COMMUNISTS IT WOULD BE OUR HOPE HE WOULD TAKE
IMMEDIATE STEPS ARREST THEM AND HOLD THEM INCOMMUNICADO IN JAIL. IT WOULD
BE MOST HAPPY RESULT IF THEY SHOULD RESIST ARREST MOVEMENT BY [REDACTED]
THUS "FORCING" [REDACTED] TAKE PROPER MEASURES."

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER Copy No.

~~TOP SECRET~~

10

1 June 1954

THIS DOCUMENT
FOR RELEASE
CSE
11 JULY 1966
IS APPROVED
BY
DIA

Memorandum

TO: Chief/ Project
FROM: C/[]
SUBJECT: Provocation Plans

1. The following tentative suggestions are submitted for your consideration and possible further study. They are based on these basic assumptions:

- a) D-Day must be reached within 30 days since weather conditions, political considerations and increasing security risks do not permit further postponements.
- b) It is unlikely that the Project objective can be achieved by the means originally provided, i.e. primarily by CALLIGERIS' invading forces.
- c) It is desirable that the events which might lead to the overthrow of the Guatemalan Government should at the same time either divert responsibility further away from the United States government or, on the contrary, provide justification for United States or even international (Panamerican) intervention.

2. I submit that under these circumstances, only a compact series of provocations, both domestic and foreign — i.e. inside Guatemala and outside, but attributable to Guatemalan government and communist forces — may conceivably have the desired result. The addition of a foreign provocation of major proportions appears mandatory since only action outside Guatemala can furnish justification for "interference with the internal affairs of a sovereign nation", in the eyes of international law as well as in the eyes of Guatemalan and international public opinion.

3. The most believable case of such a foreign provocation would seem to be a simulated Guatemalan aggression against Honduras. Recent developments there, the Guatemala-supported (if not Guatemala-provoked) strike, recall of two Guatemalan consuls for interference in that strike, today's revelations by Somoza's "spokesman" — all combined will make virtually any forthcoming hosti

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PT
PPC

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

acts against Honduras believable for many people in Guatemala and in Honduras as elsewhere. [

4. The proposed provocation in Honduras might be built up around the following events:

- a) a bomb of Soviet origin explodes under Galvez' car, just one minute after he got out or a minute before he got into the car; the would-be assassin is to be arrested and will confess that he is a member of the PCT (membership book in pocket?), that he was introduced by a leading PCT official (Fortuny who is now "ill" ??) either to a mythical Soviet officer -- or, perhaps better, to one of the actually reported foreign agents somehow involved in the arms shipment (Zatz & Co) who hired him, appealing to his communist idealism to assist in the liberation of Honduras by killing Galvez. Some rough notes, possibly a "get-away" passport with a Soviet, Polish or other communist visa, might be found on him.
- b) a group of Guatemalans is captured by a Honduran border patrol near the Guatemalan border, but on Honduran territory, equipped with Soviet arms, with military maps, etc. A member of the group will admit that they are advance scouts of a Guatemalan force about to cross the border. (This should be coordinated with actual movements of Guatemalan troops in the same general area to lend credence to the story.)
- c) a plane with Guatemala air force insignia should appear over Tegu, dropping leaflets which announce that the Guat troops come as liberators, calling upon the workers and peasants to disarm the forces of dictator Galvez, etc. (The same announcement might be made by radio over the wave length of an official Guat station). The leaflets may be printed in the form of a one-page special edition of the semi-official Guat Diario de Centro America.
- d) a "premature" cable from the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, addressed to the presumable leader of the Honduran Communists -- or to Fortuny, c/o National Palace, Tegu --, might convey congratulations to the successful liberation and offer a Soviet loan and other "economic, educational and cultural help" to build up a people's democracy in Honduras.

5. Action along the above lines might be supplemented by whatever local action the situation there permits, for instance, provoking the local communists into rioting before government buildings, or the like. The details of the entire plan ought to be discussed thoroughly [

] CALLIGERIS, before action is decided upon.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6. The possibility cannot be excluded that a provocation attempt of the above type may succeed "too well", that is, that the local communists and other enemies of the regime, already armed and otherwise encouraged by Guat, may consider our provocation the signal and may proceed to overthrow the apparently weak and wavering Galvez regime. It will therefore be necessary to arrange for a strong U.S. amphibious or airborne force to stand by sufficiently near, ready to intervene at a moment's notice if the situation should get out of hand. This intervention would then be legitimate aid under the OAS mutual assistance pact since the U.S. troops would enter by request of Galvez. (From there, it might be possible to have the troops advance into Guatemala, still as aid to the defense of Honduras, if this is desired.)

7. In addition, a series of provocations should be set off inside Guatemala, starting several days before action in Honduras begins. This might be initiated with incidents like the following:

- a) Setting fire either to a UPCO-owned finca, or to the house of a wealthy Guat land owner, finding the shell of a Soviet-made incendiary bomb (Napalm container?) nearby.
- b) Kidnapping some people who are anti-communist and sufficiently prominent, perhaps even pretending murder: for instance, the wife and children of an American business man disappear: one might find bloodstained women's clothes at the shore of a nearby lake or swamp and some clues indicating that the murderer and/or kidnappers were communists, e.g. a crude inscription "Death to all Capitalists" with sickle and hammer on the wall of the house, or the like.
- c) Desecrating a church or a cemetery, preferably a national shrine like the Cathedral in Antigua, for instance, by painting Lenin's "Religion is Opium for the People" (would fit in with our black leaflet from the "fighting Godless")
- d) Distributing a black communist leaflet, giving the ideological justification for the above acts, proclaiming people's terror against domestic capitalists and their church allies as well as against foreign imperialists and interventionists.

8. After a few days of the above have created a sufficiently strong impression of beginning communist terror, counter measures would set in, beginning with blowing up PGT offices, attacking homes of communist officials, using "personal nerve-war" techniques (see instructions for [] part II) to the utmost. If technically feasible, the forcible liberation of the prisoners at Salama might have strong symbolic, encouraging effects. This might at the same time have value as a diversionary manoeuver.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. D-Day inside Guat must be properly coordinated with events in Honduras, as suggested in para 4 above. It might be best to plan D-Day one or two days after the beginning of events in Honduras. The tie-in might be provided by the black broadcast suggested in para 4, in which we either imitate Arbenz' voice or read a statement attributed to him: this would be the signal for the assassination of [] and the others (I strongly recommend including [] in that list.)

10. I am in no position to judge to which extent it will still be possible to carry out original D-Day plans any further -- but the succession of events suggested in the present memo, if accompanied by maximum publicity and properly exploited by all remaining PNSCCESS assets might be expected to create a situation in which even a small force could overthrow the government, assuming of course, that the Guat Army assumes a friendly or at least neutral attitude towards our enterprise.

[]

Chief, []

[]

31 May 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19

OUTGOING CABLE

LINCOLN STATION COPY

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
CSE/MRC ON 11 JULY 95

PRIORITY

TO: GUATEMALA

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

FROM: LINCOLN

TOT: 23 MAY 1954

INFO: DIRECTOR, ()

TO: SCTAT

INFO: DIRECTOR, ()

CIRCS: SLINC

REBATE - PRSUCCESS

REF: A. ()

B. GUAT 642

25 MAY

1. POUCH() FOR() ALL ADDITIONAL INFO FROM() AND OTHER SOURCES
ON() FINCA. SKETCH OF BUILDINGS NEEDED FOR SAB PLANS.

2. LINC POUCHING() COPY REF. A.

END OF MESSAGE

SEN¹

NO¹

DISTRIBUTION
1 - Station File
2 - Originator
3 - Subject

()
ORIGINATOR:

()
APPROVED BY:

()
AUTHENTICATOR:

~~SECRET~~

20

Routing Form

indicate title of person to take action and that of the originator. Place comments there under by numbered paragraphs. Initial in center of page and draw a line across the page and forward. Each recipient is to repeat above procedure until action completed and ready for filing. This cover-sheet must be retained with enclosure.

Doc. No. 611-977

Date: 27 June 1995

TO:

FROM:

DATE:

ORIGIN

Subj:

To: 611-977, CAG-911

REQUEST IMMEDIATE AUTHORITY TO

LOCATED

LOCATED

WE WOULD BE THERE ON 27 JUNE

NOT CHOULD JAM HIM (CONSTANTLY)

1. FORM SET UP AS COMM CENTER
2. FORM SET UP AS COMM CENTER
AND DEBILY NAMED TWO LEGIMATE
MILITARY TARGET

DEFCON 2

LE COIN

TO: DIR

XII

CLYDE SLING

RYBAT/PILOTERS

RPT: OCAT 977

CONFIDENTIAL
EXPIRE

27 JUNE 1950

1. REQUEST IMMEDIATE AUTHORITY TO BOMB. PARK LOCATED NEAR
ON CHARGE WE WOULD BE THERE ON 27 JUNE IF NOT BOMBED KIA KIM POSSIBLY.
2. PARK SET UP AS DONGA CENTRE AND HEAVILY ARMED THIS LEGITIMATE MILITARY

TARGET.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

21

OUTGOING CABLE

LINCOLN STATION 0301

TO: SHERWOOD

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

FROM: LINCOLN STATION 0301

TOT: 27166 1954

INFO: DIRECTOR

TO: SHERWOOD
INFO: DIR (PRITI)
RIBAT/PBSUCCESS

CITE: SLINC 4439 1445

FOR []

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
C5I/NRC ON 11 JUL 95

1. TARGET: [] FARM

2. PRIORITY: S-3

MISSING PRINCIPAL BUILDINGS. STRAFE ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL AND AIR
A/C ON SMALL AIRSTRIP NEARBY.

4. INSTRUCTIONS: LOCATE SMALL TOWN [] NOTE DIRT
ROAD LEADING SOUTH OF TOWN ONE MILE CROSSES RIVER LESS THAN MILE FURTHER SOUTH SAME
ROAD IS WOODEN BRIDGE. FARM JUST SOUTH OF BRIDGE AND LARGEST IN AREA. WITHIN
ONE MILE RADIUS OF FARM IS [] AIRSTRIP.

END OF MSG

copy

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Station File
- 1 - Originator
- 1 - Subject

[] ORIGINATOR:

APPROVED BY:

~~SECRET~~

[] AUTHENTICATOR:

VIA AIR POUCH

RYBAT
PBSUCCESS
CIA
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

DISPATCH NO. []

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
PSI/MRG ON 12 JULY 95

TO : LINCOLN

DATE: 29 MARCH 1954

FROM : []

INFO: CHIEF, []

SUBJECT: General - Weekly Progress Reports: []
Specific - Period 23 through 29 March 1954, incl.

REF: []

1. Attached hereto are weekly progress reports for Station respective [] projects.
2. Separate dispatch [] has attached the dictated debriefings of [] in re the [] conversations. The debriefings are still prepared by the same procedure as outlined in the past. (See [] Para 2, etc.)

[] 7

ENCLOSURES:

Reports - []

29 March 1954

DISTRIBUTION:

2-LINCOLN w/encl as noted above in duplicate.
1-Washington w/encl as noted above in single copy.
2-Files w/encl as noted above in single copy.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WEEKLY [] OPERATIONAL REPORT
Period 23 through 29 March 1954, incl.

C 7/11:

The debriefings of [] in re the [] conversations, as dictated by [] are an attachment to separate dispatch []. The last meeting was the 13th one and held Tuesday, 23 March 1954. [] then returned to Guatemala and it is presumed he has not returned since he has not as of this date contacted [] who is prepared to attempt to persuade him to delay any assassination attempts as well as to comply with the substance of LINC 1329, LINC 1332, and LINC 1291.

C 7/12:

[] has been submitted in re intelligence which is not particularly pertinent to PBUCCESS. The [] plan to cutout [] must be held in abeyance pending an operational clearance of [] whose present clearance (See LINC 1234, Para 2) is so limited that no effective use can result therefrom. Advice will be appreciated whether or not the [] should seek for and submit another identity for this task. Of the two Communists, who are believed by [] as prepared to double, one has agreed to submit a report on the Communist situation in Santa Ana while the other is still regarded as waiving. [] has yet to be convinced their turning is bonafide and continues to explore their records and motivation. It will be helpful when a response is received to .

C 7/13:

[] progresses in his development of the [] through both [] and []. [] No intelligence production has yet been forthcoming.

C 7/14:

The [] has been contacted through his wife and upon first available opportunity will proceed to the finca of [] who has pertinent questions on hand to put to him. It is noteworthy that his temporary duty is evidently to reinforce [] to the detriment of the []. [] and his answer to the questions prepared for [] are anticipated as revealing more of the Guatemalan present [] procedures and assignments.

[] is alerted for the visit of [] and will cooperate fully. He will be informed of [] name of the moment by [] who has given him a piece of a playing card the other half of which will be given [] to insure proper recognition.

Att # 1-50:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

C D REPORT (cont.)

C 2/15:

C >, as well as E >, has apparently exhausted the possible airstrips and fincas for C although both continue to be alert for new prospects. C is prepared to contact pertinent persons owning Airstrip 2 if necessary as well as finca A.

C 2/16:

Held in abeyance for potential use as previously described.

C 2/17:

No change.

~~SECRET~~

WEEKLY [] OPERATIONAL REPORT
Period: 23 Mar thru 29 Mar 54, incl.

C 1/3:

The present status of this project is presumed dictated by C [] and C [] is awaiting receipt of the letter of para 3 thereof. Meanwhile one-way communications, C [] to C [] continue as before.

C 1/4:

C [] has arranged to procure records of the sample scripts. He has been apprised scripts will suffice but is unwilling to approve the scripts until he has actually heard the sample. C [] is expediting this to the best of its ability without actually alienating C []

C 1/5:

C [] has undertaken the procurement of 4 copies each of issues of C [] and C [] in accordance with C []

~~SECRET~~

Att # 2 to:

~~SECRET~~
WEEKLY C D OPERATIONAL REPORT
Period: 23 Mar thru 29 Mar 54, incl.

c 2/ : (finca and airports)

Answer to LING 1392 is expected momentarily and will be cabled upon receipt.

c 7/ : (train project)

No change. C D prepared to discuss methods with C upon arrival
if C D so desires.

c 3/ :

C D will be alerted for his arrival upon our receipt of his ETA and
proposed nationality and current working alias.

~~SECRET~~

ad #3 t:

VIA AIR POUCH

HYBAT
PRESUCCESS
~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. ~~25~~

25
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
CSI/HRG ON 12 JULY 95

TO : LINCOLN

DATE: 29 MARCH 1954

FROM : []

INFO: CHIEF, []

SUBJECT: General - Political Action, []
Specific - Debriefings of []

Conversations.

In re: []

REF: [] LINC 1329; LINC 1291.

1. The attached debriefings of [] were dictated by []. They are unchanged except for substitution of pertinent cryptonyms, editing for sentence structure, and occasional []. Comment when indicated. The latter is clearly denoted as such.
2. LINCOLN is reminded that while [] apparently has [] personal confidence and has obtained from information which is of no little importance to [] and his followers, nevertheless, he has never been in a position or been given the means whereby he can establish a concrete, effective control over [].
3. Messages of the type LINC 1291 are appreciated since, when the pertinent substance is relayed [], it unquestionably builds up his moral but messages of the type LINC 1329 could well at this stage of the game sabotage the operation were the full contents and implications made known to [].
4. As previously explained to [] at LINCOLN the morning of 18 March 1954, [] are undertaking this operation from a sense of pure patriotism and both are manifestly exposing themselves and their families to a real and present danger in the event [] should reach a conclusion he is being double-crossed or dealt with unfairly. Both [] were reluctant to undertake the assignment and have several times since stated they desire to withdraw. They have been prevented from so withdrawing only by the subterfuge of being prevailed upon to stand by "for another week" in expectation the situation will clarify. How long [] can thusly continue to prevail over their patience and just fears cannot be reasonably prognosticated.
5. To recapitulate:
 - a. [] are undertaking their responsibilities in spite of their own better judgement and are motivated entirely by patriotism. They may insist on withdrawing from the operation.

~~SECRET~~

1 APR 1954

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

B. There is currently no concrete, effective control over [] and we must rely on the personal position [] has achieved with him.

6. It is adamantly recommended a [] conference be arranged at the soonest possible date with []

- A. To relieve the pressure and potential adverse reaction to which [] is exposed by the present situation; and
- B. To achieve thereby an elementary contractual control over []

7. In answer to specific questions posed by the noted references, it has been ascertained:

A. The method of contact between [] has not yet been ascertained due to the presumed absence of [] from [] Guatemala. (LINC 1332)

B. [] has previously reported he holds both [] and [] in high regard as military professionals. He thinks [] should hold the office of Minister of Defense but that the actual control of the military should be vested in [] who, for reasons previously reported, shuns official office. (LINC 1291, Para 3)

C. [] has not been available for query regarding the purported statements that he has a superior position to CALLIGERIS. It is however manifest to the [] that such a report could well be inspired by either or both the following:

1. CALLIGERIS, who hopes thereby to decrease the stature of [] and rally to himself more opposition forces and funds; and/or
2. The current Guatemalan regime, which hopes by this means to drive an irreconcilable wedge between [] CALLIGERIS. (LINC 1329)

D. [] is not in a position to evaluate [] nor has it the Headquarters resume of his record. On the surface it would only occur to us that he bears an [] and his family have not only []

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Guatemala but their name to [] [] []
The [] has no information which would indicate other than
that he is a good professional soldier; a patriotic Guatemalan
who sincerely detests Communism; and a person against whom
there has been no implication nor suspicion of intrigue with
the Communists or of hostility to PRSCML. He apparently has
investments in PRSCML which could possibly be maneuvered
into some form of a control over him. (LINC 1271, Para 3)

INCLUSION:

Debriefings of 23 March 1954
[] meeting

[]
29 March 1954

DISTRIBUTION:

2-LINCOLN w/encl in duplicate
1-Washington w/encl in single copy.
2-File w/encl in single copy.

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Debriefing of []

In re: [] meeting of Tuesday, 23 March 1954 (13th meeting)

1. The following accounting is rendered by [] of the \$2000 given to him by []

\$500 [] [] to be passed on to [] [] to be used in the Departments of San Marcos and Quetzaltenango.

\$2500 to 18 different people in the area which includes [] for arms and ammunition, and to enlarge the mechanism for transporting arms shipments [] []

[] He is a former part [] and runs a small store [] [] When [] [] visited there on a market day the man immediately closed his store and went [] to Guatemala with [] [] who gave him \$25 to help him out. This requires an operational expense of the type which can not be avoided.

\$200 to [] [] to be used in Chiquimula to activate that area.

\$200 to [] [] in Jutiapa for the same purpose.

\$200 spent in Jalapa (100 of which went to [] [] and \$100 to [] [])

The \$1600 over and above the \$2000 indicated by the above total was provided by [] [] from his own funds. The \$3000 now requested will be used for the same purposes and similar accounting rendered.

2. [] [] reaction to our request for detailed accounting was philosophical and good natured. He said, however, he was reminded of a cartoon several years ago by Bill Mauldin in which two men were depicted in a shell hole receiving a directive from Headquarters reading that the General wanted them to report the number of sardine tins opened the past month. In a more serious vein he then stated several thousand of his loyal people are already alerted and in action and orders, necessary to the success of the operation, have already been given to kill certain key people. Although he has a distaste for business of this sort of the resulting period of turmoil he can not decline to do what is necessary to rid his country of the Communist plague. In order to accomplish this, some blood must be spilled. He stated further that he has given us, without reservation,

all important and secret information for the success of this movement-- his key men, his means, and his organization. This has been given in good faith. He further stated that he consented to meet [] only because of the integrity and loyalty of [] who recommended the [] in the highest of terms. However, he cannot help but recall a past time when he was approached in a similar manner by a group of [] officers who, after obtaining his confidence, forwarded the secret information given them to the ARBEMZ Government in Guatemala. As a result many loyal lives were lost and the natural suspicion arose in Guatemala that he could well have sold the information to ARBEMZ himself. He said his position in the event of betrayal would be untenable.

3. [] comment: They believe some direct contact with [] high level members should be made, preferably outside of [] with [] whether or not it is denied this man become aligned with []. His top secret information and data have been made available to the [] : [] his complete confidence has been obtained; and he has in good faith energized his channels to prepare for effective transportation of arms and ammunition [] Instructions have been issued for elimination of [] key people in the ARBEMZ organization. It is felt direct contact with [] is necessary for the reason that if nothing is done with this man he will feel that he has been deceived and might use the confirmed means at his disposal in a retaliatory manner against [] and possibly []. The importance of such a meeting cannot be over-emphasized as relieving the pressure on [] and, possibly, on []

4. In a discussion of what he stood for and whom he can meet in Guatemala, [] stated anyone who had received backing from the [] or had been known to receive funds from that source would completely fail in the long run in Guatemala even with superior arms and forces. If they are successful in forcing their way into power they will fail because the Guatemalan people will reject such an alliance and its implications. A partnership with the [] implies a reversion to the old order and atmosphere since it would be a re-entry of the same predominating influence. Such a return, en toto, is impossible.

5. Comment of [] He was told the following several months before he undertook the present duties for [] by an influential person who was then and still is very friendly with the []. [] "For the sake of proper diplomatic policy on the part of the U.S. Government upon the installation of a non-Communist Government in Guatemala which will be acceptable to the people of that country, it is very unfortunate the United States Department of State finds it necessary to dance to the tune of the [] regardless of whether this tune be correct or incorrect, because both Communists and non-Communists detest the []. It is a great mistake that the U.S. has exposed itself to this charge". [] stated he wanted no alliance with

or other foreign nationalistic parties. He is fighting for his country only. Before accepting the first money he asked if the [] was associated with []

6. The next payment of funds will be utilized on the same basis as previous payment. All names and details will be given.

7. Further comment of [] In comparing CALLIGERIS and [] thought should be given to the following. CALLIGERIS has double-crossed [] many times. Nevertheless, the only statement [] has made about CALLIGERIS is that, in spite of CALLIGERIS' previous performances, [] is willing to cooperate with him for the good of his country. reaction is kinder than that of CALLIGERIS who has from time to time issued vitriolic derogatory statements about []. [] states any known connection with the American Government or American business would only sabotage his movement if such association became public knowledge. Can CALLIGERIS have at heart the real interest of disposing the current Guatemalan Communist Government if he in any way attempts to impede the movement of []

8. []

9. []

10. The radio station, [] is believed to be working on a frequency of 19 megacycles. Illness of the [] informer precluded expert advice so this information had to be obtained by a man not technically qualified.

11. The Guatemalan Government is excited about the results of Caracas and is expecting invasion or uprising at any moment. [] states nightly foot patrols have been initiated at critical points or wherever the garrisons are not known to be politically reliable. One place guarded is the palm thatched roofs in Zacapa.

12. [] has definitely determined large quantities of arms can be moved []

13. [] a contact of [] in Guatemala, is now in Sal Salvador and has in his possession 50 machine guns.

VIA: COURIER
(SPECIAL AIR OR SEA MAIL)

DISPATCH NO.

Lincolin
(HGA 1063)

SECRET/U.S. OFFICIALS
CLASSIFICATION

DATE

27
MAY 7 1954

TO : LINCOLN
FROM : Chief of Station, Guatemala
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational - K-Program
SPECIFIC - () Second Meeting

INFO: Chief, WHD;

Reference: ()

1. Attached is an account of () second meeting with ()
2. Information contained in this dispatch will not be communicated, with or without source attribution, to personnel outside of KUBARK, without the prior approval of Lincoln.

8 May 1954

()

Distribution:

2-Linc w/att

2-Wash w/att

1-Files w/att

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FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED BY
CSP/PLG
ON 12 JULY 1985

SECRET/U.S. OFFICIALS
ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

13 MAY 1985

1. The second meeting between () and () took place on 5 May, again attended by () serving as an interpreter, in the () The meeting lasted from 9 a.m. until 12 a.m. Its purpose was to communicate to () the views and comments of the consejo made in respect to some of the basic issues that had come up during his first meeting with (). On 3 May () had advised () that () would be back from abroad with the consejo's instructions and a meeting was laid on for 5 May. At the preliminary meeting between () and () nothing of importance transpired. It may be significant though that () queried () as to the impression which he () had made upon () () in reply stated that the very circumstance that () was coming back to Guatemala a second time seemed to suggest that the consejo does not entertain any doubts regarding his bona fides. () once more briefly alluded to the reasons for () refusal to meet () and in this connection mentioned that () had referred to CALLIGERIS as a "jailbird."
2. The brief purportedly reflecting the views of the consejo () was read to () in total on 5 May 1954. He did not take exception to any of the specific points raised and it should be noted as particularly gratifying that, in commenting upon paragraph 11 he observed that this was "stating the obvious." Apparently, therefore, he no longer believes that a "point of honor" is involved. Only actual performance will prove whether this inference is correct.
3. Before any substantive problems could be discussed, () himself brought up a newspaper report concerning the capture of two Guatemalan citizens, charged with having smuggled people out of the country. () mentioned that a G-2 report, which he had read the day before, clearly proved that these two individuals had been acting under CALLIGERIS' instructions. () stated that he was not familiar with this case, but would not deny that the G-2 report was accurate. There were many more recruiters in Guatemala, acting on behalf of CALLIGERIS, and it could not be avoided that some of them fall by the wayside. () took this opportunity to suggest to () that he not be unduly impressed by similar compromises and setbacks which in an operation of this type are bound to occur. The enterprise in which we were engaged was of such scope that losses of this type, painful though they may be, could be easily amalgamated. On the other hand, () pointed out, the consejo resented deeply that some of its co-workers had been subjected to torture by the Guardia Judicial, a charge which could be clearly laid at the doorsteps of (). () marked that the Junta had reserved for () the highest lamp post in Guatemala City. () commented that () from personal knowledge, he knew that () he was now under the complete sway of the communists.

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4. () assured () that he would dedicate himself to the task of spreading the gospel of resistance among officers upon whose anti-communism he could rely. In fact, he had already done so prior to meeting (). By way of illustrating what he could accomplish, he mentioned that he had discussed the () fiasco with a close friend (unidentified) who had urged him not to take "no" for answer but really go to work on him. The "unidentified" close friend incidentally is presumably one of the ().

() By way of expatiating upon the need for personality information concerning officers, () cited the case of (), who at one time had collaborated with the Americans, about whose anti-communism at that time no possible doubt could be entertained, but who in the meanwhile had been displaying significant symptoms of indecision. () observed that he knew () who had been 0-2().

() had at one time hitched his wagon to the cover of a former chief of the armed forces named PAAZ Tejada whose tortuous political career, after a visit behind the Iron Curtain which apparently removed his last doubts about communism, eventually landed him in the communist fold. PAAZ Tejada, an engineer by training, did not at present occupy any official position. As a matter of fact, as far as the Army was concerned, he was washed out for good. () believes that (), whom he considers basically anti-communist, may in his somewhat ambiguous attitude reflect the transmigrations of his former chief and close friend PAAZ Tejada.

5. In addition to () the following ranking Army officers were discussed:

a. () He is the () and not to be trusted. In order to illustrate the solicitude with which the Americans will be watching over () personal security in the future, () related to him a (strictly notional) incident involving (). At a recent meeting between him and an American (not identified by position or name) () tried to find out whether there existed any unofficial contacts between () and the Americans, using the rather crude gambit of recommending to the American opposite that, if no such contact existed, it might be worth establishing. According to () (notional) story the American disavowed all knowledge of such contacts and in fact stated that () record inspired no confidence whatsoever. () was noticeably impressed by this story and it is our feeling that intended point was successfully put across.

b. () () takes an excessively dim view of him. He has strong presidential aspirations, is a professional,

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~~SECRET/US COMINTS ONLY~~

intriguer and should under no circumstances be trusted. () confirmed that this was also the consejo's opinion and added, as a notional account, that () had in the presence of various people mentioned () as a prominent foe of the regime.

c. () He is an anti-communist, but not a man who would take any chances whatsoever in standing up for his principles. He failed miserably during the ARANA crisis.

d. Colonel Oscar ~~OPALES~~ Lopez. Not trusted by () Played a double game during his tenure as Military Attaché in Washington where, instead of contracting for military supplies, he kept plying Colonel ARANA with confidential information.

5. As you will note, none of the individuals mentioned above are in any way associated with CALLIGERIS. It is () belief that () in the further development of our operational relationship, can be brought to the point of priming certain individuals singled out for recruitment into (). () did not want to go ahead with this scheme without prior headquarters approval. As you no doubt realize, this would introduce () into the very vitals of our enterprise. It furthermore would furnish a direct tie-in with CALLIGERIS, and unavoidably tip off CALLIGERIS as to the fact that () has joined the team (this latter consideration should, however, not be considered overriding).
6. In the course of our conversation a number of rather interesting topics were discussed, some of which in () opinion clearly point along what lines the capabilities of () had best be developed. Although the point is at this stage academic, it should be noted that () once more brought up the issue of CALLIGERIS. After flatly stating the position of the consejo () resuscitated the issue, prefacing his remarks by the assurance that it was not his intention to do any missionary work on () and that he was fully conscious of the depths of the chasm that divides CALLIGERIS and a certain element in the Guatemalan generalidad. However, () might as well know that () initial approach was made on the strength of a written report submitted by CALLIGERIS, stating in completely unequivocal terms that () was a man to be trusted - period. () was momentarily taken aback and proceeded to comment (a slight deviation from his original position) that personal issues were not actually predominant, but that national problems were involved in the controversy. () did not choose to inquire: "What national issues?", although very likely this derives from ineradicable suspicions that CALLIGERIS is in this primarily to further his own ends. () further stated that he could well

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IMAGINE what prompted CALLIGERIS to express such flattering sentiments. CALLIGERIS, like others, must be aware of the fact that () is not and never has been motivated by political ambition. CALLIGERIS may, or may not, know that () was fully informed about the planned prison break, three months before it took place. During CALLIGERIS' incarceration, CALLIGERIS' wife looked up () on repeated occasions to ask for advice and intercession. () rather brusquely wound up our discussion of this issue (which noticeably embarrassed him) by stating that he certainly valued CALLIGERIS' opinion of himself. () stated: "I regret that I am prohibited from passing on your sentiments." It is () impression that the dominant role played by CALLIGERIS in PB-SUCCESS, is no longer an insuperable barrier as far as the enlistment of () cooperation is concerned. We should, however, continue to tread gingerly and bear in mind that the scar is covered by a very thin scab indeed.

3. Rather out of context, () inquired of () what he knew about the Salamá uprising ()

() answered that all he knew about that fiasco was that it had been led by a prominent Guatemalan publicist, now in exile in the United States. Did () know whether certain Guatemalan exiles now in Mexico had been implicated? No. - Did () consider it possible that this affair had actually been instigated by the communists in order to ride in on the wave of its quelling? No. However, () was aware that it was a favorite communist strategy to convey by subtle innuendo that "they knew all about it and could have stopped it." () added that he was certain that this particular fiasco could not be laid at the FCP's doorstep and () gave affirmation.

3. The next question, likewise out of context, was whether () was familiar with the circumstances surrounding the fall of General PONCE? No. Had () ever heard of events that took place in Patzicia at that time? No. Immediately after PONCE's fall, the campesinos had risen in that particular community and had massacred the ladinos, at least one instance wiping out a whole family. It had been noted before by both () and () that any indications of a possible campesino uprising, are being recorded and weighed very carefully by () at each meeting, with () alone and in the presence of () this issue came to the fore. In the case of the Patzicia uprising, it happened that General PONCE had been assiduously cultivating the campesinos in that particular district, holding out all kinds of promises. When therefore General Ponce was overthrown, it was comparatively easy to agitate among the campesinos, convincing them it had been the General's progressive approach to their problems that precipitated his fall. () fails to recollect whether () attributed this agitation to communists).

11. It should be noted that () is looking at the threat posed by an aroused peasantry from two angles. On the one hand he is aware of communist plans to develop selected campesinos into a paramilitary force, to be committed in combatting a counter-revolutionary uprising. This contingency, he feels, the Army will have to cope with and he in fact believes that the quelling of a campesino uprising, more than anything else, may solidify the Army in its opposition to the regime. But he is also concerned about the probability of local, possibly spontaneous, campesino uprisings resulting in the massacre of outnumbered ladinos and finca owners. In () opinion, this dread of unleashed campesino forces, is a very real one among the still ruling classes of Guatemala, less in urban centers than in the provinces. () expressed hopes that the Junta's propaganda effort will take cognizance of this very real danger. () inquired whether assurances that the Agrarian Reform would not be undone might help, and () commented that the Government's assurance to cope with any emergency rested squarely on the belief that they had been successful in convincing the campesinos that all they had been gaining under a progressive regime would be lost in case of successful outside intervention. () urged us not to underestimate the successes of the government along those lines. () promised to pass on his observations verbatim to the consejo.

12. In the course of our conversation, () remarked that during the last three years he had been studying communist techniques very closely. (In this connection, it appears significant that he refers to the Guatemalan government as a communist government, without qualification. () is of the firm conviction that the communists are on the road to success and that their methods of perverting the constitution for their own ends had been eminently successful, so much so that the formation of a "front populaire" is now only a question of time. At this stage already, the coalition parties could no longer put up a candidate for congressional election without the approval of one of the communist mass organizations. Questioning brought out the fact that () is convinced that ARBENZ will succeed himself. What will happen - he is certain - is that the communists will organize a public (not necessarily constitutional) referendum, backing a spontaneous demand for a constitutional amendment permitting the President to succeed himself. There is, in ()'s opinion, no one who could possibly succeed ARBENZ and satisfy Communist insistence upon a predominant voice in the management of the affairs of the nation.

12. () mentioned that he had learned from an absolutely reliable source that the communists are indoctrinating campesinos from the nationalized, but also from privately owned fincas, giving them specific instructions on what to do during an uprising against the regime. These indoctrination classes are

being held in the headquarters of the CGTG in Guatemala City. Elaborating upon a statement made during the previous meeting, () explained that the Escuintla mobilization of campesinos took place during the ARANA crisis. The campesinos - approximately 10,000 - regathered from the districts surrounding Escuintla, but were not issued arms. () was consulted at the time whether the campesinos should be brought to Guatemala City to strengthen the Government's hand in coping with local unrest resulting from the liquidation of Colonel ARANA and he immediately vetoed the plan.

13. () is convinced that in an emergency the campesinos will be mobilized, not only in Escuintla. He also believes, but has no concrete evidence to back this up, that the communists have been training special shock troops which will put in an appearance and which may be used to stiffen the backs of the campesino rabble. In answer to specific questioning, () stated the following:

- a. Most campesinos, especially in the Escuintla area, know how to handle a rifle, because of the fact that a lot of deer hunting is going on in that area.
- b. The campesinos are not capable of human wave attacks and meeting up with determined Army resistance are bound to disperse.
- c. All conceivable means of transportation will be used to bring the campesinos to Guatemala City, but mostly the railroads are available.

14. In offering some remarks on the propaganda line which, in his opinion, the Junta should follow, () stressed as important to plug the "Unity of the Army" theme. Although his explanation was somewhat confusing, the underlying thought appears to be the following: The greatest threat to the success of our endeavor is Army divided against itself. By stressing the importance of complete solidarity of the armed forces, and in conjunction therewith underseoring the overwhelming anti-communist sentiment in the armed forces, our propaganda will strengthen the Army's back without inciting to rebellion or attacking the government. In other words, he seems to think that the slogan of "Army solidarity" will per se militate against the President's untrammelled control over the Army, provided (this is () conclusion) it has been made clear to the Army that the uprising is directed against communism. Conversely, () infers, () and his associates would resent the plugging of any themes, suggesting that the officers' corps has sold out to communism, thereby attempting to drive a wedge between officers and enlisted ranks.

15. Paragraph 12 of (), instructing () to furnish information of a specified kind, was explained to () along the following lines: The Junta was in need of up-to-date information, indicating the steps the government proposes to take in case of an uprising, what advance information the government has been able to gather on our plans, what outside help from

Iron Curtain and other countries the government is getting or expects to be getting. By way of illustrating what the consejo has in mind regarding "outside help," () related to () that there had been a recent flurry of rumors regarding the alleged bringing in to Guatemala of planes of Czech (or German) manufacture, flown by Czech pilots, also that runways had been readied to service those planes. () pointed out to () that this type of information was reaching us all the time and while we were inclined to depreciate its value, we could not afford to ignore it. The Junta was also conscious of the existence of a government project designed to spread deceptive rumors for purposes of harassment and to saturate the facilities of American information services in trying to track them down. For that reason the consejo wishes to solicit his cooperation in reporting such rumors and in advising us whether serious consideration should be given to their possible truthfulness.

16. () while conceding that war materials could be brought into the country without his ever finding out about it, expressed some doubt regarding the foundations of the "Airplane" rumor. To the best of his knowledge, the only arms shipment reaching Guatemala recently had been two hundred twenty guns of Swedish manufacture, which had been issued to the Guardia Civil. He knew that arms were on order and that several arms shipments had allegedly been intercepted and confiscated in Europe (Italy?). () assured us that he would keep his eyes and ears open and report any pertinent information. () confirmed that arms could be cached in Poctún in comparative secrecy inasmuch as this location had been completely abandoned. Whether the airfield at Poctún could accommodate jet planes he was in no position to affirm or deny inasmuch as he did not know what kind of a runway would be needed. () mentioned the facilities of the Sarstún River, 75 kilometers of whose course are navigable. () further expressed the opinion that a more likely location for hidden arms, planes etc. would be the finca of President ARBENZ. Rumors, linking the improvements of a road pasting ARBENZ' finca with plans to import jet planes, failed to impress (). Although this particular road happened to be completely straight for a total length of 60 km (with only one bend at the half-way mark) it had not as yet been asphalted, although this was being projected. () emphasized that his information was based on personal observations and on talks with the engineer in charge of the project.

17. While on the subject of arms exports, () mentioned to () that certain Americans in undefined positions had been approached by their Guatemalan friends with the following kind of argument: "You Americans are fools. By denying the Guatemalan Army supplies you are weakening and antagonizing the very element on whose support in defeating communism you will have to count." () reaction was prompt and cuts spoken. The withholding of arms, he stated, may antagonize

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THE Army. However, it would be extremely unwise at this stage to furnish any arms whatsoever unless the Americans have the absolute assurance that they will not be used in defense of the communist regime. () commented: Can such assurances be obtained? and () answered in the negative. Any shortages, () averred, should not be blamed on the Americans but on the improvidence of the government which until recently had not considered it necessary to budget for arms purchases. In reply to ()'s question whether the armed forces with equipment and material now on hand could successfully cope with a communist initiated campesino uprising, () remarked that in the absence of reliable information regarding the strength and armament of communist shock troops, he could not give a reliable prognosis. He denied that () ex officio collects this type of information and was unable to answer ()'s question what potentially friendly sources in the government can be presumed to know about these matters. He did request, however, that any data pertaining to paramilitary activities and preparation be furnished him so that he could pass them on to () () avoided committing himself on this issue.

18. () was told again that the consejo had absolutely no misgivings about his communicating freely with (). One major consideration prompting () to make this statement was the incontrovertible realization that () will talk to whom he pleases and that to enjoin him from talking to () might alienate the latter from our cause. Besides, () is convinced that () as soon as more tangible evidence of the Junta's resolve and capabilities come to hand, will reconsider his attitude. (See also para 4 above). () has instructed () to consider favorably any request on the part of () to talk matters over with him, but not to evince any undue hast in accepting the invitation. () assured () that in his dealing with () and possibly (), he would be perfectly safe in leading from strength. It is understood, as a matter of course, that () will brief himself carefully prior to meeting with () if this should come to pass.

19. Passing reference was made by () to the military assistance pacts concluded with Honduras and Nicaragua. Just in case - it was pointed out to () - his friends should cite this in evidence of U.S. intent to goad Guatemala's neighbors into military intervention, he would go safe in assuring them that this is not so. For the very purpose of reassuring the Guatemalan Army, () told () "in strictest confidence" deliveries of contracted supplies had been deferred or broken down into small installments.

20. () asked whether it was true that CALLIGERIS was living the life of Riley (). The Guatemalan Military

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Attache had been turning in reports to that effect. ()
assured () that this was complete "rot." Inasmuch as
() worked closely with CALLEGARIS, we ought to know.

21. () told () that () was not in any way linked with
the Junta, although he may wish to convey that impression.
() in turn remarked that he had known () well and
that he considered him an incurable egocentric (or words to
that effect). In 1944, during the ARAHA unpleasantries, ()
in all the fighting was over him. () expressed strong
doubts whether () ever again would set foot on Guatemalan
soil. (in this connection it may be appropriate to supply a
quote, originating with an () acquaintance who knew
() intimately: "He likes to eat his dish, but he doesn't
like to prepare it."

22. The subject of ()'s security came up in a number of con-
texts. () is loath to have any further meetings in ()
where the governor knows him. () pointed out to him what
mechanics of future meetings between him and (), who would
be the channel between him and the consejo, should be worked out
by them jointly. ()'s question whether there would be any
further meetings with (), was answered in the negative. It was
pointed out to him that meetings with () would augment the
security hazards which normally attend to an operation of this
type. It was emphasized that () enjoys the fullest confi-
dence of the consejo. ()'s request for information would
be met to the best of our abilities. He need not worry about
the security of the communications between consejo and ()
this being a matter we felt confident to handle in a professional
and secure fashion.

23. The meeting ended on a note of cordiality. ()

() carried away from
this meeting the strong impression that () is irrevocably
committed to aid our cause. Thus far symptoms of a double game
have not been in evidence. Doubtlessly, if this be a controlled,
professionally run operation, the government would not choose to
bring about an early denouement and continued vigilance will be
in order. However, () doubts whether the Guatemalan intelli-
gence service has the capability and can master sufficient opera-
tional finesse to carry through an operation as intricate as this
one would be, without showing its hand sooner or later. Besides,
it would be nothing short of a masterpiece of defection, to get
a man of ()'s antecedents to the point where he is willing
to prostitute himself in behalf of a cause which, his whole re-
cord shows, he detests. () knows what the wages of discor-
very would be. He is certain that assassination rather than exile
would be resorted to. He has a family (), and is not going to expose them to the "G-
nominy which would be the result should he betray the cause.

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24. (), who is going to take over the operation as of 7 May, has been fully briefed. He has further been assured that as heretofore Lincoln guidance will be forthcoming and that every effort will be made from that end to afford him sufficient latitude in determining the operational handling of this case. There can be no doubt that () has carefully absorbed everything () has told him about PBSUCCESS and that major deviations in subsequent presentations will be noted by him. We are fortunate in having () as our go-between who has shown an intelligent appreciation of the issues involved and who can be relied upon to interpret any instruction in the spirit it was issued.

25. It would be premature to base on our talks with () any estimate of our chances of success in attaining the objectives of PBSUCCESS. There is little doubt in () mind that the PBSUCCESS concept as explained to () came as complete news to him and that, if it weren't for the bitter pill of CALLIGERIS' role in the Junta, he might have shown a great deal more enthusiasm. What finally swayed him, we believe, was the fact that for the first time he encountered a workable concept represented to him as in a stage of advanced implementation. Being a realist, he may have realized the futility of embarking upon any peripheral enterprise rather than aligning himself with what no doubt impressed him as a workable scheme. Under the circumstances, the disastrous consequences of a fizzle (not necessarily of an abortive coup), as far as the continued willingness of people of () ilk to join in any further kind of conspiratorial activity is concerned, need not be elaborated upon.

26. You are hereby requested to allocate for this project a monthly sum of \$1,000.00 to cover all operational expenses incidental to running () and (). This allocation will serve to cover expenditures such as transportation, entertainment, rental of safe houses etc. Should the need arise, the station would like to provide () with a vehicle, and authorization is hereby requested for its procurement at the station's discretion.

27. No formal commitments have been made, but () was informed orally by () that "we" consider it a moral duty to aid him and his family, should circumstances resulting from his operational work force him to go into exile. Should he get killed in line of duty we would undoubtedly render equitable support to his wife and children. You may wish to set aside an additional \$9,000.00 for future contingencies in order to meet any specific obligations the agency is prepared to undertake.

28. No commitments were made to (). No doubt, under similar circumstances, the agency will see to it that he is accorded political asylum and that he does not become a public burden.

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29. No operational equipment is required at this stage. We presume, however, that implied in the approval of this project is the authorization to issue () and to instruct him in its use. We would also appreciate it if headquarters could look into the question of availability of a concealment device for non-bulky documents, (), and - if available - to forward it soonest.

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VIA

(Specify Air or
Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO.

28 (HU 60 1035)

~~KIBAT/ENCL 1035/SECRET
CLASSIFICATION~~

13 JUN 1954

DATE

TO FBSUCCESS Headquarters

INFO, Guatemala

FROM LINCOLN

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational - E Program
SPECIFIC Talk with (

) to Guatemala

REF: () 8 June 1954

Attached in () a report on the above subject. The
rough report was forwarded to LINCOLN with reference dispatch.

()
12 June 1954
()

Distributions:

Wash (2) w/att. in dupl.
Onat (2) w/att. in dupl.
Files (3) w/att. in tripl.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS BARTED, BY
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CLASSIFICATION~~

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SOME SUCCESS

K-Program - Talk with
()

1. The meeting reported on in this dispatch took place at the() in Guatemala City on Sunday, 6 June, lasting five hours. () was in attendance as ()'s consultant and interpreter. During our talks the first secretary of the embassy dropped by and both () and () were introduced to him.

2. My second() served the purpose of passing in review the events leading up to the present impasse between the United States and Guatemala, to elicit ()'s estimate of the current situation, his assessment of the communist threat emanating from developments in Guatemala in particular so far as it concerns the security of () and to join him in a study of the factors that could be brought to bear upon an effective solution of the existing problems, especially the contribution the United States could render.

3. In any evaluation of the views() expressed it should be borne in mind that() a nation which from all accounts can boast an outstanding record of consistent and irreconcilable hostility to communism. ()

It should further be borne in mind that() is unfamiliar with the principles and the strategic concept underlying it.

4. It is my understanding that, on a strictly governmental plane, relations between() and the United States are not what they ought to be. This, in part, may serve to explain ()'s lack of complete understanding of United States foreign policy relating to Guatemala. While by()'s own admission he is completely consonant with the views of() (which, as far as Guatemala is concerned, he is undoubtedly instrumental in fashioning) his approach is of needs circumscribed by a narrow projection of his country's specific needs and fears upon a study of facts and symptoms of growing communist ascendancy in Guatemala. He is undoubtedly aware of the nature of our strategic interests in the Panama Canal Zone and able to view United States preoccupation within the larger context of our worldwide commitments but neither are determinant factors in his analysis.

5. ()

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6. On 5 June () once more broached to () the issue of meeting an American and this time () displayed some interest - "other engagements permitting" - in talking to me. () told him that he had met me in () and that he would attempt to invite me to come to Guatemala on the understanding that during my sojourn I would be the guest of the

In commenting upon my observation that at this particular juncture the meeting would take place under the worst conceivable conditions, () concurred that recent developments would in fact reduce the purpose of any meeting to telling () what () himself had told President Arbenz innumerable times, without my being able to adduce any tangible evidence of United States determination to meet the communist challenge in Guatemala. ()

() pointing out that he had established for himself a record of friendship for Guatemala which he was loath to mar, his whole personal future in () being bound up with a success of his mission in this country.

7. () agreed that my position would be an altogether stronger one if a meeting with () and () could be laid on in the wake of a series of incidents suggesting growing resistance strength and growing United States involvement. ()

() It may be pertinent to mention once more that the () expressed the firm conviction that any meeting between () and me at this time could be presumed to enjoy the native sponsorship of President Arbenz.

8. On June, () had met with Chancellor TORIBIO for about 40 minutes. TORIBIO exuded confidence (not feigned). He requested () to convey to () that relations between Guatemala and the United States were formal and that his conversations with Ambassador Kuehne, to be followed by several more, had contributed toward that end. TORIBIO further confided that he had "a master card to play" in conjunction with the proposal advanced by President Figueres of Costa Rica to convene a meeting of Presidents and/or their foreign ministers in Panama. TORIBIO would propose that, rather than making this a round table conference, the United States and Guatemala join the conference as litigants, with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile and El Salvador arbitrating all outstanding issues. He asked () to

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present this idea to() and have him second it.

9. The recent arms shipment has strongly aroused the suspicions of the Central American nations and a development of acute friction is only a matter of time. It was wise on the part of the United States to let the Alhem get through (sic). The arms shipment has served to weaken Guatemala's international position, inasmuch as 2,000 tons of evidence can now be adduced in support of the hitherto unproven allegation that there is a direct link between Guatemala iron curtain countries. Especially(), over the last 50 years a bulwark against Guatemalan penetration attempts, is profoundly disturbed as a result of this event which "sharpens up the picture of communist penetration based on Guatemala." Nobody should be deceived by()'s show of neutrality which is a simple time-saving device, enabling the Republic to gird itself for the anticipated Guatemalan onslaught. A break with Guatemala is absolutely unavoidable and will necessarily lead to an open conflagration. Any such development will be provoked by Guatemala. In about six to eight months, once Guatemalan troops have been fully trained in the application of their new weapons, Guatemala will be free to move.

10. The arms shipment has of course had a very beneficial influence upon the morale of the Army which up to that time had suffered from symptoms of asphyxiation. Their reactions are naturally conditioned by the "morbid nationalism" pervading Guatemala. The possession of the arms makes them think that they are stronger than actual conditions would justify - a very dangerous state of affairs. Opposition elements in Guatemala are staggering under the impact of these developments and there has undoubtedly occurred an alarming drop in their morale.

11. () has been provided with a flow of information on the contents of the arms shipment, but since not everything has been unpacked yet an accurate quantitative estimate won't become available for some time. The shipment included 20 assault cars, 120 mm mortars used in the Korean theater of war, 75 mm artillery pieces of Krupp manufacture, bazookas, flamethrowers, large quantities of automatic rifles resp submachine guns, antiaircraft guns, of 20 mm (dual purpose) and 37 mm caliber and "enormous" quantities of hand grenades. There is a sufficient supply of small arms to arm three divisions of 15,000 men each and this, according to() should be considered a conservative estimate.

12. The arms deliveries rushed by the United States to threatened Central American nations fail to impress Guatemalan military experts. They reason that Honduras has no Army, Nicaragua no reserves, being forced to keep 5,000 militaries out of a total of 7,000 in the country to maintain control over the internal situation. El Salvador - they reason - has 4,500 men under arms plus a National Guard of 1,500 men. Guatemala's strategic plans call for the disorganization of the deployment of the Salvadoran Army through three or four air bombardments, designed to throw the civilian population into panic. According to() the operations plans

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of the Guatemalan Army, which two years ago he had an opportunity to study, list air bombardments of Salvadoran targets as an indispensable requirement for military victory. According to () the Guatemalan Army realizes that in any encounter of

ground troops, the Guatemalan Army "would be made hash of."

() "without question" has a better Army than Guatemala, one of the reasons being that the troops are thoroughly indoctrinated and can be counted upon to shed their last drop of blood in defending () against communist aggression.

mentioned as an interesting sidelight that the Guatemalan Army in turn is equally aware of the fact that Guatemala would be highly vulnerable to air attacks, her military objectives being concentrated in a few areas, and their communications being easily disruptible.

13. While the Guatemalan Government obviously appreciates the fact that in any conflagration involving Guatemala and (), the United States would not stand by idly, but come to the aid of () (possibly intervening directly), this in () opinion will prove no deterrent to attack, because the leading faction within the Guatemalan Government is completely irresponsible. Their reasoning would be along the lines that by fanning into flame the latent conflict between Guatemala and (), they will consolidate the regime's position internally on what would purport to be a national issue. () stressed once more that his government considers a conflict unavoidable and that it is engaged in laying its defense plans on the supposition that the United States "will do nothing to halt Guatemalan tendencies."

14. () mentioned that his government has in recent days submitted its military requirements to the United States through the Ambassador in (). And that terms of payment have been taken under advisement. () added that inasmuch as his country is willing to pay for the stuff, he trusts that there won't be any major substitutions for items requested, implying that requirements have been drawn up conservatively and in full awareness of ()'s strategic situation. () further put in a plea for doubling or trebling scholars tips granted to officers and enlisted men by the U. S. Army, in particular to step up aviation and heavy arms training.

15. The outcry against the arms shipment has immeasurably strengthened the internal position of the regime, the communists being most successful in giving the argument a nationalist twist. The Guatemalan Government is now convinced that it will be able to weather the storm, "that the height of the tide has passed," "that the air is out of the balloon." (TOCHILO quotes). An indication of this confidence is that President Arbenz and four or five cronies have just decided to invest 2,000,000 dollars in a long-range business venture. This confidence is to some extent based on the supposition that the United States would rather spend itself on two or three years of fruitless negotiation than going it alone.

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16. As regards economic sanctions, the Guatemalan Government takes this possibility into consideration without seriously believing that it will be applied. In () opinion the United States has behaved in a much too lenient fashion vis a vis Guatemala. As they say in (): The United States is like a big dog allowing its tail to be bitten by a small woolly dog. The Guatemalan Government is further convinced that economic sanctions, even if imposed, would have no teeth, freedom of trade in the United States militating against its effectiveness. Beyond doubt, the curtailment of gasoline supplied would in short order have a crippling effect and might bring about the collapse of the regime. Only small gasoline supplies reach Guatemala via El Salvador. The bulk comes through San Jose.

13. Two years ago()had access to planes, preparing for the organization of syndicate shock units. He is convinced that if an emergency arises, the campesinos and syndicates will be armed. Even Army representatives no longer deny that this probability now exists. Obviously such forces would be effective only for purposes of internal repression. If ordered by President Arbenz, the arming of those elements would not be opposed by the Army which at this stage identifies itself with the Government. The Army would be completely oblivious of the fact that it is signing its own death warrant. The arming of the campesinos would of course be resorted to only in an extreme crisis... ()

19. One of ()'s informants, a () communist, told him that the communists could take over Guatemala today if they so wanted. However, it does not suit them at this time. For one thing they are sure that it would provoke outside intervention. It is also doubtful in ()'s opinion whether the Army High Command would countenance such a move and for that reason he does not share the view that the communist could establish themselves in power without encountering resistance. Since the communists are making effective use of the Army in carrying out their

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designs anyhow, there is no reason why they should wish to precipitate a showdown.

20. No evidence has come to hand yet that the Guatemalans are passing arms to oppositional elements in (). () believes that it will take quite a while before this comes to pass.

21. The Guatemalan Government refuses to believe that the United States would risk incurring Latin American approbrium by unilaterally intervening in Guatemala. They are also quite convinced that collective action will fail.

22. (), based on his knowledge of "six or seven resistance centers in Guatemala," and on the strength of some rather painful experiences with resistance elements, is inclined to disbelieve their potential effectiveness. Government persecution may cost the Army its best men, but it will not be able to draw boomerangs, though, because more and more families are being drawn into its purview, with sons and friends disappearing in the Government's dungeons.

23. One should not entertain any illusions as to the Army's determination to defend the regime in case of a civilian uprising. All plans should take into account the probability of Army action. The Army will throw in with the insurrection only "on the basis of established facts," such as simultaneous uprisings in widely scattered communities of the Republic, accompanied by acts of sabotage, which might bring the Army to terms. As long as there exists a modus vivendi which might bring the regime to master the situation, the Army as a whole will remain loyal to it. However, there may be groups of greater or lesser importance associating themselves with the uprising from the start. In sum, the Army's reaction will depend entirely "on how the thing goes." It is quite likely that the Army's reaction will be correlated to manifest evidence of United States machination, because they would realize that they are on the losing side.

24. It should not be ignored that the Army, in case of a peasant uprising, would be faced with the most serious problem in its history. All its links are with the urban population. Many of the ranking officers are nouveau riches. An actual physical conflict would of course only arise where there are garrisons, not in villages where campesino shock troops would be in command of the situation. () has been told that in certain outlying, village opposition forces are preparing to offer resistance to campesino shock troops. There is a possibility that in some towns the Army will remain neutral if this should come to pass.

25. Any uprising would encounter its first resistance on the part of the Guardia Civil which is totally dominated by communists, but whose combat effectiveness is very low.

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26. () is unable to conceive of a successful overthrow of the regime as a result of internal action only. Conversely he is certain that the Government could not cope with an internal uprising and a simultaneous invasion. He did concede that there might be some prospect of success for a civilian insurrection "depending on its scope;" (this taken in conjunction with ()'s low estimate of the resistance's potential especially as a result of the recent purge, would still leave the outcome in doubt.) If, on the other hand, we are aiming for an immediate favorable solution, a simultaneous invasion is quite indispensable.

27. In theory an invasion of Guatemala could be launched by either Honduras or El Salvador. The topography of the Honduran/Guatemalan border area does not lend itself to a successful invasion in either direction and action would soon grind to a halt. Should Guatemala at any time launch an invasion against Honduras, El Salvador would instantaneously rush to her aid and invade Guatemala. Should, on the other hand, Honduras provoke a conflagration with Guatemala, El Salvador's reaction might be somewhat less instantaneous. The historical invasion route is through the Salvadoran flatlands.

28. () stated that he could not visualize an invasion of Guatemala by (), except under conditions of "extreme provocation." He pointed out that ()'s idiosyncrasies in that respect are similar to those of the American people. Only an obvious and violent slap in the face would engender a propitious climate for military action. Only manifest provocation would do the trick.

29. Question: Given the following circumstances, what would be ()'s reaction?

A. A civilian uprising, competently planned, centrally controlled, with an ample supply of arms and ammunition, has started in Guatemala;

B. The outcome of this enterprise is trembling in the balance;

C. The Guatemalan Government has up to this time studiously abstained from giving provocation to ();

D. () is fully conversant with the uprising's progress and with the backing behind it and as determined as ever to help in the liquidation of communism in Guatemala.

30. ()'s reply: On an official basis () would do nothing. However, important groups of the () citizens dedicated to fighting communism and anxious to contribute their share to the overthrow of the Arbenz regime, would immediately join the fray. The () Government would sin by omission and would lend itself as a base for assistance. () emphasized

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that his statements could be accepted as reflecting the views of President(). The burden of their frequent conversations was the situation in Guatemala. They were completely at one in the conviction that a normalization of relations with the Arbenz regime was completely out of the question. For one thing, Mrs. Arbenz made it impossible to come to any kind of desirable understanding. She should be considered at least an instrument of communism. It was well known that many Salvadoran communist in Guatemalan exile lived from her personal handouts.

31. The following "undiplomatic" question was put to () with the clear understanding that it should not be construed as reflecting the thinking of anyone in responsible position in the United States Government: Under what conditions and on the strength of what specific assurances given by the United States Government would () be prepared to precipitate an invasion of Guatemala? Would, as an example, an iron clad United States guarantee to consider any military setback in such enterprise a "causus belli" and sufficient cause for coming to the aid of (), be a proposition worth looking into?

32. () without a moment's hesitation replied that this was definitely a matter worth discussing between "an official representative of the United States Government" and President (). Once an understanding between the United States and () had been reached "the manufacture of a Guatemalan provocation" could easily be resolved. After all, there was historic precedent in () history for the manufacture of provocation. In () the later() President(), who then commanded troops in the border district, arranged for a bombardment of ('s) soil by Guatemalan troops. Had it not been for the intervention of the (), which stopped the () advance 12 kilometers inside of Guatemala, "we could have been launching peacefully in Guatemala City one week later."

33. () in thinking out loud about the possible course of events, should there be an uprising in Guatemala, made the following observations, which I have not tried to place in their proper context and which are set down here as stated by him:

A. Once elements of CALIGRIS' Army of Liberation have landed at points along the Pacific and Atlantic coast and taken possession of a few important centers, CALIGRIS would declare himself immediately the constitutional Government of Guatemala. His Government would gain immediate recognition from the United States and a number of Latin American nations. Preferably two or three Latin American nations should take the lead, with the United States following suit.

B. An interior uprising would result in considerable bloodletting.

C. Although the historical invasion route is via the

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Salvadoran plains, an invasion of Guatemala based on Honduras would be useful diversion. If the Honduran invasion of Guatemala should turn out a failure (as most likely it will), Guatemala would undoubtedly retaliate and this in turn would bring El Salvador into the act. In other words, an invasion based on Honduras and designed to fail might be an effective curtain raiser.

D. United States approval of the undertaking could best be signified by sending atomic bombers over Guatemala and by bombing military objectives.

E. The fall of the Arbenz regime would be a foregone conclusion, if we could organize a civilian uprising, accompanied by widely scattered acts of sabotage and an invasion attempt based upon Honduras.

F. Given all other factors, overt United States intervention could be dispensed with.

G. Once Guatemalan troops set foot on Honduran soil, even if they do so in the defense of Guatemalan soil against unprovoked Honduran aggression, El Salvador would have no choice but to intervene.

34. () confirmed that there exists considerable personal jealousy between SANCHEZ and DIAZ both being in the running for the presidency. The majority of Guatemala's officers are not in favor of communism. Only the assurances which they have been receiving from resident Arbenz are causing them to act the way they do. "The purchase" of most of the leading officers is likewise an important factor. The Ambassador has personal knowledge of sizeable gifts received by SANCHEZ, DIAZ, and RIOS, especially their participation in new industries. Some of the best lands carved out from national reserves, and valuable urban property have been turned over to them at a charge of 7 cents the square vara, the real price being 13 the square vara.

35. () views Colonels SANCHEZ and VASCO DIAZ. They are not communists, but completely under the thumb of President Arbenz whom they worship as a genius "simply because he excelled in the schools militarily."

36. There is no doubt in ()'s mind that the Army High Command would respond to manifestations of strength. Such manifestations would also have a strong influence upon the "bystander element" among Guatemala's civilians.

37. The great majority of the Guatemalan people still hope that the United States will act. Failure to do so has caused considerable disillusionment. () cannot conceive of any effective, i.e., practicable formula emerging from an OAS conference. What will emerge is bound to be "a romantic, not an effective formula." In

viewing the prospects of such a conference he entertains the same grim forebodings that were with him prior to Caracas.

36. () emphasized that there are strong forces in Latin America to whom unilateral United States intervention is anathema. Consequently unilateral United States intervention should be "the last card in the deck." Let us exhaust all other methods first. This is not in conflict with the realization that in some sectors of Guatemala and of other Latin American countries, great hopes are being entertained that the United States will intervene unilaterally.

36. ()'s personal opinion: if as a last resort the United States should intervene unilaterally, it would be "quite easy" to convince world opinion that this move has the approval of the majority of the Guatemalan people. The reception which will be accorded to American troops by the Guatemalan populace will leave no doubt on this score. () "has heard a thousand statements in favor of it." If the stage is properly set for intervention, the United States will not be left holding the bag. Imagine, as 40% of the Guatemalan populace support the idea of United States intervention, the manifestation of popular joy, "even if they are to be annihilated," would make such an impact on world opinion that other countries would have no choice but to approve of what the United States will believe to do.

40. The socialist's principal objective in Guatemala is to establish on its soil an operations base, not necessarily to gain control of its government. Guatemala is on the road to becoming the center for agitation and subversion directed against other Central American states. The first phase, designed to soften up the governments of these states, has already commenced. In Central America, communism's principal target is not () but ().

Central America will fall into the Kremlin's lap, the day the communists have succeeded in surfacing in and penetrating the government of (). The penetration of () has as its main objective to outflank and encircle ().

41. Communist policy in Guatemala is rather stupid. They have made such a show of strength that everybody has by now been put on guard, not only the United States but also (). In theory at least the Guatemalan Army could still stem the advance of communism because "they are fully acquainted with the communist apparatus."

42. To my question: If ACP-ML offers to contain communism in Guatemala, what should our reaction be? () gave the following terse answer: Don't believe him. The Guatemalan Government, if it wanted to control communism, it could do so. The Guatemalan Government does not want to control communism.

43. () personally favors a radical solution of the communist problem in Guatemala. He shares a widely held conviction that the best communist is a dead communist and that communists are uncontrollable.

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44. Would an official statement on the part of the United States Government to the effect that President Arbenz and his regime are communist and that the regime's continued existence threatens United States security and that of the Western Hemisphere be of any benefit? Answer: Actions, no talk.

45. () has some good penetrations of the communist movement in Guatemala. In particular has he been able to keep abreast of the plans and activities of a communist cell dedicated to the sole task of subverting (). This particular cell is also responsible for several abortive attempts against the life of President (). While this cell is not overtly linked with the Guatemalan Government, there can be no doubt that it draws sustenance from it. Its most important members are:

Licenciado Miguel Angel Lopez, labor judge in Guatemala

Revero Hidalgo, lawyer working for PAB

Alberto Castellanos Salvo, who is the chief coordinator of all subversive activities directed against ()

and others

Alvaro Norie, who is currently in Moscow

() government is aware of the activities of the Guatemalan Military Attaché in () and "is able to provide him with most of his information."

46. Mold comment:

()

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(b.)

.) "Today they are pro-communist because they believe that the President is pro-communist. Tomorrow, if a priest is elected President of Guatemala, the same people will show up as ecristians." In contradiction, he states the () ans are highly individualistic and articulate in voicing their political opinions not always in line with those entertained by the Government.

2. It should further be borne in mind that himself is presidential timber and avowably so the morning. He is thirty seven years of age and in answer to my question, how old he would be as president of (), he remarked: two and a half years older.

3. () considers () is one of the most impressive Latin politicians he has ever met. Without adequate standards of comparison, I wish to associate myself with this characterization to the extent that I share the impression that () is a highly motivated individual who does not rule out what he is at the same time as by means of his political fences.

4. There is no doubt in my mind that as far as the communist threat to his country is concerned, () is in lead segment and that, if he believes that the issues warrant, he may even be "willing" to risk his political neck.

5. I doubt whether () ever before has been afforded an opportunity to expand his political philosophy within the broad content of all the problems with which we are concerned. In some of the issues raised he may have felt somewhat out of his depth, but his cooperation in our attempt to develop through him a consistent "utter" of planned action was beyond praise. With the qualifications noted in the introductory paragraph, it may be worth your while to study what he has to say.

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COURIER

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29 Wash

LINCOLN

Chief of Station, Guatemala

INFO: Chief, WMD; ()

Operational

Operational Report ()

JUN 15 1954

1. Enclosed are five contact reports from () covering recent meetings with ()

2. The subject matter of paragraph 4, enclosure 1, is also discussed in paragraph 16, enclosure 4, and it appears that the arrest of () was not as serious security-wise as we originally feared.

3. The highlights of enclosure 2 were cabled to LINCOLN, information DIR. The matter of () paragraph 14, this enclosure, was previously reported with the request that appropriate security action be taken.

4. Enclosure 3 is a detailed reply to () Both () and () were convinced (when the report was written) that a suspension of () activities was essential in order to assure the existence of an effective underground organization in the critical days preceding D-Day. They have since concentrated on regrouping and other organizational work in connection with the underground teams () Within the limits of "need-to-know" we have indicated to () that PBSUCCESS state of readiness has not been seriously retarded by recent compromises and that they should be prepared to activate the underground teams at a moments notice.

5. The subject matter of paragraph 4, enclosure 4, was reported to LINCOLN, () and DIR (GUAT 821) and we are awaiting identifying data before attempting to establish contact with these elements that appear to have been cut off by the () compromise. The identifier mentioned in paragraph 17, enclosure 4, is retained in station files.

6. Paragraph 2, enclosure 5, refers to tentative contact plans for picking up the individual mentioned therein (not to be implemented until his bona fides are confirmed by () Much of the data in this and above enclosures (e. g., paragraphs 6, 7) cover matters outside station jurisdiction. We presume that these miscellaneous comments will have meaning to LINCOLN and () and that any action required will be handled by responsible personnel. Paragraphs 15-18 contain interesting PI data reflecting reactions to current events and are submitted in compliance with ()

Attachment: 5 reports

15 June 1954/ ()

Distribution:

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2-Wash w/att; ()

1-files w/att

10 June 1964

SUBJECT: Meeting Between() and()

1. A meeting occurred between() and() on Wednesday night, 9 June.

2. ()'s meeting with(), scheduled for Wednesday night, failed to materialize. It is not believed that() has been arrested - and() is attempting another meeting with() for tonight.

3. () met with several seoras del mercado. They are determined to carry on, and are full of courage. () reports that this group is perhaps the most courageous and willing-to-fight group of any. These seoras are planning on sending out some delegations to the departments to tell the people not to lose hope, etc. () also expects to utilize them as messengers to the underground if this can be worked out in any way. They are almost the only group left entire in()'s organization since the recent wave of arrests.

4. ()

() had had a meeting with her Tuesday night, at which time she reported that apparently the police had taken the pressure off the CEUA headquarters, since the orajas were no longer evident in the vicinity. Her arrest can possibly be due to information extracted from other prisoners - the lawyer retained by the () reports that() is being subjected to considerable torture at the hands of the police. This is probably true in the case of the other arrests also.

5. () suggests that inasmuch as all packages sent through the mail are inspected at the post office, and hence another method would have to be utilized in

Enc 1

delivering a package to such persons as (

) it is much better to use something with a real
shock value, like the empty shells of a grenade or a
large machine gun or rifle clip, with plastic explosive
than an alarm clock or other such harmless articles.
Also, rather than to () and men of this
 ilk, who know they haven't anything to gain at the hands
 of the opposition and are confirmed gobernistas -

() and his fellows, who are fence-sitters, opportunists,
and cowardly at heart, should be the recipients of such
"presents". If we cannot obtain any grenade shells,

() has a few (two or three) clips which he can use -
however, the grenade shells would be much more effective.

6. Concerning the details of () meetings -
before concluding one meeting, arrangements are made for
the next meeting - time, place. The meetings are held
at night, and contacts established in the darker sections
of the city. Because of the present situation - ()
in hiding, and unable to come out during the daytime,
emergency or unscheduled meetings cannot be included
with any degree of certainty in these plans.

7. Before her arrest, () reported to
() that the people arriving at the CEUA headquarters
from the departments reported a great deal of discouragement
among the opposition, and the belief that these
recent arrests and government charges have meant the
destruction of the anti-Communist movement - at least
in so far as it means any effective movement to liberate
the country from its present rulers.

()

11 June 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting Between () and ()

1. A meeting occurred between () and () on Thursday night, 10 June.

2. ()'s house was entered and searched by the police yesterday. ()'s house was also searched, as well as various other persons.

3. The police released (). She reports that she offered no resistance to their questioning, but answered "si" to everything. An attempt is being made to obtain a more detailed account of her questions and answers.

4. () was arrested yesterday - possibly as a result of the () arrest, or of other arrests and confessions. () assisted in setting up the underground in Puerto Barrios, Quetzaltenango, and Quiché.

5. The () (fmu), believed connected with some part of the movement, was arrested yesterday also.

6. Because of the () arrest, BLANCA is now in semi-hiding.

7. BLANCA reports that many people are here in the capital looking for ANARELIA. They carry messages, and not finding him do not know what to do - they search the city for some one to deliver the messages to - the three groups of messages turned in this morning are samples of the type material these people are carrying. Also, a big demand seems to be for money from ANARELIA's activities in the provinces to carry on the work they have been assigned - otherwise it is in danger of lapsing. The note concerning the arms shipment to Honduras comes from a Communist on the ANARELIA payroll - and he is crying for his money. We do know not know how much money is involved in any of these cases.

Encl 2

6. () (of the ANARHLA system presumably) has sent an urgent cry to the city that he is desperately in need of money.

7. () (fmu) and a secretary of one of the anti-Communist filiales in Tiquisate have fled to the capital. (name of secretary unknown) - they report many arrests in Tiquisate area and the people disheartened. These two are being sought by the police and are now in hiding here in the city.

10. Reports indicate there was a "matanza" in Amatitlán yesterday. The gobernador, jefe de policía, and the sub-jefe were reportedly killed, as well as others unnamed.

11. Alfonso Bauer País yesterday stated that a coup by the military is expected this week.

12. Current rumors, with considerable strength, in the streets are that Eliego Monzón has fled Guatemala, presumably to Honduras.

13. DeLeón (name and rank unknown - but is on the) said that there is a great states of "nervios y descontrol" in the army.

14. The market women report that from other sources come continued reports that María Cruz (widow of Oscar Luna, and believed to be cook in Castillo Armas home in Honduras) is a government spy. They report that there seems to be little doubt about this. Her amante (name unreported) is a member of the Policía Judicial. Her father received messages every day from her. Her father is employed by a Sr. Serra or Sierra (fmu) who is reportedly a relative of Arbenz. Again - it is considered extremely curious that María Cruz went to Honduras without advising anyone and apparently on her own money - and had no trouble crossing the frontier.

11 June 1954

SUBJECT: Review of () Underground Situation

References: Dispatch, 24 May 1954, and Memo 3629

1. () and (), after discussion and review of the whole general situation, believe that it is best that no action be taken at the present time with regard to reference matter, which may compromise our position, or which will indicate to the government that the backbone of the opposition has not been broken. It seems best to let the government's anti-Communist activities gradually lessen before we undertake any more propaganda activities from within the country. More propaganda from within the country at this time will only serve to betray to the government that there is still a network or partial network of the opposition elements functioning, and the government will redouble its efforts at breaking this up. Tortures will be increased or renewed and many names will be given under these tortures that will only lead to more arrests, more disclosures, and more arrests - which could have the effect of breaking up whatever remains presently of the organization.

2. A halting of our propaganda activities now may also serve to lessen or halt the tortures on the prisoners already taken and now being taken by the government. () men, was arrested yesterday, and can disclose the underground system in Quetzaltenango, Quiché, and Puerto Barrios.

3. Paragraph 3 of 24 May dispatch contains sentence "strict compliance with this rule (the teams should engage in no activities before word is given) is imperative to conserve our forces for the critical phase". If the underground system is expected to play a part at a more critical phase of the operation, it is considered necessary that for the present at least, no activities other than maintaining lines of communication and contact be undertaken.

4. At present there is no propaganda which we can put out which will counteract or soften the government's blows - such propaganda as "the government's actions have not

Enc. 3

destroyed the opposition*, etc., or "here lives a Communist", or the issuance at this time of the mimeographed news sheet, give little encouragement to a people facing arrest and torture, and who have been fed much propaganda through the years and particularly in the past few months. Their greatest fear and only hope at present is to see some kind of armed action. They are afraid and want nothing more to do with propaganda - they want action, or they will render no more assistance until that time.

6. Another point to be considered in regard to the underground activities is that communications is a major problem. Dispatch recommended that telegrams or phone calls, in previously arranged open code messages, be sent to the chiefs of the underground. It is necessary to remember that these people are not accustomed to receiving telegrams, nor do they have phones. One telegram, when most needed, is perhaps feasible. But more telegrams, at indiscriminate times, will immediately call attention to, and under the present existing conditions in Guatemala, direct suspicions against, the recipients of said communications.

6. The alternative is to send messengers. This must be done by the land routes in most cases, and in view of the poor and indirect roads, necessitates time - time to get there, and time to get an answer back. The air routes are too carefully checked, and the messengers available cannot use these routes more than once or twice, if at all.

7. We feel that too little advance notice was given for the best organization of this underground system, and particularly is this true (although unavoidable) in view of () resultant enforced bidding. We were given two weeks to set up this organization. Before the two weeks were up, the flap occurred. One part of the directive stated that the persons chosen should not be connected with any overt activities or should retire from same - if such directives had been given a month ago or preferably even more (I understand the plan was in being for some time before it was passed along to me and through me to() such directives could have been carried out more competently and easily. Now, however, with () and most of his assistants either in bidding, arrest, or exile, and arrests continuing in the capital and the departments daily, it is extremely difficult to get a true picture of our set-up and what is available to us and what is now compromised and dangerous, and to be able to judge how we

can best proceed. We don't know who all have been compromised by () papers, and through the resultant arrests, who else have been compromised by confession extracted under torture.

8. The foregoing is not intended to present a picture of hopelessness - but it is intended to explain our picture and our belief in non-activity for the present, as we can only judge from the meager information being gotten to () from the departments. We believe that all our present activities should be concerned with retrenching, establishing, or re-establishing and safeguarding our communication lines and our contacts, particularly in regard to the underground.

9. Any propaganda designed to cheer the people can best and most safely be delivered from the airplane or over the clandestine radio. In this connection, is it not possible and feasible, that the airplane make a series of trips to the capital and other major centers, dropping extremely forcibly written and presented volantes, promising retribution without fail, to all those persons having a hand in torturing any of the prisoners being taken by the government? These tortures are being applied to the prisoners and by no means gently. It might make things somewhat easier for them, and also help us, because without torture, the prisoners are considerably less likely to talk.

10. One great security hazard at present is that because of the government news blackout, many people, including ourselves, do not know who has been arrested. Delegations continually arrive in the capital, carrying messages, papers, etc., - looking for () etc. When they cannot find the persons they usually contact, they begin to search through the city for some one else to whom they can deliver their messages. This is a hazard to all concerned. Perhaps the clandestine radio could make daily announcements of those persons it knows have been arrested or are in exile. This would serve as a warning to persons looking for any one so named on the programs.

11. () both feel that military action should not be delayed any longer than absolutely necessary. The people are crying for a change and will support any such movement. Propaganda-wise, they are mentally prepared

for armed action (or at least they were, before the arrests, and there is nothing to indicate they are any less so now). All comments from the (-) group indicate many are tired of propaganda and exposing themselves to arrests, etc., - they want action. They are no longer willing to risk their security for what they regard as useless and non-resulting propaganda which gets them nothing except the government's wrath and imprisonment.

12. Both () feel that because we have never been given even an approximate date for any military action we have been handicapped in preparing propaganda or in giving advice on propaganda suggested. The propaganda must be timed so as not to get the people too aroused until the proper moment, or should not ask the people for too much risk and exposure unless the military is ready to follow up. Also, knowing approximately when any military action is going to occur to back up the propaganda, we are enabled to know what propaganda would be most effective, and when it should be used. We have engaged in certain propaganda work which, in view of the non-appearance of military action, seems foolish and ill-timed, and serving only to bring down government repressive measures. It seems to () that the timing of the "32" campaign was wrong, inasmuch as it occurred in April (26 April was the deadline given us - and with no follow up until almost a month later) and apparently no military action of any kind was contemplated for anytime thereabouts. The "32" campaign merely disclosed to the government that a vast network of opposition existed throughout the country, and aroused the people (in conjunction with other inflammatory propaganda including the clandestine radio, airplane, etc.) - without ever arriving at the only logical climax - military action. These propaganda campaigns should have been scheduled for very shortly before the outbreak of the military campaign. The people's spirits would have been at their highest point, and the government would still be too bewildered by the barrage of different types of propaganda and the vastness of the propaganda, to even begin to effectively take steps to counteract it.

()

12 June 1964

SUBJECT: Meeting Between() and ()

1. A meeting occurred between () and () on Friday night, 11 June.

2. () and (fmu) () of the Municipalidad of Guatemala City have been arrested. Reportedly, some 60 more persons have also been arrested along with these two.

3. () received a report that the entire municipal council of either Juliapa, Zacapa, or Cuilapa has also been arrested.

4. () met with (), who has acted as spokesman for the group of persons here in the capital looking for ANABELA. () is from Zacapa. His father, (), also from the Zona Zacapa, is presently a prisoner here in the capital.

5. () states that the group he represents in Zacapa was given instructions by PANCHO (or in name of PANCHO) while () was in Honduras, and () was told that ANABELA here in Guatemala would provide them with all that they needed:

- a) a pick-up or Panel
- b) three or four houses
- c) a place for the arms
- d) comida, etc., for the men

() estimates that this would represent some \$3,200.00 - pick-up - \$1,400.00; houses - \$160.00 - \$200.00; food, etc. for the men - \$600.00.

- e) guardians or watchmen for the houses that and the arms site - probably another \$100.00
- f) () expenses - \$150.00

Other compromises mentioned by (), as spokesman for the group:

- g) ANABELA has been giving money to the families of some 8 or 10 of the men who are in Honduras
- h) () family - \$125.00
- i) () of the zona in the (), and who has a number of people in his care - \$500.00
- j) Communist contact - his name is on the paper turned in with reference to arms shipment to Honduras. He states that in the upper part of this paper is also the clave (key) to the code used by the Communists for those parts - \$200.00
- k) a Guardia Judicial, apellido ()(fmu), who passes information to the group - \$75.00.

6. The Communist of paragraph 6, j, states that the PGT sent to Honduras in the mentioned arms shipment, 32 ametralladoras and a number of fusiles.

7. Several lawyers have been arrested (names unknown).

8. () has been arrested.

9. A group of persons at the frontier (presumably the Salvador-Guatemala frontier) asked () to relay word to () in Salvador that "capas de hule" and "zapatos de hule" be sent them because of the heavy rains.

10. () is reportedly the following information, he has no contact with the group now - () talked with a group of persons in Salvador on his way back to Guatemala from Honduras, which persons are either now in the capital or due to arrive very shortly. They stated they were to make contact with "El Compadre" who was to instruct them and to hide certain people here in the capital.

11. ()'s house was "cateada" (searched) by Villagrán (fmu) and 10 other police, for 3 and a half hours the other day. They searched everything - book by book, and took away ()'s cameras, projector, radio, typewriter, his personal business accountings, photographs. They found nothing compromising.

12. ()

() reports that no pilot has lied with any plane. Each pilot has a "shadow" or spy, and everyone is carefully controlled.

13. The underground chief and contact has been arranged for Zacapa. () does not have this name as yet. He will obtain it from ()

14. A group of locatarians left on a trip through the departments to try and calm and reassure the people.

15. ()

16. () states that the questions she was asked while in the hand of the police concerned only the papers which the police had seized and her work:

- a) had she seen ANABELA;
- b) who gave her money for the office expenses;
- c) did she know where this money came from;
- d) who gave her orders;
- e) ()
- f) did she have any knowledge of the papers seized in ANABELA's house;
- g) how much was her salary;
- h) what was the motive behind some telegrams sent out to various persons in different Zonas and signed by her;
- i) was she aware of the persons who traveled to the departments;
- j) did she know the "apodos" of the persons who frequented the offices;
- k) did she know how they communicated by code;
- l) did she know the () house and address;
- m) did she know () and was he a member of the Comité (she answered that sometime ago he had been on the directive, but that he had retired. Her acquaintanceship with him was through sports and through his sister);

- n) did she know () address (she stated that she believed he lived "()", but didn't know the exact address);
- o) they had her identify signatures, letters (letras), and types of machines;
- p) what and to where did she send to Honduras and El Salvador by certified mail.

17. Contact with the locatarias (señoras del mercado) can be established through:

()

The half piece of newspaper photograph should be presented to her to be matched up.

18. The following are workers (obreros) who can be used as contacts with or through the locatarias:

()

()

()

13 June 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting Between () and ()

1. A meeting occurred between () and () on Saturday night, 12 June.

2. () was given contact instructions to pass along to (). Further talks with () have revealed a misunderstanding concerning his name - it is not () as previously reported, but (). () is approximately () years old, and he is in the capital. () is staying ().

3. () can be contacted at this place between 12:30 and 2:30 P.M., or at the tienda "Lafco", which I understand is a radio servicio in front of the Club Guatemala, which tienda is where he is presently working.

4. () has had two detailed conversations with this man, and says that he knows too many of the right people and too many details for the man not to be what he claims to be, in all probability. () is in charge of the arrangements in the Zacapa zone and wishes to return home as soon as possible in order not to call attention by a too long absence.

5. () states that he had a countersign arranged with ANARELA, consisting of one half of a 10 centavo playing card. This was arranged through (), who had to leave Guatemala as a result of the ANARELA flap. () was to arrange the matter of the pick-up, maintenance of 300 men, radio technician and instructor, houses.

6. CARTER arranged previously to our contact instructions, a countersign consisting of one half of a 50 centavo note (which has been already given to JOHGE). The note contains the number DO 37402. This number is on both halves. () has one half, and the person making the contact is to present the other half.

Encl. 5

6. Members of the families

and some 5 or 6 other families are looking for (brother of Antonio), who has been in charge of reporting money to these families. This is Q50.00 each time to each family.

7.

8. () coordinador and enganchador for the Zona Los Piedros, La Palmilla, Ceculutan (?), etc.. left Guatemala City Saturday because of necessity. () gave him some money. () was in Honduras with PANCHO.

9. () was asked by PANCHO to supply some information on a couple of railroad bridges. This information is the following, and should be sent to Honduras:

Puente ferrocarril, milla 177.2 - barranco profundo, cerro al otro lado. It could be destroyed and its replacement or substitution would be very difficult.

Puente ferrocarril, milla 174.5 - same story.

These bridges are in the Zacapa area.

10. () wants to know about (). if he is in Honduras. () says it is many days since he has heard from him, and that () is important because he controls a whole village in the area.

11. ()

().

12. The chief of the underground group in Zacapa has been chosen. He is () (apparently related to ()). His father is () and mother is ().

7

13. His assistant is (), bachelor, 34 years old, lives at the right hand side of the (). His father is ().

14. Arrangements have been (or are in process of being finished) made with a group of universitarios to bring out some volantes among the universitarios touching on the censorship, government arrests, etc., etc. with the aim of arousing the students and possibly provoking a flare-up or strike. One of the ditto machines from the office will be used for this purpose. This group is being rounded up through a professor of Derecho Interna- cional at the university (I believe his name is ()XXX fm) and is some relative - possibly brother - to man where () is presently hiding out).

15. () (gobiernista) in a talk with one of ()'s contacts, stated that he and others would be willing to collaborate with the opposition if they only knew that there was something well organized.

16. () a licenciado and a gobiernista, says that he and others like him in the government, feel that it is a shame that because of a "grupo de intran- gencias" the aims of the October Revolution are going to be lost, because it is "cosa sabida" that this govern- ment is finished, and all because of the stubbornness of Arbenz and his group and the communist influence.

17. Paragraphs 15 and 16 are indications of how many gobiernistas, now feeling that their side is doomed, are making overtures to the opposition or at least letting remarks drop where they can be over-heard, so they won't lose out completely when a change comes.

18. In the Quiché area, when the opposition airplane passed over the military base, where a couple of machine guns or anti-aircraft pieces were in position, the report is that the soldiers abandoned their arms and instead went about chasing the propaganda that was dropped.

()

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1961 APR 19 2000

30

CONFIDENTIAL 1961 APR 19

DATE: 1961 APR 19

FROM: []

INFO: DIRECTOR

TO: SLING

INFO: DIR

CITE: []

REBAC PBSUCCESS

1. [] 2nd STATEMENT LOCATE RUMORS ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ARRANGED BY SOMOZA TO KILL PROVIDE BASIS FOR ACTION AGAINST FIGUERES OR ARBENZ.
2. ACTION REQUIRED TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN 10 DAYS AFTER ATTEMPT.

END OF MESSAGE

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
CSE/HKG ON 14 JUL 95

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

SECRET

INCOMING CABLE

SECRET

LINCOLN STATION COPY

31

TO: LINCOLN
FROM: DIRECTOR
INFO: PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
TOR: 0435Z 9 APR 54

DIR 45678

TO: SLINC
CITE: DIR
RYBAT PBSUCCESS
REF: DIR D45571

[] []

1. HEREWITH FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION POSITIVE ANGLES FOR EXPLOITATION WHICH DO NOT FALL WITHIN PROSCRIPTION OF REF MESSAGE. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE DISPATCH FROM PARIS IN RADIO TELETYPE TO THE AMERICAS TODAY'S DATE HAS FOLLOWING TEXT:

"GUATEMALA CITY--THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANNOUNCED WEDNESDAY MORNING THAT THREE PERSONS IMPLICATED IN THE PLOT AGAINST PRESIDENT Somoza IN NICARAGUA HAVE BEEN GIVEN SANCTUARY AT THE GUATEMALAN EMBASSY IN THE NICARAGUAN CAPITAL. THEY ARE LT. GUILLERMO SUAREZ, DR GUILLERMO SUAREZ RIVAS, AND FRANCISCO BARRA MAYORGA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THE GUATEMALAN EMBASSY HAS REQUESTED VISA FOR THE REFUGEES DEPARTURE FROM NICARAGUAN TERRITORY, OR IF THE VISA WOULD BE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA."

2. RECOMMEND THAT THIS MATTER BE CHECKED WITH [] FOR CONFIRMATION AND IF CONFIRMED THAT IT BE PLAYED IN DEADPAN FACTUAL MANNER BY SELECTED STATION OUTLETS IN SUCH MANNER AS TO UNDERSCORE [] ANGLE.

3. ANTICIPATE POSSIBILITY EARLY [] DENIAL AND CONFUSION EFFORT IN ATTEMPT DENY RESPONSIBILITY OR FAILING THAT CONFUSE ISSUE. IF THIS NOT ALREADY UNDER WAY BY [] RECOMMEND YOUR CONSIDERATION OF LINES PREDICTING THAT [] WILL TRY TO CONFUSE AND OBSCURE ISSUE SINCE THEY ON THE SPOT.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

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SST/OM 11/54

PRIORITY

32

[] []

PRIORITY

LINCOLN

6 APRIL 54 0752Z

DIRECTOR, [] []

TO: [] [] INFO: DIR, [] [] CITE: SLINC 1690

KIBAT/PBSUCCESS

1. IMPORTANT EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON ALL EVIDENCE CONNECTED [] [] WITH RECENT ATTEMPT AGAINST [] [] DESIRE TO KNOW TRUE SPONSORS OF MOVEMENT; WHERE AND HOW TRAINED; ORIGIN OF WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES PLUS ANY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IMPLICATING [] []
2. UNDERSTAND DIPLOMATIC CORPS INVITED TO DESPOT WEAPONS. COULD YOU OBTAIN PHOTOS AND DESCRIPTION INCLUDING MARKINGS?
3. JOSE MARIA XERCERO LACAYO IN HANDS LOCAL AUTHORITIES ALLEGEDLY STATED GROUP TRAINED IN [] [] AND SENT [] [] FOR THIS MISSION. CAN YOU OBTAIN DETAILS OF INTERROGATION?
4. ALBERTO XAEZ BONE ALLEGEDLY FORMER MEMBER [] ARMY, A LOUIS XAEZ BONE, [] [] EXILE IN [] [] WAS CONNECTED WITH COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS. ARE THEY IDENTICAL? WHERE IS XAEZ NOW? IF CAPTURED, ATTEMPT OBTAIN FULL DETAILS OF INTERROGATION.
5. JORGE XPIVAS MONTES, RONDURAN, KNOWN LEADER OF CARIBBEAN LEGION.

[] [] [] []

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C S I H R C ON 11 JUN 1971

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

REPORTEDLY IN CHARGE CAMP/LEGION TRAINING PROGRAM. WHEREAB/KITS UNKNOWN.

6. FRANCISCO ~~IBARRA~~ MAYORDO, LT. GUILLERMO ~~IBARRA~~ DUARTE AND GUILLERMO ~~IBARRA~~ JUAREZ RIVAS REPORTEDLY TOOK ASYLUM IN EMBASSY. THESE PLUS ADOLFO ALFARO AND MIGUEL ROBLETO REPORTED IN EMBASSY MAY BECOME AVAILABLE FOR INTERROGATION IF CRIMINAL LAW DECISION INVALIDATES POLITICAL ASYLUM.

7. JUAN ~~IBARRA~~ MARTINEZ REYES, KNOWN ARMS DEALER.

8. RIFLES AND MO'S REPORTED BY AS MEXICAN MAKE; THIS REPORTS ARMS IN BORE MARKS.

9. CABLE INFO PRIORITY AS RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

7 APRIL 1954

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
CSE/HRC ON 11 JULY 1981

REF ID: A616105

TO: [] GOTAT INFO: PER

RYBAT/PROSESSE

DELEGATE ACTION

1. ~~DETAILS~~ COINCIDE ~~WITH~~ SOMOZA ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.

2. DETAILS, PACHAL, RONCOUR, MEXICO.

a. ON 28 MAR 1954, 1000 MAN TAKEN OUT, HEADED BY CARLOS LARION'S YOSSES RIVAS
MONTEZ, FROM COSTA RICA, EXPRESSED MEXICO. IN THIS UNIT WOUNDED. ALL CAPTURED.

b. UNIT SUPPLIED 200 MEXI RIFLES, 12 MO'S, 50,000 RDS 1440, 200 GRENADES,
20 GRENADES GAS BOMB. WAS SENT TO PUEBLO SOLAZENO IN COSTA RICA, MEXICO GUERRA.
COSTA RICA DISSEMBLES UNDER CARLOS RIVAS CHAMBERO RECD THEM.

c. ON 3 APRIL AT MILITARY HOME PUEBLO SOLAZENO PLACED SHOT AT PALACE,
BUT RIVAS MONTEZ SAID SHOT WAS FIRED ON SOMOZA MURDER. DURING DEBATE, MONTEZ SAID MORE
TO GUAET PELM, WHO INDICATED MORE WORK SOMOZA MUST BE KILLED.

d. SHOT PLACED NIGHT APRIL 3, VIGILANCE MICA POLICE CALLED. SHOT FORCE,
COSTA RICA DISSEMBLES SAYS.

33

PAGE TWO

5. NEW ATTEMPT PLANNED BY GUAT, BUT NICAR POLICE KNOW PARTICIPANTS, LOCATION ARMS CACHES.
3. THEMES FOR ALL MEDIA:
 - A. GUAT-INSPIRED ATTEMPT ~~FAILED~~.
 - B. GUAT-RAID AND AGGRESSIVE INTENT CLEARLY VISIBLE, AS IN LUPERCH LANDFILLS WHICH OAS COMMITTED.
 - C. ATTEMPT TYPICAL EXAMPLE COMMUNIST DESPERATION TRY CSZ FORCE WHEN LACK POPULAR BASE.
 - D. GUAT USE OF TERROR VRS LIKE CHAMIDE GAS BOSS.
2. URGENT NECESSITY ALL CENTRAL AMERICA RALLY TO DEFEND HAT SOVEREIGNTY, FREEDOM AGAINST GUAT INTERVENTION. MOSCOW-CREATED GUAT CANCER MUST BE ERADICATED.
7. SIT SHOWS NECESSITY, JUSTICE OAS RESOLUTION AGAINST REDS.
4. CABLE BROGRESS.

END OF MSG

~~SECRET~~

34

LINCOLN CALLER

~~SECRET~~

LINCOLN STATION COPY

TO: LINCOLN

PROCEDURE: ROUTINE

FROM: []

TOR: 0616Z 27 APR 54

INFO: DIRECTOR

[]

TO: SLINC INFO: DIR CITE: []

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

RE: []

1. SOURCES AND EVAL SAME AS REF REPORT FOLLOWING.

2. BASIS OSORIO FEARS REF PARA 1 C IS ARBENZ HAD IDENTICAL PACT
WITH [] AND VIEWS ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AS ARBENZ BREACH.

[] ALSO SHORT ARMS.

3. OSORIO CONVICTIONS REASSURED BY LIC FERNANDO FOURNIER COSTA
RICAN VICE CHANCELLOR []

4. []

[]

END OF MESSAGE

939

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
C31/HMK ON 1/20/95

35

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

GUATEMALA

20 MAY 1954

LINCOLN

DIRECTOR

TO: SGUAT

INFO: DE.

CITE: SLINC 2890

REBATE/PBSUCCESS

REF: QMAT 602

1. INADVISABLE DISCLOSE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH [] TO CALLEGRES,
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW [] BASIC COMPARTMENTATION
BETWEEN CALLEGRES AND K-PROGRAM MUST BE KEPT.

2. ASSURE [] WE WILL KEEP HIM OUT OF CALLEGRES BLACK BOOK AT
PROPER TIME.

3. LINC NOT CONTACTED CALLEGRES ON THIS MATTER. WILL INFORM YOU IF
CALLEGRES VOLUNTEERS ANYTHING.

4. [] NOT TO DISCLOSE ANY OPERATIONAL DETAILS TO []

5. KEEP [] IN [] AS LONG AS OPERATIONALLY NECESSARY AND

FEASIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED BY
CIA STAFF ON 11/20/1995

36

LINCOLN:

CONTACT AGENT

C/R No. 33

DATE: 21 February 1954

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CSE/HRG ON 11 JULY 95

PLACE: Safe House "A"

PERSONS PRESENT: ()

COVER USED: Pseudonyms

DISCUSSION: Discussion Topic: ()

1. In accordance with instructions which I had received, I went over in detail the memorandum regarding the possible use, or exploitation, of ()'s attitude was completely negative. Even before I had finished the complete discussion of the points contained in the memorandum, he had attempted to interrupt me with strong objections. The complete list of objections is to be found in attached memorandum typewritten.

2. The most outstanding thing which I gathered from this discussion was ()'s intense dislike of () and any possible collaboration with him on the part of the JUNTA or the GROUP to him appeared as a grave error. He summarized this attitude in stating that even if we discover that it is necessary to place () in a position of use* that is to secure his help in having () as a base of operations, or in some manner to assist us in that country- whatever small part he plays will not be worth the trouble which will be created later on by incorporating him into the movement. He pointed out that, in weighing this, it would be his opinion, and he was certain that RUFUS would share this opinion, that no use could be made of ()

3. () then explained several points which had been made in the initial discussion, ~~as my part~~, of the written memorandum which had been given to me. However, () did not give in an inch and appeared to be adamant regarding the matter of doing any business at all with ()

4. I advised him that, of course, they would be kept in constant knowledge of what was taking place with () and furthermore, the results of the conversations which might ensue.

5. At this time I returned to () and, after conveying the initial reaction of () I was advised that possibly this attitude should be changed slightly to the one that it would be possible to utilize him after his true assets had been obtained and reviewed by RUFUS and () an isolation process would have to take place; that I should advise () definitely that this consideration certainly would be thought of, if his assets did not appear actually to be real. I advised () that I had not brought this matter up because it had not been in the memorandum, although () advised me such information had been contained in the () Task. I, in brief, outlined the information and reaction and objections of () to him and then advised him that I would return with this additional information for () benefit. Also, I advised that I wished to clarify the matter regarding () obtaining an approval of approach to () and as

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to what reaction there had been at the time.

6. Checking again with () a short bit later, I advised him that I had been thinking about this matter while I had been gone and that I was extremely interested in finding out further his reaction on this thing. () said that he principally had absolutely no confidence in () and that RUFUS shared this view also. I then advised () that, actually, if we discovered that no real assets or real value could be made of () certainly we wished to get him out of the way, either by neutralization, isolation, or, at last risk or cost, elimination. I said we could not allow this man to continue in his present state, in as much as he was actually doing harm to the JUNTA, and that we must find some way to fit him in or take him out of the picture.

7. () again stated his views as to the risks of taking him in and gave to me at this time a list of objections which he had verbally told me earlier in the afternoon. He again counselled extreme caution on any dealings with () stating that, at any time and at any place, () would be willing to betray anyone for his own personal interests. I advised him that the utmost discretion would be used and that immediately after we had obtained from () a list of his assets, we would make these facts known to RUFUS and () for their private investigation or survey of them.

8. I asked () if this whole subject of () had not been approached previously by (), and () had advised that it had been and that RUFUS said that if the GROUP dictated that () should be the leader of this, if it meant success for the movement, he, RUFUS, would become a soldier in the ranks to comply. () said if this eventuation should come to pass, he, although he would continue along with the movement, would be the first one to oppose him once he was established as the new leader of Guatemala.

COMMENTS:

DECISIONS:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Signed _____

Distribution:

Orig & 1: Addressee
cc: Subj (1)
Chrono (1)
etc. (1)

3A -

MEMORANDUM ATTACHMENT TO CONTACT REPORT No. 3.3

() is not in favor of any use of () because he can't be trusted. The following points are set forth to prove his arguments:

1. () has disregarded entirely his ()

2. () denounced Rufus to Trujillo as a spy in Arbenz service. (This was obtained by Arenas. Trujillo showed a copy of () letter stating Rufus was a spy.)

3. Rufus has proof () was author of a leaflet distributed widely in Guat., El Salv., and Hond. (which) defamed Rufus--claims was for sole purpose of obtaining outside aid for him and not for ()-Ruf.

4. In Guat. () has lost all strength--major portion--still anti-Communist--is now aligned to Rufus.

5. () is personally ambitious and wants nothing less than presidency. Com-
munist cause completely secondary. Does not, rpt not, have support of the army
or people.

6. () sent letter to certain US Senators attacking the FGroup* for their
siding Rufus instead of () (Group has copy of this letter.)

7. () tried to get Rufus to sign an agreement guaranteeing that Rufus
would give () official backing in a "free" election to be held after a
successful revolution. Rufus refused. () was furious.

8. () particular friends see () even less than Rufus' military
elements.

9. Rufus young army men in exile want no part of (), since he would benefit
fact only older, high ranking officers--youngsters would be out in the cold
after the big day.

10. () represents conservative elements and if a part of the new govt.,
would give Commies chance for come-back, since he would have little real
desire in a positive program.

11. () has little regard for () even once thru () offered to kick
him out of ()

12. Rufus and () themselves have no, rpt no, personal confidence in
and consider () i.e.) he has nothing to offer. They can prove it, they
say. Anyone talking to () will soon learn same--if he makes () get down
to FACTS regarding his assets.

23 Jan., 1954

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Subject: GENERAL CONCEPT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH () PREPARING
HIM FOR FORTHCOMING CALLIGERIS MEETING

1. This memo is prepared for approval C/P PBSUCCESS prior to subject conference, as being the general basis of planning now being conducted within the project in the () field. It is slanted toward setting () in an advantageous position insofar as his forthcoming meeting with CALLIGERIS is concerned and will be followed up in (). CALLIGERIS meeting and Calligeris- () discussions to follow.

II. FACTORS DETERMINING THE CONSIDERED PLAN OF ACTION:

A. Former CALLIGERIS planning has been considered carefully, and with the following exceptions the main context of PBSUCCESS thinking adheres as nearly as possible to CALLIGERIS's prior concept:

1. It is considered that extreme care must be taken to avoid putting all our assets into any situation, the compromise of which would seriously deplete the forces of the movement. For that reason an attempt is being made to make the entry of outside forces nearer to an infiltration type entry than that of regular forces grouped along main communication routes. Compartmentation of units is sought, also.

2. For the same reason, the approach to Puerto Barrios is being considered land-approach to prevent the obvious containment and easy destruction of Calligeris forces in the event recent notification of "baks" to the opposition are more complete than realized (an entirely possible situation).

3. With a realization that to allow this movement to become a prolonged civil war would present major complications in addition to allowing opposition to strengthen its tactical situation while ours bogged down, it is considered that each possible strongpoint of the opposition should be accounted for simultaneously rather than piecemeal.

4. Utility of bombing tactics to neutralize any strongpoint has been eliminated, even as a psychological factor, in view of the fact that the very concept of the movement is that of release of persons from oppression and all actions must allow this discontented element to participate in the overthrow of oppression or at least aid by sympathy. Our tactics must veer away from terrorism of this faction and veer towards inviting participation.

4
50-1

5. Techniques of partisan warfare will be applied in the tested and proven manner to best support more conventional military tactics. This technique of combining the two types of tactics has proven itself in reducing the number of personnel and the magnitude of support necessary to overwhelm superior forces many times in history.

6. Techniques in logistics are being applied to eliminate the massive logistical problem and its limitations to mobility and actions of normal military tactics.

7. Communications has been brought to a maximum of dependability.

8. Utilization of all potential personnel, some of which though now unknown, will through organization become "the thousand bee-stings which kill the tiger" which Mao Tse Tung so successfully utilized to overthrow superior forces.

9. Realization that there can be no failure, both from ()CALLIGERIS' standpoint and ours, and that aside from known opposition tactics and precautionary measures the third factor of being up against trained Communist tacticians in the field of security, staybehind, subversion, intrigue, etc., all of us involved must overplan, overprepare, and be prepared to "drive the tack with the sledge-hammer" in the event the tack turns out to be a railroad spike.

II. FRAMEWORK OF GENERAL PLANNING:

A. The key targets under consideration, those felt necessarily to be controlled to completely insure total success are:

Guatemala garrisons, air facilities, commo, (Guatemala City)

Puerto Barrios port, air facilities, commo, and garrison

Jutiapa Garrison, commo, and air facilities

Kacapa garrison, commo, ~~and~~ ^{air} facilities

Maratenango, ~~and~~ ^{Guatemala} and Quiche garrisons, commo and air facilities

Coban air facilities, commo and garrison

San Jose garrison and port facilities and commo

B. The ideal would be simultaneous containment and seizure of control of each key target using known and physically directed shock troops with supporting partisans in each instance.

C. In all actuality, once the entire assets of Calligeris are brought to the surface and evaluated and assigned missions, the approach to each target will be different but will follow one of the following patterns:

1. Strike the feasible targets with shock troops and inner organization, while having pre-developed the others to a point of self-seizure and eventual pre-planned assembly with shock troops and resulting recruits from other targets.

2. Strike the feasible targets as above, and ELIMINATE develop the feasible targets to a point of self seizure, and block the remaining targets through spotting of saboteur teams along routes of egress from the remaining targets, and through organization of block areas in which small equipped and directed units harass and retard any desired military movement until effective consolidation can be attained at our strong points.

56-1

3. In all eventualities target sub teams at come at each target, existing military air facilities, and at any possible transportation tie-up situation. In all eventualities utilize all partisan units possible to be formed at any point in Guatemala where a single Calligeris man can be located.

III. () BASIS OF PLANNING:

A. The key to the country's survival is Guatemala City. Thalifeline (so long as Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico remain reluctant to support the present Guatemalan regime) is the port at Puerto Barrios. Jutiapa, Iacapa, and Coban should be controlled before penetration beyond them to prevent reorganization behind our movement and eventual entrapment. San Jose should be controlled as a possible substitute for Puerto Barrios, an encirclement of Guatemala City, and as a port of entry for our movement in eventual employment of prolonged hostilities. Mazatenango, Quetzaltenango, and Quiche pose distance and logistical problems plus a personnel drain, plus a remoteness which calls for possibilities of the block manner of containment, that causes us to search for self-seizure and block procedures which will control the situation until consolidation of other gains is completed.

C. Roughly, pending receipt of intelligence expected as a result of () CALLIGERIS meetings (it should be brought out constantly that all planning at this stage is based on rumor and that total/() known assets, the reliability of which is unknown, consists of eleven trainees for (), plus four trainees for () it is felt that inner organization of the Guatemala complex will be the main source for immediate, physical seizure of control. It is estimated that sufficient shocktroops could not be assembled outside the country to accomplish the job. If discussion with Calligeris proves that the inner assets in the Guatemala City area are sufficient to attempt (with high percentage of success chance) striking at Guatemala City instantaneously and in concurrence with seizure of Puerto Barrios, Iacapa, Jutiapa and San Jose, the major portion of available forces will be directed at Guatemala City, utilizing the organization of inner assets and surrounding areas at the other sites to obtain control, (control here means physical control, without assurance of which, Guatemala City should be put on a secondary basis chronologically speaking and men released () in our planning to insure this physical control).

D. Preliminary reports on our assets plus distance and elements of surprise factors may well dictate a course which calls for setting up Guatemala City inner organization to the point where if a move is made by the Guatemala Central Command to move a partial force towards Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, or Coban or San Jose, the inner organization would make its bid while partisan organization around Guatemala City retarded, harassed and generally set up the partial force for annihilation by the Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, Coban, and San Jose Forces.

5/1

The idea of being capable of taking over if Guatemala City forces are depleted can be promoted to the point where the Guatemala City Command will be detained, at least partially. Sab action against air facilities and commo will be executed AGAINST simultaneous with D-day, with possible K-team action at the same time against key figures. All other assets within the inner organization would remain covert, their plan calling for action on depletion of Central Command forces designed to take control or recall the committed troops, or for action once Callegeris' Zacapa, Jutiapa, Coban, and Puerto Barrios and San Jose forces were consolidated.

E. It is contemplated that the terrain and distance situation along with professed Callegeris assets and reported opposition OB, would allow shock troops to be applied against Jutiapa, Zacapa, and Puerto Barrios. These shock troops would travel in small compact units utilizing back trails and prohibitive terrain to maintain non-detection inasmuch as possible, and relying on mobility and concealment to disguise location if detection unavoidable. On D-Day these three forces would be in respective positions, the exact nature of which to be determined following more extensive terrain and intelligence studies. Present figures available, unevaluated, report the following situation, personnel-wise, some of which will be cleared up following a discussion with Callegeris:

Zacapa...opposition	consists of 6 officers, 94 enlisted Guardia
	38 officers, 601 " Military
111 Callegeris assets	200 within Zacapa (no indication military status)
	500 various localities approx
Jutiapa...opposition	consists of 14 officers, 199 enlisted Guardia
Callegeris assets	300 within Jutiapa
	300 various localities approx
Puerto Barrios opposition	28 Officers, 283 enlisted Military
Callegeris assets	450 overall vicinity
Coban...Opposition (not extracting Callegeris assets reportedly strong)	4 Officers 64 enlisted Guardia,
	23 Officers, 295 men Military
Callegeris assets	2000 reported combination military and surrounding populace
San Jose...Opposition	2 Officers 26 enlisted Guardia
Callegeris assets	15 Officers, 208 enlisted, Mil. 2000 (reported by () in preliminary discussions)

5 D-1

F. While the above does not in any way constitute a reliable estimate of the situation it does give us a basis for planning and confirmation or rejection of portions of the knowledge should be possible following the forthcoming meetings. Tentatively, the basis of thinking allows for Zacapa shock troops to seize control and move out to approx 11° 53' long 90° lat. to form assembly with Coban forces moving down parallel to the Coban-Salama-Korresan highway. It is tentatively planned to seize control of Coban through reported Calligeris' assets within the Garrison and augment that force with pledged populace (reported) moving through Salama on the journey to the assembly. On assembly, and in line with the existing situation a movement towards Guatemala by this force could be commenced.

Jutiapa seizure would be affected in the same manner from a compartmented staging base just across the Salvador border. Upon completion of this seizure it would turn parallel to the main highway to a point some five miles east of Laguna de Amatitlan to join with forces from San Jose and turn towards Guatemala City. The seizure of San Jose would be dependent on the facts learned from the coming Calligeris meeting as to the true identity of the 2,000 reported personnel in the area.

G. Due to distance, logistical problems and need to utilize personnel at the foregoing projects the ideal will be to organize Quetzaltenango, Quizaltenango and Quiche to the point of self-seizure. A study of personnel of those garrisons may disclose gimmicks with which we can force key military figures to employ a Latin-type retardation, insuring that these forces do not enter into the tactical picture in time to alter it. The probable situation will be a series of retardation events set up by organization of the area between these three sites and Guatemala City designed to delay reinforcement from these three sites until consolidation of the other targets as completed.

H. Contingency plans should account for 1. employment of Guatemala forces to the aid of our initial targets (which contingency has been generally considered in the above paragraphs); 2. retirement of Guatemala forces to Quetzaltenango as has been reported to be the Guatemalan plan. In this latter event it is now being considered most feasible to complete the capitulation of Guatemala City set up against returned activities from the Quetzaltenango area and complete solid reorganization before turning to the Quetzaltenango problem. After solid organization it would be considered within our capabilities to take the forces at Quetzaltenango by straight attack. 3. ~~Another~~ contingency would be for Guatemala City to prepare for a state of siege in which case reorganization following seizure of the initial targets could be carried out while insuring isolation of Guatemala City from re-supply or reinforcement.

IV. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Communications men now commencing training will produce two types of radio operators. One type is to be called resident R/Os and will be placed in the vicinity of target sites, as yet unselected points, for the purpose of reporting last minute changes in OB. Once the tactical situation opens up,

b D-1

we will revert to tactical R/Os who have previously been married to specific shock troop units. Until the tactical situation opens up Commo will be processed through outside (look LINC). It is expected agent-to-Calligaris service will be a 6-hour process. Once the tactical situation opens up arrangements have been made for unit-to-Calligaris-to-unit-info LINC service. The messages will be sent in code due to the dependability of the RS-1 set to be used on this operation. Resident R/Os will have their radios delivered to them once they are in position. Tactical R/Os are expected to be paired and will carry RS-1s in packs.

V. LOGISTICS:

- A. The logistical support has been broken down into three categories:
 1. Weather-proofed kits of approximately 50 lbs. weight, the contents of which are grouped to service partisans, saboteurs and R/Os. Approximately 12 March the total of these kits will arrive by plane at fields near the staging areas for distribution as needed. The sum total of equipment to be packaged is outlined

10 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/P
SUBJECT: Basic [] Document #1

I. As a result of two months organization, planning, and assessment, certain solid patterns for future [] action have been formulated. As a measure for solidifying the vast, multiheaded planning and support movements to be completed within the next two months it is felt necessary to set up this basic [] document, major changes to which will be recorded as subsequent basic documents.

II. OPERATIONAL PLANNING

A. General

1. The basic key to all operational planning is the realization that the strength of our movement is going to be from within the target country rather than being in the nature of an "invasion" from without. Certain shock troops will be utilized; however, mainly as a psychological factor, consolidation center, and aid to logistical support.

2. The reasoning behind the tactical planning is the realization that ADAM is the key area of resistance or support to our movement. Comparatively trained, well-equipped, well organized troops and Guardia Civil are centered here, in addition to its geographical, topographical, and psychological position.

3. There are nine key points of resistance with which we must cope: Adam, Bond, Ceasar, Doc, Eddie, Frank, Goss, Hark, Ike. Their significance and strength and capabilities of opposition will be brought out in discussion on each individual target.

4. [] is working towards self-assurance of positive control of each of the key areas of resistance prior to the overt move hereinafter referred to as D-day.

5. Positive control as mentioned above will be accomplished by one of or a combination of the following methods:

a. Seizure by an inner organization, organized by a local commander from his own personnel plus defections gained through Psychological Warfare persuasion.

b. Seizure by shock troops launched from staging areas outside the target country with definite support missions being performed by a similar inner organization as mentioned in 5.a. above.

c. An inner organization capable of neutralizing and nullifying the positive reaction of a key point of resistance until success at other key areas is attained and consolidated; then inner support missions to the aid of the consolidated forces.

d. Blocking strong resistance points from the entire action by organizing partisan groups in strategic areas and by strategic placement of specially trained sab-teams.

6. No overt move will be made until XUBARK self-assurance of capability of control of ADAM by one of the first three methods is attained.

7. Defected army personnel capable of influencing units will be the main source of Psychological Warfare for defections within the key areas of resistance to produce organized assets for [] activities.

8. Defected and influenced and sympathetic civilian organizations will be utilized in support functions.

9. All planning will be based on the aim to allow defection, allow capitulation and sympathetic action before and during activities.

10. Preparations will slant towards the capability to implement the three plans:

a. Plan ALICE: Preparation for and seizure of control of target country.

b. Plan BAKER: Consolidation and prevention of counter-movement.

c. Plan CHARLIE: Contingency plans for seizure of control to include alternate and emergency actions at each key area.

B. Organization for Plan ABLE, GENERAL: With full cognizance of the present vague knowledge by all concerned of the exact status of our real or imagined assets, the following cautious inner organization is to occur at each key point:

1. Military:

a. CALLIGERIS is to confer with [] and Staff to determine each local garrison military figure considered most loyal, most uncontaminated by past experiences, etc. This man hereinafter designated Area Leader will be cleared by KUBARK facilities and his name placed on a watch-list of C/S WSBURNT for continual observation.

b. CALLIGERIS will confer with his staff to produce for investigation a proven local citizen (hereinafter designated Contact M) nearby each garrison who is to provide safehouse and contact with the selected military figure. NOTE: Submission of the identities above personages is to occur prior to 1 March.

c. From the staging area for the particular key area (see Para ____, Preparation) a training graduate hereinafter designated Organizer, will be launched back to contact the Contact M. (This Organizer will have received clearance along with other trainees and will be established on the appropriate watch list.)

d. From the safety of Contact M facilities, the Organizer will inform the Area Leader:

(1) The movement is continuing, but with a cautious realization that large portions of former assets have been blown or disaffected or contaminated.

(2) He is to study his garrison situation and recruit:

(a) One man as his executive who will be responsible for the mechanics of inner organization, leaving the Area Leader comparatively inactive from an opposition-eye standpoint.

(b) One man as a cutout-contact to the incoming resident radio operator (See para ____, Commo).

(c) One man as a cut-out courier to the Contact M for the garrison.

(3) He is to instruct the executive (and later direct the organizational operations of the exec) he is to investigate cautiously and examine and submit to him for approval for recruitment:

(a) One man who is in the best position to organize within the commo system an organization capable of controlling or negating commo on signal.

(b) One man who is in best position to organize within the garrisons air facilities an organization capable of negating the air arm through defection of pilots and/or mechanics, destruction of fuel and planes, assassination of pilots, etc.

(c) One man who is in position to and capable of organizing for special missions to include destruction of critical supplies and transportation facilities, crippling of weapons and ammo and armored facilities, raider groups within the garrison, etc.

e. The appropriate clandestine-techniques instructions will be passed by the Organizer to the Area Leader for passing to each recruited person.

f. The Organizer will withdraw to the staging-area headquarters once instructions have been passed to the Area Leader. From that point the Organizer should be the staff head to CALLIGERIS for the inner organization prior to D-day. He should utilize a recruited courier via Contact M and set up alternate and emergency commo to the Area Leader which does not require utilization of Contact M. NOTE: Area leader and groups will be identified by the crypto denoting that target.

2. Partisan organization among civilian populace surrounding each garrison:

a. Organization mechanics of approach will be similar to the organization within the garrison discussed above. The initial contact by Organizer within the garrison vicinity, hereinafter called Contact C, will thereafter provide the cutout between the key area civilian, hereinafter designated Partisan Leader, and the staging area courier to staging area headquarters.

b. The Partisan Leader will be instructed to recruit an Executive whose function would be similar to the Area Leader's Exec. The Partisan Leader's Exec would examine, recruit, and instruct heads for each of the following compartmented partisan groups:

- (1) Commo
- (2) CE
- (3) Reception Party for incoming Materiel Kits
- (4) Action Leader, to head demo and raider teams, later to be assigned Area Leader support missions by CALLIGERIS via Partisan Leader.

NOTE: Partisan Leaders will be identified by the crypto denoting the target and the letter P.

3. Special Partisan groups strategically organized:
In certain areas already spotted and others which will develop along with the situation, there will be a need for partisan organization with harassment, retardation, and diversionary duties. These will be designated hereinafter by cryptos key town with the area to be organized followed by the letter P.

V. TRAINING

A. There are two training sites at present in KMFLUSH.

1. []:

a. The training site SARANAC (field crypto EL ANGEL) is located approximately [], KMFLUSH. It is on an isolated farm owned by [].

b. At present twenty-seven men are in the process of completing a sabotage course designed to produce ten sab instructors, seventeen couriers, staging area personnel, transport-couriers for running arms, etc. This class is known as "A" class. These men are being exposed to some clandestine-technique subjects such as: Resistance to Interrogation (2 hrs.), Night Movement (10 hrs.), Clandestine Commo (6 hrs.). Also included are classroom and live firing range work on the following: 7.62 Soviet Rifle, 9mm Luger pistol, 7.62 Degtyarev LMG, 9mm SMG, German concussion grenade, Canadian frag grenade. Class and range work on the following rounds out the course:

- 1) Crimping and capping
- 2) Handling and placing charges
- 3) Electric and non-electric detonation
- 4) Arson
- 5) Field expedients
- 6) Planning charges
- 7) Planning operations
- 8) Use improvised shaped charge
- 9) Use napalm blocks as incendiaries.

Wood, concrete, and rail work are being stressed. Covering a sab target with fire is being stressed in the planning course.

c. 1) On graduation (approximately 5 March) the ten top class members are to be utilized at an isolated area within SARAHAC to train twenty other recruits now being gathered (as of this date, six of the new class has been recruited). This class of twenty will be known as "C" class and will each be assigned a specific mission and will recruit a team to accomplish the mission. It is expected these teams will be launched just prior to D-day in order to be in position at their assigned targets on call. The team will be launched from the staging area assigned to the target.

2) The remaining seventeen will be assigned missions of support as needed by [] and CALLIGERIS to implement plans.

d. 1) On completion "A" class approximately 5 March, "B" class commences. "B" class is for the purpose of training thirty leaders and specialists and CALLIGERIS is assembling his top caliber personnel including his staff and shock troop leaders or execs.

2) Graduates are to be assessed by Chief of Personnel, Camp Commander, and [] and CALLIGERIS will determine assignments on completion of assessment.

3) Assignment will be to the following jobs:

a) 4 staff men - to return to CALLIGERIS to provide [] guidance

b) 2 assassination specialists - to retrain and replan the launching of present "K" team personnel as well as instruction of "K" team personnel now located within WSBURNT.

c) 8 shock troop leaders and execs - 6 to be returned and assigned leadership to Bond Frank, and Hank; 2 to be launched just prior to D-day to Goss to provide direction to garrison and defections gained there.

d) 16 organizers - to be launched from staging sites to the targets and areas of organization for instructional and coordination functions.

4) The course to be followed is basically [], with stress on Partisan-type highly mobile light traveling well-equipped small, compact units employing irregular warfare tactics. Stress in tactics is on right work. However, certain clandestine techniques, agent handling, employment of tools of resistance, etc. have been included.

- a) Principles of Resistance (2 hrs)
- b) Nature of Clandestine Activities (2 hrs)
- c) Clandestine organization (2 hrs)
- d) Clandestine commo (6 hrs)
- e) Safe sites (1 hr)
- f) Personal contacts (2 hrs)
- g) Resistance to Interrogation (2 hrs)
- h) Selection of members (2 hrs)
- i) Investigative techniques (2 hrs)
- j) Use of drops and cutouts (2 hrs)

- k) Cover concept (2 hrs)
- l) Recruiting (2 hrs)
- m) Testing (2 hrs)
- n) Caching (4 hrs)
- o) Employment Political Warfare (2 hrs)
- p) Nature of Active Opposition (2 hrs)
- q) Organizational Planning (2 hrs)
- r) Employment Psychological Warfare (2 hrs)
- s) Defection (2 hrs)
- t) Principles Partisan Warfare (2 hrs)
- u) Weapons (including range) (68 hrs)
- v) Map Reading (28 hrs)
- w) Cover and Concealment (4 hrs)
- x) Individual Movement (8 hrs)
- y) Sanitation and First Aid (4 hrs)
- z) Observation and Reporting (4 hrs)
- aa) Drop Zone Selection and Marking (10 hrs)
- bb) Survival Practices (4 hrs)
- cc) Assassination (8 hrs)
- dd) Sabotage (mostly theoretical planning) (16 hrs)
- ee) Hand to Hand Combat (daily)
- ff) Sentry Elimination (4 hrs)
- gg) Probs Leadership and Command (4 hrs)
- hh) Partisan Tactics (4 hrs)
- ii) Terrain Use (4 hrs)
- jj) Partisans on the Move and Bivouac (8 hrs)
- kk) Night Control (10 hrs)
- ll) Unit Fire techniques (2 hrs)
- mm) Intra and Inter Unit Comms (2 hrs)
- nn) Intelligence Gathering and Evaluation (2 hrs)
- oo) Ambush (20 hrs)
- pp) Raid (30 hrs) -
- qq) Night Practice (96 hrs) -

TOTAL HOURS 387

Field work will be emphasized over class room work.
Total length class seven weeks.

e. On completion of "B" class, six jumpmasters will be trained. It is estimated if necessary [] has the necessary background to provide sufficient training. However, if possible, the present airborne specialist, [], will be placed at SARACANAC disposal for this training period. On graduation these men would stand by at an intermediate area in SARACANAC until transported to FJHOPFUL under complete darkness to reside in complete isolation under FBPRIMUS supervision in the boondocks near Field.

f. Three and one half tons of sterile training equipment are on hand at SARACANAC, having arrived by black flight.

2. KUCLUB

a. Prior to the recent disclosures in WSBURNT of KNFLUSH participation, the KUCLUB training and equipment was situated at a point [] KNFLUSH. At the time of writing, the gear is under the supervision KNFLUSH [] KUCLUB Activities in []

[]. No new site has been assigned and the situation is in a state of flux awaiting []'s reaction to recent developments. At present the biographical data on four prospective trainees has been submitted as against the committed number of twenty.

b. When the above situation is settled it is expected the class will graduate twelve RRO's, two FCP radios, and six TRD's. Length of training is expected to be approximately two and a half months, indicating a graduation date of approximately 1 May at present situation reading.

VI. Logistics

A. The total list of operational equipment being gathered at ROBALO is as follows:

1. Soviet rifles	2,960
2. Submachine guns, Madsen	1,480
3. Pistols	545
4. Frag. grenades	6,000
5. Conc. grenades	6,000
6. 7.62 ammunition	1,000,000 rds.
7. 9mm ammunition	540,000 rds.
8. Oil	530 pts.
9. Piano wire, high C	1,590 ft.
10. Rags	530
11. RPG's, w/carry case & 3 drums ea.	200
12. Napalm mix	100 lbs.
13. TNT	4,500 lbs.
14. Non-electric caps	3,720
15. Pocket knives	650
16. Pliers, small	650
17. Shaped charges	1,100
18. Friction tape	1,050 rls.
19. Time fuse	4,000 ft.
20. Matches, waterproofed	650 bxs.
21. Blasting machines	10
22. Electric caps	400
23. Firing wire	3,000 ft.
24. RS-1 (agent rec/transmitter)	25
25. Ration kits, emergency	1,650

(continued next page)

26. Medical kits	1,650
27. GI watches	25
28. GI compasses	25
29. Compasses (indigenous)	225
30. Binoculars	30 pr.
31. Canteens	2,000
32. Solothorn, 20mm, anti-tank	10
33. Mortar tubes	50
34. 20mm armor-piercing, anti-tank	3,000 rds.
35. 20mm, high explosive, anti-tank	3,000 rds.
36. Mortar ammunition	1,000 rds.
37. 22 cal. rifles w/silencers	21
38. 22 cal. ammo, hollow point long rifle	1,000
39. Cargo chutes and harnesses and bundling equipment	50
40. Burial packing equipment (gunny sack, tar, ropes, etc.)	250 lbs.
41. Instruction sheets	
a. Utility Napalm and Shaped charges	550
b. Crimping and fusing instructions	1000
c. Utility medical and ration kits	1650

B. Headquarters logistical support is now gathering the materiel for approx 26 February Black Flight. The total tonnage expected is 30. Logistical Support PBSUCCESS is responsible for coordination of loading and security matters concerning gathering of materiel. Security is furnishing a man for guidance. AMD has been briefed on the tonnage and cubage and deadlines and destination and nature of security involved. AMD-Logistical Support coordination now being worked out between the two groups involved.

C. On 15 February, [] and an experienced caching man on TDY from Training Section will arrive at ROBALO for survey of storage and packing facilities, and detailed briefing of []. IROBALO to augment pouches pouches general briefing. On 20 February an experienced Airborne packer will arrive ROBALO for surveying facilities on TDY 90 days. Between 20 February and 25 February approximately 10 cleared labor personnel will arrive ROBALO for 90 days TDY. [] is to set up packing procedure, orally and with written instructions brief the packing team and working party, and generally assure the working efficiency of the packing group prior to his departure. On departure ROBALO, [] will designate a chief of the packing party to be responsible to [].

[], ROBALO throughout packing operations. Messing and lodging facilities will be made available by [] ROBALO with understanding if necessary the packing team will subsist in tents and on field rations drawn from the Army.

D. The packing will be executed in three categories. In each category an inspection table will be set up at ROBALO for inspection of each item and preparation for combat-readiness (light coat of oil on all weapons) prior to packaging. In the first category all bundles have been reduced to 65 lbs. or less so that where necessary single persons could transport the bundles. The category is comprised of those items for pre-d-day transport to inner WSBURNT forces. The packing will be made waterproof through sterile gunny sack and tar covering with oiled paper inner covering. The packs will include carrying straps for transportability. All kits should conform, when possible, to the 11" x 11" x 30" dimensions desirable. The packs, and weights, and numbers to be packed are as follows:

1. A Kit (Partisan) (Each kit in 2 units, Wt. 40# ea.)	TOTAL Req'd	<u>480</u>
a. 2 rifles		
b. 2 SMG; 2 MAGS/SMG		
c. Frag grenades 8		
d. Concussion grenades 8		
e. 600 7.62 ammo		
f. 150 rds 9-mm		
g. oil		
h. rags		
i. wire		
2. A-1 Kit (Partisan) Wt. 55#	TOTAL	<u>36</u>
a. 10 pistols		
b. 20 clips		
3. B Kit (Partisan) Wt. 65#	TOTAL	<u>50</u>
a. 2 LMG w/6 drums & 2 carrying cases		
b. 1000 rds 7.62 ammo		
c. oil		
d. rags		
e. wire		
4. C Kit (Demolition) Wt. 50#	TOTAL	<u>200</u>
a. Each C Kit contains 5 small units, each small unit is packed for individual handling. Each small unit of 190 of the C Kits contains		
1. 1# block of napalm		
2. 3# TNT		
3. 3 non-electric caps		
4. 1 pocket knife		
5. 1 utility pliers		
6. 1 roll friction tape		
7. 1 box waterproofed matches		
8. 3" fuse		

Four small units of the remaining 10 C Kits are the same as above while the 5th small unit is converted to electric demolition by substituting 1 blasting machine, 300 feet firing wire, and 5 electric caps for the standard caps and fuse of other units. These special units should be marked with the letter E for identification. Each small unit contains a letter of instructions in Spanish on napalm. One small unit of each C Kit contains 2 shaped charges and a letter of instructions. This small unit is marked S.

5. D Kit (Resident Radio Operators) Wt. 65# TOTAL 10

- a. 1 RS-1 receiver-transmitter w/spare parts
- b. 1 9mm pistol w/1 clip
- c. 50 rds 9mm ammo
- d. 2 emergency food and medical kits
- e. 1 GI watch
- f. 1 GI compass

E. The number of kits designated for delivery to each staging area, the marking to designate the target destination, and the expected airport of delivery for transfer ROBALD-to-staging area is as follows:

1. For staging area #1, probable field for dispersion
DTPROGS:

a. A Kits marked G-A	TOTAL	<u>150</u>
b. A-1 Kits marked G-A-1	"	<u>11</u>
c. B Kits marked G-B	"	<u>12</u>
d. C Kits marked G-C	"	<u>65</u>
e. D Kits marked G-D	"	<u>3</u>

2. For staging area #2, probable field for dispersion
WSHOOFs:

a. A Kits marked B-A	TOTAL	<u>120</u>
b. A-1 Kits marked B-A-1	"	<u>10</u>
c. B-Kits marked B-B	"	<u>12</u>
d. C-Kits marked B-C	"	<u>25</u>
e. D-Kits marked B-D	"	<u>1</u>

3. For staging area #3, probable field for dispersion

a. A Kits marked Q-A	TOTAL	<u>80</u>
b. A-1 Kits marked Q-A-1	"	<u>5</u>
c. B-Kits marked Q-B	"	<u>10</u>
d. C-Kits marked Q-C	"	<u>50</u>
e. D-Kits marked Q-D	"	<u>3</u>

4. For staging area #4, probable field for dispersion
DTFROGS:

a. A Kits marked J-A	TOTAL	20
b. A-1 Kits marked	"	0
c. B Kits marked J-B	"	3
d. C Kits marked J-C	"	15
e. D Kits marked J-D	"	1

5. For staging area #5, probable field for dispersion
WSHOOPS:

a. A Kits marked C-A	TOTAL	100
b. A-1 Kits marked C-A-1	"	10
c. B Kits marked C-B	"	20
d. C Kits marked C-C	"	20
e. D Kits marked C-D	"	1

6. For staging area #6* probable field for dispersion
DTFROGS:

a. A Kits marked Z-A	TOTAL	10
b. A-1 Kits	"	0
c. B Kits marked Z-B	"	1
d. C Kits marked Z-C	"	15
e. D Kits marked Z-D	"	1

* Attachment A this report identifies the targets to be operated against from each above numbered staging site. Attachment A should be filed separately.

F. The movement of the material within this category from DTROBALO to the field nearest the target staging areas is tentatively to be by black flights from DTROBALO field. Coordination between dispatching point at ROBALO and reception point in WSHOOPS and DTFROGS will be executed between [] (or appointed assistant) and []. [] will be physically present in the vicinity of reception field and in liaison with CALLIGERIS during this phase. Communications between [] and [] should be instantaneous and will be coordinated through cable facilities offered by [] and [] and [] and []. CALLIGERIS has four large trucks and is prepared to have them on standby to shuttle from staging field to staging area.

G. AMD has been alerted as to the general nature of the entire PBSUCCESS logistical program as proposed. AMD was informed as to the unapproved, tentative nature of this first preparatory conference.

1. Coordination is now underway between AMD and PBSUCCESS Support Office, Headquarters on 25 February black flight from Andrews Field to [] Field. Approval has been granted. Supplies are to be in position ready for pickup by 0900 24 February. AMD liaison to Andrews will point out the spot for temporary storage and will provide guards and tarpaulins.

AMD will furnish planes and pilots and arrange proper liaison West Palm Beach and Panama airfields. The planes will be [] and the flight will be covered by normal [] base to [] base procedures.

a. Security is providing emergency cover story and backstop necessary.

b. Logistical Support, PBSUCCESS, Headquarters, is stockpiling the necessary equipment and has assured this project of capability of making the deadline.

2. AMD made a preliminary staff study of the proposed movement by Black Flight of Category 1 equipment ROBALO to reception fields DTFRIGGS and WSHOOFS. The following views were stated in a resultant conference with C/[], PBSUCCESS:

a. Pending receipt of approval by [] via C/[] Joperations, AMD would keep in mind proposed PBSUCCESS movement but would devote no further effort which detracts from operations in other fields.

b. AMD was given the cubage and weight to be transported this movement.

c. AMD was notified as to peculiar sensitiveness of this project and connecting operations. It was agreed that an officer from Security Division should be assigned to provide emergency cover and backstop for pilots and plane.

d. Two C-47's or C-46's would be utilized. The procurement of these planes would be difficult but not insurmountable if authorized in time.

e. The date set tentatively for this operation was 1 through 15 March. A cable to DIR requesting pass to AMD sets an alternate date of 15 March - 1 April. See para. CALLIGERIS Assignments for purposes delay.

f. AMD suggested that an air-operations officer should be assigned TDI to control probable plane-maintenance problems, conduct pilot-briefings, plan details of each flight, etc. AMD's function as a staff and not operations group necessitates their maintaining an advisory capacity and providing high level contacts which set up all machinery for black flight. The experienced air operations officer who will implement the planning has been assigned TDI to the project. His initial duty will be that of furnishing liaison with AMD, following complete briefing by [] - PBSUCCESS. His subsequent duties will be physical presence LINCOLN-ROBALO-HEADQUARTERS as PBSUCCESS Air Operations Officer for planning and coordination purposes.

g. []pilots are being considered as the most feasible, both from the value of their experience and the security standpoint.

3. To sum it up, AMD has the general requirements, complete stockpiling is underway in that the 25 February flight is designed to bring the ROBALO stockpile to completeness and the flight is approved, packing teams are recruited, are being briefed, and are due to depart within the next two weeks.

a. [] DTFROBALS has been briefed generally by dispatch and has been requested to furnish care for packing teams. He has been notified that the teams are prepared to live under field conditions if the 1 April closing-down of regular ROBALO functions pose a problem which could be solved through drawing army tentage and field rations. A request for utilization of his trucking facilities was also included to verify his verbal offer of same in January.

b. The approval for this Category II set of black flights is necessary in order to plan further than above. In order for AMD to locate planes and pilots and clear same, and in order for Air Operations Officer to implement same, and in order for security to build proper cover, approval to proceed is required soonest.

H. On arrival at the DTFROGGS field nearest the staging areas in that country, CALLIGERIS' trucks, using cleared drivers, will truck the equipment to its marked destination. From each staging area separate operations will be run to the recipient underground of the target area.

1. Area #1: By concealment in CALLIGERIS' personnel owned vehicles, which up to the point of the recent white paper were not searched on crossing the border. CALLIGERIS will run test cases with present vehicles to find the amount of search or surveillance such vehicles are subject to. CALLIGERIS is also instructed to cause vehicles now in the target country to come into the vicinity of the staging area and return to target country to determine the amount of search or surveillance the vehicle becomes subject to. In cases where it can be arranged so that the vehicle of the target country is similar to specially rigged CALLIGERIS vehicles at the staging area, a license-plate swap should suffice so that the Category I kits can be concealed. The kits are all designed to fit an 11" x 11" x 30" space similar to the space being provided by shifting the rear seats of CALLIGERIS' cars.

2. Area #2 will have a primary method of entry to the target country of Category I equipment of hand carrying to the recipient underground by transport courier personnel working out of the staging area, traveling black (see details on Staging Area #2 para). Transport from the

staging area at Jack to a position of launching at Kent will be necessary along the Jack-Kent highway under cover of darkness due to the offset position of this particular staging area. Either available trucks or acquisitioned vehicles will be utilized for this duty. If the acquisition of vehicles proves a security problem, mules will be utilized and the courier-transport personnel will become a five man team, the load being broken down after approach as far as vicinity of Larry via mules. Travel will be only at night due to the heavily Communist infested nature of the staging country between the staging area and the crossing point. Larry will be used as an inner staging base for supplying inner forces at Bond by stockpiling at Larry for distribution by Larry personnel as well as use by Larry personnel.

3. Area #3 is for service of Ceasar, Doc, and Eddie. Due to the distances involved, the three indicated designations are to be serviced in Category I under present planning by the use of CALLIGERIS' present automotive facilities after test runs are made and recipient are established. In addition, operations from within the target country will be mounted to cause CALLIGERIS-controlled transportation to logically leave target country and reenter with materiel.

4. Area #4 will employ the transport-courier method for Category I and will service inner organizations Mike and Frank (see details on Staging Area #4).

5. Area #5 will employ a similar method to Area #3 for Category I.

6. Area #6 equipment will be moved to road's end at approximately Jack and further transported to the area via mule-train which CALLIGERIS has been authorized to purchase. The movement of Category I equipment to the recipient underground organizations at Nick and Hank will be by black-courier-transport personnel in operations mounted from staging area #6 in the vicinity of Jack.

1. Category 2 equipment includes that equipment to be carried by shock troops and specialists who enter the target country just prior to D-day for semi-overt and overt actions tied in with D-day. The movement of Category 2 equipment from ROBALO to the selected fields nearest the respective staging sites is due to commence approximately 26 March immediately on the heels of the movement of Category I. The breakdown of the Category 2 equipment will be made at ROBALO and the marking of all Category 2 equipment will be as follows: Area #2 marked XB
Area #4 marked XJ
Area #6 marked XZ.

Total equipment Category 2 due shipment to the respective areas is as follows:

Item	Total Area 2	Total Area 4	Total Area 6
1. Soviet rifles	300	325	625
2. Submachine guns, Madsen	150	155	320
3. Pistols	15	15	20
4. Frag. grenades	460	470	940
5. Conc. grenades	250	250	500
6. 7.62 ammunition	105,000	110,000	210,000
7. 9mm ammunition	60,000	70,000	145,000
8. LMG's, w/carry case & 3 drums each	15	15	20
9. Napalm mix	5	5	10
10. TNT	100	150	250
11. Non-electric caps	50	50	100
12. Shaped charges	150	200	350
13. Time fuse	125	125	250
14. Matches, waterproofed	150	175	325
15. Blasting machines	2	3	5
16. Electric caps	10	15	25
17. Firing wire	650	850	1,500
18. RS-1 (agent rec/transmitter)	3	3	4
19. Ration kits, emergency	400	410	810
20. Medical kits	400	410	810
21. GI watches	3	3	6
22. GI compasses	3	3	6
23. Compasses (indigenous)	50	50	125
24. Binoculars	5	10	15
25. Canteens	500	500	1,000
26. Solothurn, 20mm, anti-tank	2	4	4
27. Mortar tubes	12	13	25
28. 20mm armor-piercing, anti-tank	600	1,200	1,200
29. 20mm, high explosive, anti-tank	600	1,200	1,200
30. Mortar ammunition	240	260	500
31. 22 cal. rifles w/silencers	0	10	10
32. 22 cal. ammo, hollow point long rifles	0	500	500
33. Instruction sheets			
a. Utility Napalm and Shaped Charges	10	10	10
b. Crimping and fusing instructions	10	10	10
c. Utility medical and ration kits	10	10	10

a. The shipment is expected to furnish the gear necessary to provide self-sufficient shock troops and specialists, independent on logistical support throughout ten days continuous overt action, yet enable the men and units to maintain mobility and firepower at the same time. (See para ___, T/equipment and organization.)

b. The gear will remain in constant state of readiness and repair at the staging areas, preferably under the responsibility of an assigned graduate of Class A training not otherwise employed until issued to the men for use.

J. Category 3 equipment is being prepared for resupply by overflight during plan Able and Baker operations where necessary, plan Charlie operations in the event emergency situations call for implementation of plan Charlie.

1. Preparations include bundling into the bundles described below and tying to EX-9 cargo chutes. (The described chute is government-sterile chute being produced on contract by a U.S. firm, and is suitable for carrying a 300# + load)

2. The below described bundles are being bundles in straw-cushioned burlap bundles:

a. Bundle A Total 50, each approximately 250#

- (1) 10 rifles
- (2) 5 SMG w/2 mags/weapon
- (3) 1 LMG w/3 pens/weapon
- (4) 3000 rds 7.62 ammo
- (5) 1000 rds 9mm ammo
- (6) 20 frag. grenades
- (7) 20# TNT
- (8) 10' fuse
- (9) 1 pair pliers
- (10) 1 roll tape
- (11) 1 knife
- (12) 5 non-electric caps

b. Bundle B Total 5, each approximately 75#

- (1) 1 R3-1 radio-receiver-transmitter w/spare parts
- (2) 1 pistol w/1 clip
- (3) 50 rds 9mm ammo
- (4) 2 ration and medical kits
- (5) 1 GI watch
- (6) 1 GI compass

c. Bundle C Total 25, each approximately 200#

- (1) 10 rifles
- (2) 5 SMG w/2 mags/wpn
- (3) 10 frag. grenades
- (4) 3000 rds 7.62 ammo
- (5) 1000 rds 9mm ammo

3. Distribution of the Category 3 equipment will be governed by the requirements on and shortly following D-day.

a. From H-hour on until canceled all tactical radios and the base station will go on open circuit.

b. The shock troop staff and leaders and organizers now in training are receiving resupply requests, requirements, DZ location etc. in the curriculæ.

c. Resupply requests will go from team to base station to AMANDO to FJHOPFUL - LINCOLN simultaneously. Preparations to fly will be implemented at ROHALO, authorization to fly being issued from LINCOLN.

d. The feasibility of stationing a project Air Ops - [] - Logistics Team at FJHOPFUL during this period is being considered. If considered feasible this team would be allowed to authorize the overflight, thereby cutting down on time and number of times each request handled, consequently eliminating chances of garbling.

e. Daylight resupply is being considered pending Headquarters' approval. AMD assurance of daylight flight preference has been issued following an Air-OB terrain and situation study by AMD.

4. It is expected that D-day supply to GOES will be the first Category 3 flight inasmuch as total expected defections there are higher than the expected ability to supply through Category 1 movements.

ATTACHMENT A TO BA-1C [] DOCUMENT #1:

1. Site Number 1 Adam, Ike
2. Site Number 2 Bond
3. Site Number 3 Caesar, Doc, Eddie
4. Site Number 4 Frank
5. Site Number 5 Goss
6. Site Number 6 Hank

ATTACHMENT B TO BASIC [] DOCUMENT #1:

Field Cryptos:

1. Adam
2. Bond
3. Ceasar
4. Doc
5. Eddie
6. Frank
7. Goss
8. Hank
9. Ike
10. Jack
11. Kent
12. Larry
13. Mike
14. Nick

ATTACHMENT C TO BASIC [] DOCUMENT #1:

True Identities:

1. Guatemala City
2. Puerto Barrios
3. Quetzaltenango
4. Mazatenango
5. Quiche
6. Zutapa
7. Coben
8. Zacapa
9. San Jose
10. Florida, Honduras
11. Cariel Viejas, Honduras
12. Entre Rios, Guatemala
13. Ascencion Mita
14. Qualam

8 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Conferences with []

1. On 6 and 7 September meetings were held in []

[] New York City, with []

and []

2. Subject left Guatemala, to []

[] He joined [] and directed operations from
there until his departure a few days ago. Shortly prior to his departure
visits were made to []

[] He was assured by []

[] shipping, ports and land bases are unconditionally
available. One bomber was also offered, free. [] will continue to
allow [] to remain. [] urged subject to get on with
his movement. [] offered clandestine support and facilities for
movement of guerrilla forces []

3. A meeting was held with anti-Communist Guatemalan leader

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